

PERIODICAL ROOM  
GENERAL LIBRARY  
UNIV. OF MICH.

JUN 13 1947

*Dels*

VOL. LXVIII, 2

WHOLE No. 270

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by

HENRY T. ROWELL

KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT

JAMES H. OLIVER

EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editor  
DAVID M. ROBINSON

APRIL, 1947

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND  
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

## CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Some War-Time Publications Concerning Plato, I. By HAROLD CHEERISSL,	113
The Descendants of Asinius Pollio. By JAMES H. OLIVER,	147
The First Elegy of Solon. By RICHMOND LATTIMORE,	161
Progress and Primitivism in Lucretius. By MARGARET TAYLOR,	180
The Attic Archons Diokles-Timarchos. By BENJAMIN D. MERITT,	195
On Varro, <i>De Lingua Latina</i> , V, 15. By H. M. HOENIGSWALD,	198
 REVIEWS:	200
Jaeger's <i>Paideia</i> , The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. I: Archaic Greece; The Mind of Athens; Vol. II: In Search of the Divine Centre; Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato (G. M. A. GRUBE).—Edelstein's <i>Aclepius</i> , Vol. I: Testimonies; Vol. II: Interpretations (MARTIN P. NILSSON).—Bassett's The Poetry of Homer (ALBERT BATES LORD).	223
 BOOKS RECEIVED,	223

The American Journal of Philology is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 25 cents extra); single numbers, \$1.50 each.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

---

The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals.

---

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1108, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 3, 1918.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXVIII, 2

WHOLE No. 270

---

## SOME WAR-TIME PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING PLATO.

### I.

The editor of the *American Journal of Philology* has invited me to put into a single article an account of some books dealing with Plato which, though published at different times during the last seven years, have because of the turmoil and the exigencies of this period either reached the Journal only recently or failed to receive earlier notice in its pages.<sup>1</sup> I wish to express my gratitude for the opportunity thus given me to present a critique of a number of modern works in this field. At the same time it is only fair to warn the reader that it is not my intention and is not within my competence to give a full report or even a bibliography of all the Platonic scholarship done during the war.

---

Joseph Moreau's two complementary theses appeared on the eve of the war.<sup>2</sup> In the larger of these, *La Construction de*

<sup>1</sup> Several important books on Plato published during this period have already been reviewed in this Journal: J. B. Skemp's *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (cf. *A.J.P.*, LXV [1944], pp. 298 ff.), F. Solmsen's *Plato's Theology* (cf. *A.J.P.*, LXVI [1945], pp. 92 ff.), and R. Hackforth's *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (cf. *A.J.P.*, LXVII [1946], pp. 378 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Moreau, *La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien* (Paris, Bovin et Cie., 1939), pp. 515; *idem*, *L'Ame du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1939), pp. 200. The former will hereafter be referred to as *La Construction*, the latter as *L'Ame du Monde*.

*l'Idéalisme Platonicien*, the author is concerned with the early dialogues and with the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*,<sup>3</sup> his purpose being "to seek in the teleology of the Socratic dialogues the origin and meaning of Platonic idealism" (p. 25). That this origin was reflection on the moral problems raised by Socrates and not on the conditions of mathematical knowledge is shown, he believes, by the very order of the dialogues, for the use of the dialogue-form guarantees that the exposition, even if not contemporaneous with the discovery, represents the evolution of Platonic thought as Plato himself saw it or wished others to see it,<sup>4</sup> so that we have here the unique case of a doctrine the exposition of which is equivalent to an intellectual autobiography (pp. 21-9).<sup>5</sup> Accordingly Moreau devotes his first three chapters, entitled "the problem of education," "technique and practice," and "practical reflection," primarily to an analysis of the *Protagoras*, *Charmides*, *Hippias Minor*, and *Gorgias*, drawing in the *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Laches*, and *Republic* I as supplementary to the main current of his interpretation.<sup>6</sup> It is in the

<sup>3</sup> The *Phaedo* he inclines to put later than the *Republic*, certainly later than *Republic* II-IV and X and in the same period as V-VII (p. 26). His reason, as it later appears (pp. 259, 395-6, 415-16), is his interpretation of the final argument in the *Phaedo*, in which he thinks it possible to find his own conception of idealism, as the most profound expression of Plato's psychology.

<sup>4</sup> These two possibilities are quite different, though Moreau takes no account of that. It is quite possible that what Plato considered the best way of leading others to his conclusions was not the way in which he first came to them himself. The so-called "intellectual autobiography" of Socrates in the *Phaedo* would be a case in point if, as Moreau apparently believes (pp. 18-20; p. 22, n. 1), it is not meant to be historical.

<sup>5</sup> This does not mean that Moreau subscribes to an "Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie" in the usual modern sense of the phrase. He maintains that it was from the beginning "oriented towards a doctrine of finality" (p. 21); he denies that the criticism of the ideas in the *Parmenides* represents the beginning of a new orientation of Plato's thought (p. 471); and he adopts (p. 472) the interpretation of "the friends of the ideas" in *Sophist* 248 A that Ritter proposed in his *Neue Untersuchungen*. Similarly he denies any "evolution in the moral thought of Plato" from the *Protagoras* to the *Republic* (pp. 89-90).

<sup>6</sup> Some of the specific conclusions of these chapters are the following. Pp. 90-92: The *Protagoras* is a pedagogical artifice by which Plato opposes to the popular conscience two notions which he does not himself

fourth chapter, however, "Finality and Hierarchy," that the meaning of Platonic idealism as Moreau conceives it first clearly emerges. Having brought the *Meno* and the *Lysis* into conjunction with the *Euthydemus* (278 E-282 E and 288 D-293 A) to show that all three seek to establish a notion of absolute good which is intelligence, all other "goods" being only ambiguous means, and having concluded that similarly to the reasoning of Kant the Socratic dialogues show that "the Good, the object of moral volition, can be defined only by the pure form of rational activity" (p. 188), he contends that in *Republic* I the value of justice or morality is established in accord with the *Euthydemus* by analogy with techniques, of which it contains the form but the form in a pure state (p. 194). Arguing then that no technique is a pure form, since each is attached to a material by which it is specifically defined, he arrives at the notion of a "hierarchy of techniques" (p. 194) and from this derives a "hierarchy of forms, each of which can be defined only by that which is immediately superior to it" (pp. 197-8). This conclusion Moreau reaches by using "form" in an ambiguous sense<sup>7</sup> and by employing the Aristotelian notion of matter as the potentiality of opposites (pp. 198-200).

accept and wherein Socrates indicates where the liberation of the intelligence ends if, rejecting external norms, it is incapable of discovering any within itself. P. 108: The purpose of the *Hippias Minor* is to overthrow the ambition of a teaching that lays claim to universality but lacks knowledge of the ends to which man's activity should be directed; at the same time it shows that, if virtue is science, it is nevertheless radically different from the technical sciences or arts. Pp. 129-33: The *Charmides* opposes an inadequate interpretation of Socrates who, the dialogue suggests, meant that true wisdom consists in the knowledge of good and evil, which implies the knowledge of our rational nature. Pp. 149-50: The *Gorgias* has as its foundation an analysis of the will which establishes two fundamental propositions: 1) every act of will implies search for a supreme end to which an absolute value is given, and 2) every voluntary activity is characterized by an adaptation of means, the subordination of the parts to the whole of the work realized.

<sup>7</sup> It is true that a tool, e.g. a lyre or a halter, can be judged good or bad only by the one who uses it, not by the artisan who makes it; but this does not mean that the idea of the tool and the idea of the art constitute an ontological hierarchy and certainly not that one idea is less determinate, that is more materiate (p. 198!), than another. And where does Plato speak of "the pure form of rational activity"? Or what could this mean to him for whom reason is just the state in the soul produced by its vision of the ideas (*Republic* 508 B-D)?

This notion of a hierarchy of ideas, derived from the idea of good or rather the systematic representation of it, is an essential characteristic of the "idealism" which Moreau constructs and in the subsequent chapters, "The System of Morality," "Love," "The Ideas," "Soul," and "The Good," seeks to vindicate to Plato. Like all modern idealism it traces being back to knowledge; but, as it is not merely nominalistic, it claims to go beyond essence to existence, that is to absolute and categorical truth, which (since idealism recognizes no existence in itself) can be only a requirement of the practical reason, and this is why it makes the idea of good the principle which communicates truth and reality to essences of all kinds (p. 388). So the ideas cannot be independent realities, for that would make Plato's doctrine "naïf realism" and not "idealism" at all; they are productions of the mind, and that they draw their reality from the Good means that they have their source in pure spiritual activity determining the hierarchy of its ends (p. 464). For idealism the absolute end is not distinguished from the activity of the subject; on the level of reflection the duality of subject and object is thus abolished, but it is not the consciousness that is engulfed in the representation of an object raised to an absolute, on the contrary it is the object that vanishes in the pure transparency of a value, in the interiority of the absolute activity of mind (p. 457). Outside of this pure spirituality there is really no object. The essences draw all their reality from a hierarchical principle which expresses the transcendence of the Good, and the kinship of knower and known only translates at the level of understanding in the duality of subject and object the transcendental intimacy of pure act and value (p. 461). It suffices therefore for the soul to recover its absolute activity in order to find itself immediately in contact with the absolute essences, and this is evidently because the nature common to the soul and the idea has its principle in pure activity adequate to its own ideal and generative of every real object (p. 462). Properly speaking there is in Platonism no other absolute than that of act and value; the idea of Good, which is the expression of this, is endowed with a motive activity symbolized by the myth of love; the other ideas represent the models elaborated by the mind itself to serve as norms for its own activity, and they express

just as they determine the very life of the spirit in its autonomous progress (p. 474).

Moreau dismisses, of course, as metaphorical formulae (e. g. p. 462) the "realistic language" that Plato uses of the ideas.<sup>8</sup> Going beyond this, however, he argues (pp. 302-3) that *Republic* 476 E-478 C is proof that  $\tau\ddot{o}\ \delta\nu$  is just  $\epsilon\nu$ , not an independent reality but the object of knowledge, since Plato could not have declared *a priori*  $\tau\ddot{o}\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\delta\ \delta\nu\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\delta\ \gamma\nu\omega\sigma\tau\omega\nu$  (477 A 3) unless he meant simply that the perfection of knowledge is characterized by the perfect determination of its object<sup>9</sup> and because 478 B 12-C 1 ( $\grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\nu\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \delta\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\ \delta\grave{\nu}\chi\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\iota\ \grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}\ \mu\grave{\eta}\delta\grave{\nu}$ ) indicates that  $\mu\grave{\eta}\ \delta\nu$  is nothing because it is not a determinate object ( $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\iota$ ),  $\mu\grave{\eta}\delta\grave{\nu}$  being expressly the absence of unity and determination before thought.<sup>10</sup> He contends (pp. 336-7) that in *Republic* 507 C-509 D the representation of subject and object of knowledge as distinct from each other does not imply any realism, because the subject as well as the object is there posited independently of knowledge and they become knowing subject and known object only in the light of knowledge without which intermediary the two terms have only the virtuality of their functions. The question, however, is not whether there is an *actual* object of knowledge apart from a knowing subject but whether the ideas exist apart from being known; and even in the figurative language of this passage it is in the light of the good that they have their being and knowability and not through the fact of being known by a subject any more than the visible objects are "unrealized" apart from their relation with a seeing subject.

<sup>8</sup> On this question see Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* I (hereafter referred to as *Aristotle on Plato*), pp. 207-11.

<sup>9</sup> I confess that I cannot see how the Greek could possibly mean this, but in any case it is not an *a priori* declaration. As  $\delta\grave{\nu}\nu$  shows (477 A 1) it is the conclusion drawn from 476 E 7-11. Moreau should have observed that *Parmenides* 132 B-C starts in the same fashion in order to draw the conclusion that thought implies as object an idea existing outside of the mind.

<sup>10</sup> The  $\mu\grave{\eta}\ \delta\nu$  here is *absolute* non-being, the  $\mu\grave{\eta}\ \delta\nu\ \mu\grave{\eta}\delta\mu\grave{\eta}$  of 477 A 3-4 *supra*; and the sentence means simply that absolute non-being would properly be called not any one thing but nothing at all, i. e., as the parallel passages, *Theaetetus* 188 E-189 B and *Sophist* 237 D-E (cf. 238 C) show, that it cannot properly even be spoken of.

As was to be expected, the doctrine of reminiscence is explained as a myth of the same kind as the creation-myth in the *Timaeus* which translates a transcendental relation by means of chronological order (pp. 367, 372); and "participation in an idea" is taken to mean "receiving from the mind a determination *a priori* and consequently mathematical" (p. 384). This last phrase, Moreau thinks, is implied in the example used in *Phaedo* 101 C (*ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἀλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἡ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν*), an interpretation which is very strange in view of the immediately preceding *μετασχόν τῆς ἴδιας οὐραίας ἐκάστουν οὐδὲν ἀν μετάσχη*. It is no stranger, however, than the conclusion previously drawn (p. 309) from *Phaedo* 102 B ff., that only the comparatives "greater" and "smaller" which express a relation denote an essence; in this very passage it is said that a person is larger or smaller than another because he participates in the ideas "largeness" and "smallness," which ought to imply that "larger" and "smaller" are *not* ideas (*Phaedo* 102 C 1-9 and 100 E 5-6; cf. Campbell on *Politicus* 283 D and Plotinus, *Enn.*, VI, 1, 8). Nevertheless, Moreau declares that all Platonic ideas are pure relations (pp. 312, 471-2) and then that every idea is in essence number, since numbers constitute proportions or systems defining the absolute essence of a form (pp. 322-5, 347-51).

The soul should then be "a system of mathematical essences conditioning the harmonies of celestial phenomena and of human conduct." Assuming (p. 366) that this has been made out for the world-soul by Robin's mathematical construction,<sup>11</sup> Moreau explains away Socrates' refutation of the harmony-theory in the *Phaedo* by saying that it means that soul cannot be the resultant of organic life, because soul is the knowing subject without the activity of which there would be no object of knowledge and consequently no body (p. 372). Socrates opposes then, according to Moreau, only the materialistic doctrine that soul is a harmony of physical elements and not the notion that it is a harmony in another (i. e. idealistic) sense (p. 373). The final argument of the *Phaedo* is interpreted to mean that the idea of

<sup>11</sup> The reference in *De Anima* 429 A 27-29 to soul as *τέπος εἰδῶν*, on which Moreau seizes, does not refer to Plato's doctrine at all (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 565); Robin's interpretation of the psychogonia is otherwise erroneous also (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, notes 339 and 366).

life is the system of organization, the activity of which is represented by soul (p. 402) and that "it is the harmony of the Whole that requires the perpetuity of individual souls" or in other words it is the Idea of Good "which guarantees their imperishable existence" (p. 406).

By this time Moreau is using "the One" as a synonym for "the Good" (p. 407).<sup>12</sup> He goes on to identify the truth which is the object of *φρόνησις* in the *Phaedo* with the idea of Beauty in the *Symposium* and this with the idea of Good in the *Republic* (p. 543); and the idea of Good is in the end the idea of the Whole, the autonomous system of relations, the hierarchy of forms, the representation in which the mind determines itself for itself and objectifies its own pure activity (p. 473). This is the *παντελῶς ὄν* of *Sophist* 248 E and *Republic* 477 A and the *παντελὲς ζῶον* of *Timaeus* 31 B, which are, of course, supposed to be the same "idea of the Whole" though in different aspects. Now, each of these many identifications has been suggested many times in the past, and each has been so often refuted that it would be useless to repeat here these refutations point by point.<sup>13</sup> The modern idealist who desires to read his system into the text of Plato would in any case remain unconvinced; and the unsophisticated philologist who protests that Plato's Greek does not support Moreau's "construction" and often flatly contradicts it will cite texts to no avail against the argument that "only by this resolutely idealistic interpretation do the arguments of the dialogue escape the reproach of puerility" (p. 416).

Philologist or philosopher, however, may wonder how Moreau avoids *Parmenides* 132 B-C which appears to reject "conceptualism" of all kinds. He does not answer the question in his

<sup>12</sup> He refers here to §§ 273-4. If one turns back to these sections, one finds not the expressed identification but two propositions of which it is apparently the unexpressed conclusion. These are: 1) Every idea is a number, being a pure relation, and 2) They possess reality because they answer to an absolutely undeniable obligation, the total unification of activity, because they have for their principle the Good. Presumably then the Good is the One because it is the principle of the ideas, which are numbers!

<sup>13</sup> On the *παντελῶς ὄν* of the *Sophist* cf. Aristotle *on Plato*, pp. 437-9 and 606-7; on the *παντελὲς ζῶον* of the *Timaeus* see the reference in note 16 *infra*; on the identification of the ideas of Goodness, Unity, and Being cf. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 56-8.

larger book; but in *L'Ame du Monde* (p. 36, n. 5; cf. p. 48) he asserts that *νόημα* in this passage of the *Parmenides* means "a contingent and particular mode of thought" and that the dilemma there presented is to be avoided by recognizing that each idea has reality only in its connection with the total system of the ideas, that is as object of absolute thought. In short, every idea has existence only in the total system which cannot be separated from the thought of god. Moreau offers no argument, however, for limiting as he does the sense of the passage, which in the first place puts its argument quite generally (*νόημα . . . ἐν ψυχαῖς*) and does not restrict it to human minds, in the second place expressly concludes that any "thought" implies an object distinct from the act of thinking, and finally presents as the crowning absurdity of conceptualism the fact that it implies "idealism" of one sort or another. Furthermore, whatever Plato's motive may have been for presenting this refutation of conceptualism,<sup>14</sup> there is no text of his which indicates that he for his part meant the ideas to be products of mind in any sense more subtle or profound than that which the young Socrates here proposes and abandons. Finally, Socrates here speaks of the ideas existing *ἐν τῇ φύσει* as an alternative to his proposal that they exist *οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς* (cf. 132 D 1-2 and 132 B 4-5); and this should imply at least that Plato when he refers to them elsewhere as existing *ἐν τῇ φύσει* (cf. *Phaedo* 103 B, *Republic* 598 A) does not mean that they are "determinations of practical reflection that human art fragmentarily realizes" (*La Construction*, p. 478).

To Moreau, however, *Republic* 597 B-D appears to be in perfect accord with his interpretation. There God is called the *φυτοργός* of the ideal bed, the bed existing *ἐν τῇ φύσει*; and Moreau, taking this isolated passage as serious Platonic doctrine,<sup>15</sup> interprets it

<sup>14</sup> From Alexander, *Metaph.*, pp. 92, 18-28 and 103, 1-4 as well as Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 A 27-29 (see note 11 *supra*) it appears that persons other than Plato did identify the ideas with *νοήματα*; and the passage in the *Parmenides* may well be directed against them.

Moreau does not mention the *Seventh Epistle* attributed to Plato; but he would probably reject it as spurious, since there at 342 C 4-7 it is said that *ἐπιστῆμη*, *νοῦς*, and *ἄληθης δόξα* being *ἐν ψυχαῖς* are obviously different from the ideas.

<sup>15</sup> That Aristotle did not make use of the passage in his polemics against the doctrine of ideas is itself evidence that it was not considered

to mean that God "determines the model ideally by his transcendent reflection," this ideal genesis, as distinguished from the demiurgic action, being represented in the *Timaeus* by the calculations attributed to the Demiurge (*La Construction*, p. 350, n. 1 and pp. 477-8).

Moreau's systematic treatment of the *Timaeus* constitutes the first chapter of his complementary thesis, *L'Ame du Monde* (see note 2 *supra*). He takes the generation of the universe as mythical, in which he is justified by Plato's own indications; but his interpretation of the object of this account, what he calls the organization of the whole, rests ultimately upon the mistaken assumption, an assumption which he makes no attempt to substantiate, that the "model" of *Timaeus* 31 A-B is "the idea of the Whole" (p. 7) which he straightway identifies with "the One" and "the Good" and a totality of the hierarchy of forms subordinated to the supreme form of the Good (p. 8). From this he concludes that "all the transcendental metaphysics of the *Timaeus* flows from the original decision to think the datum as a whole" (p. 9) and later (p. 35) that "the idea of the Whole . . . furnishes the principle of an ontological argument which gives its justification and meaning to the artificialism of the *Timaeus*." It is really because the Universe is by definition a Whole, he says (p. 36), that it must be endowed with organization and thought and must be the work of a benevolent and calculating activity. He admits that this is the reverse of the course of reasoning in *Timaeus* 29 E-30 D; that, he explains, is because the ontological argument is concealed by the demiurgic mythology. Well and good; but that will not explain why Plato makes no mention in all this passage of an "idea of the Whole" or "the One" or "the idea of Good" or "the total hierarchy of ideas" but on the contrary says clearly that the "model" is

to be a serious expression of Plato's theory (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 609). J. Tate (*Class. Rev.*, LX [1946], p. 33) insists that "this plain, non-mythical passage is worth innumerable speculations based on rhetorical and ambiguous remarks from the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*"; but his reason seems to be his conviction that God must be supreme in any really philosophical system. My reasons for believing that the passage was not meant as a serious expression of the theory of ideas are given in *A.J.P.*, LIII (1932), pp. 233-42; cf. also to the same effect Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, pp. 105-6.

just the general "idea of living being" and later (39 E-40 A) lists the four sub-generic ideas which this includes, whereby it becomes indisputable that the model  $\zeta\phi\nu$  is expressly *not* inclusive even of all the ideas later mentioned in the dialogue.<sup>16</sup>

Moreau, however, assuming that this model is "the idea of the Whole" gets into it by means of his ontological argument "the idea of perfect intelligence in actuality" and the necessary implication of its own realization; and this "idealistic" reasoning leads him on to the discovery that this "absolute living being" includes "three aspects of the divine: first, the Intelligible or the Word, i. e. the absolute revealing itself in us, apprehended by reflection as the condition and ideal of knowledge; then the Intelligence, the Cause or Father whom we reach by ontological argument; finally the third aspect proceeding from the first two, the Will, the Soul, or the Goodness of God" (p. 39).<sup>17</sup> All this is derived from "the principles of Platonic ontology" (cf. p. 43), principles which follow only from the assumption that Plato must be an "idealist" and not from an unprejudiced consideration of his words. It is only from these principles that Moreau can interpret the psychogony as "a purely ideal construction," i. e. as the objective expression of the absolute Intelligence determining by its reflection the ideal model, which

<sup>16</sup> On the  $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu$  cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 575-8 and the references to Cornford and Shorey on p. 577. Moreau in § 3, note 7 (pp. 7-8) is mistaken in saying that the reasoning of *Timaeus* 31 A has its echo in Aristotle's *De Caelo* 278 B 4-8; that argument of Aristotle's proceeds from the assumption that the universe contains all the matter there is and is an adaptation of *Timaeus* 32 C-33 A. Moreau is also mistaken, however, in trying to differentiate *Timaeus* 31 A and *Republic* 597 C on the ground that the argument of the former turns upon an essential property of the whole in virtue of which there can be only one whole even *in concreto*, for not only is there no mention of a "whole" in the passage but Plato gives a specific reason for the uniqueness of the physical universe and this is not even the argument that there *can* be only one because the model is unique (cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 43; *Aristotle on Plato*, note 347). The reason for the use of  $\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$  in *Timaeus* 31 A 6, which has so much impressed Moreau, is simply  $\tau\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \zeta\phi\alpha \kappa\theta\alpha \epsilon\nu \kappa\alpha\lambda \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \gamma\epsilon\nu\eta \mu\nu\alpha$  (30 C 6).

<sup>17</sup> Moreau assumes without discussion (p. 81) that *Timaeus* 92 C declares the world to be an image of the intelligible God, although it has been shown with certainty, I think, that the sentence does not have this meaning (cf. e. g. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 359, n. 1).

he then identifies with the activity of the φυτουργός of *Republic X* (pp. 43-5; see note 15 *supra*).<sup>18</sup> *Timaeus* 35 A 1-B 3 properly construed (cf. Grube, *Class. Phil.*, XXVII [1932], pp. 80-82; Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 59-61) makes it impossible to identify the World-Soul with the ideas or the "model," just as *Timaeus* 52 A-D makes it impossible to say that the receptacle is the physical expression of non-being which on the plane of the intelligible Plato calls the "other" (pp. 26-30; cf. *La Construction*, pp. 442-3). Neither the intermediacy of soul nor the reality of χώρα independent of the ideas is compatible with idealism and the ontological argument, and so Moreau must explain them away in the face of Plato's straightforward assertions.

The second chapter of *L'Ame du Monde* is concerned with the "physico-theology" of the *Laws*. Although Moreau admits that the doctrine of ideas and the dialectic are not abandoned in the *Laws* and even professes to see in 898 A-B, though concealed, the foundation of the ontological argument (pp. 74-5, 81, 86-7), still not even he can find in the argument of the tenth book "the idea of the One-Whole" or "the dialectical deduction of reality from a self-sufficient idea, an absolute, the idea of Good" (pp. 67 and 81).<sup>19</sup> This falling-off from the ontological reflection which he had read into the *Timaeus* he explains not only by the popular character of the discussion in the *Laws* but also by Plato's desire to call positivistic science to testify in favor of the religious spirit (pp. 71-72). The

<sup>18</sup> Moreau cites (p. 45, n. 8) *Sophist* 265 E in support of his statement that "nature is a divine art . . . which in its perfection excludes the properly demiurgic factor with the transcendence of model to worker." Yet the products of the divine art are listed in *Sophist* 266 B-C; and they are not the ideas but 1) phenomenal objects, living and inanimate, and 2) dreams, shadows, and images, i. e. the natural objects of the two lower sections of the "divided line."

<sup>19</sup> On p. 81 occurs the statement: "la totalité du Monde y (*scil.* in the *Laws*) est identifiée au Dieu suprême (*τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον* VII 821 A)." The sentence from which these accusatives are taken not only does *not* identify god and the world but it expresses not Plato's opinion but a popular attitude which the speaker proceeds to combat (cf. England *ad loc.* and Mayor, *Ciceronis De Natura Deorum*, I, p. 118 on I, xii, 30). The cream of the jest is that Harvard (*The Epinomis of Plato*, p. 116 on 977 B 2) quotes just this phrase from the *Laws* as a parallel to the identification of οὐρανός and god in the *Epinomis*.

absence of the theory of "the One-Good" and of the ontological argument from the *Laws* might well have caused Moreau to question whether he had rightly seen them in the *Timaeus*;<sup>20</sup> but on the contrary he asserts that Plato reserved this fundamental part of his doctrine for esoteric use and in so doing opened the way for those of his successors who for want of philosophic vigor rejected it (p. 84). One would have thought, then, that those who knew this esoteric doctrine would have been the last to be misled by the "popular apologetics" of the *Laws*; yet according to Moreau it was Plato's accommodation of his true doctrine to the practical purposes of the arguments in this writing that opened the way to those who were to reject the world of ideas, confuse astronomy with theology, and fall into a confused immanentism in which the distinction of mind and matter is abolished.

This rupture with the intelligible in the Academy Moreau finds completed in the *Epinomis* (p. 84), where the confusion of the sensible universe and the intelligible marks the end of idealism; and the repetition of some formulae that recall those of Plato concerning dialectic is only one example of the "manifest parrottry" of the dialogue (pp. 92-3). While Moreau's observations of difference between the attitude in the *Epinomis* and in the admittedly genuine dialogues of Plato are frequently correct, his case for athetizing the *Epinomis* is weakened by the fact that it is made to depend upon his interpretation of the nature of Plato's "idealism." It is unfortunate that he apparently did not know the study of Dr. Benedict Einarson, "Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Structure of the *Epinomis*" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXVII [1936], pp. 261-85), which would not only have provided him with more formal arguments for the spuriousness of the dialogue but would also have presented him with the strong probability of its dependence from Aristotle.

To Aristotle in his "pre-Aristotelian period," represented by the *De Philosophia*, the *De Caelo*, and parts of the biological writings, Moreau ascribes (pp. 114-45) a "biological dynamism" or "cosmobiology," a kind of "Stoicism before the Stoics." During this period, he contends, Aristotle made the fifth essence

<sup>20</sup> Especially so, since the exposition in the *Laws* corresponds so closely with the concise argument of the *Phaedrus* (cf. J. Stenzel, *Ueber zwei Begriffe der platonischen Mystik*, pp. 14-15 and p. 16, n. 1).

the substance of soul and the first heaven, which is this substance in its purest state, the immanent principle of movement and as it were the soul of the universe, thus installing as the Absolute the sensible universe instead of the intelligible. This whole construction depends upon the highly questionable, though presently fashionable, thesis that the notion of an unmoved mover is later than the *De Caelo* and upon a misinterpretation of *De Gen. Animal.* 736 B 29-737 A 12.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, as evidence for the diffusion of this pre-Stoic, post-Platonic cosmobiology which, progressively repressed in classical Aristotelianism, was maintained, he believes, by other authors who guarantee the transition between the Old Academy and Stoicism Moreau adduces (pp. 145-157) the pseudo-Philolaic fragment περὶ ψυχῆς and the extract of Alexander Polyhistor preserved by Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 24-33). He scarcely succeeds even to his own satisfaction, however, in proving that the latter is pre-Stoic; and his treatment of the former certainly falls far short of his claim that it must belong to the same period as the *De Caelo* (p. 149).<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle does not there say that the constitutive nature of the soul is an analogue of the element that constitutes the stars (Moreau, *L'Ame du Monde*, p. 139) but that the analogue of that element is the immediate vehicle of the soul, this vehicle in turn being contained in the *pneuma* which is itself contained in the sperm (observe also that πάσης ψυχῆς δύναμις, 736 B 29-30, does not mean "toute âme en tant que puissance" but "the faculty of every soul"). This question as well as Moreau's contention concerning the unmoved mover and the interpretation of the pertinent fragments of the *De Philosophia* I have discussed in *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 584-602.

<sup>22</sup> Moreau argues (pp. 152-3) that *De Caelo* 293 B 4-15 shows that Pythagorizers contemporary with Aristotle tried to establish a strict parallelism between the structure of the universe and that of an animal. It does, in fact, just the opposite, for Aristotle contends that his opponents understand "centre" in an unambiguous geometrical sense whereas there is also as in animals another vital centre which does not coincide with this. The passage of Simplicius (*De Caelo*, p. 512, 10-12), cited by Moreau, is shown by Simplicius' own words to refer to a later "Pythagoreanism" unknown to Aristotle and Simplicius' source for which was probably Iamblichus (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 562).

Moreau's translation of ἐξ ἀρχῶν in the pseudo-Philolaus fragment (Diels-Kranz, I, p. 417, 14) as "poste de commandement" (p. 148) is certainly wrong, and his later interpretation of this as "the central fire" (p. 153) is quite without substantiation. The phrase itself is

The thesis to which this leads and which is developed in the fourth chapter of *L'Ame du Monde* is that Stoic physics is neither an innovation nor a deliberate return to the ancient physical philosophers but a cosmobiology made inevitable by lack of dialectical reflection on the soul and closely connected with the conceptions which immediately preceded it. Moreau's scheme for the development of Stoicism is expressed in the somewhat paradoxical statement that starting from premises borrowed from a dualistic dialectic it culminates by way of a physiological materialism in a spiritualistic monism that lacks only a critical consciousness of the spirit (p. 173). The Stoics, he believes, maintained in the theory of the World-Soul the essential affirmations of Plato's rationalistic teleology but detached from their dialectical justification and supported only by biological analogy. There is reason in Moreau's protests against the extravagant modern attempts to derive Stoicism from oriental sources and in his view of it rather as a stage in the development of Greek thought; but on the other hand, even apart from his notion of Platonic "idealism" which casts its shadow over all of his interpretations, one may demur at his tendency to represent Stoicism as a simple unit in this development and the development itself as a single current without eddies and storms, debates and cross-influences.

---

P. Brommer in his book,<sup>23</sup> which appeared a year after Moreau's theses, rejects out of hand the idealistic interpretation, which for him is represented chiefly by Natorp's version, and asserts that the key to Plato's thought is to be found in the distinction of meaning of the two terms, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. The latter is in origin the Socratic—and so primarily moral—notion

probably an error; but in any case *περιαγόμενος* is not to be taken with it and separated from *φύσει διαπνεόμενος*, as Moreau does (p. 147) in order to get the doctrine of *πνεῦμα* from the first half and a ἡγεμονικόν of the universe from the second; *φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγόμενος* means simply "pervaded and made to rotate by nature"; and *ἐξ ἀρχῶν* or whatever it stands for is the complement of the main clause of the sentence.

<sup>23</sup> P. Brommer, ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ, *Étude Sémantique et Chronologique des Oeuvres de Platon* (*Philosophia Critica*, Deel I [Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1940]).

which is supposed to arise spontaneously in the soul as soon as the maieutic art has eliminated all that prevents its birth; the former Plato got from Pythagorean geometry, and it he conceived to be the real structure which accounts for the formal aspect of existence and accords perfectly with the image that we have of it in the soul. The combination of the Socratic *idea* and the Pythagorean *eidos* was a hybrid union, for the former was essentially dynamic while the latter was static; and it was this static *eidos* that brought in its train all the difficulties involved in participation. Plato, though fascinated at first by the logical appearance of this static *eidos*, is always brought back to the dynamistic conception of the *idea* which seems better to account for reality. The *eidos*, then, from the time of the *Meno* onward is "real structure," the essence of which exists outside of our minds and our concrete existence and of which our souls have simply had knowledge. "*Idea*," however, has not one meaning for Brommer but two: it is on the one hand "the primary image which is the source of reality" (i. e. of realized structure) and on the other "the concomitant image which represents in the soul the structure of the real" (p. 68).

From this one gathers that for Brommer *iδéa* is finally 1) a transcendent and separate entity and 2) the notion in the soul, while *eidos* is 3) the immanent structure caused by *iδéa* in the former sense and to which *iδéa* in the latter sense exactly corresponds;<sup>24</sup> but in the end he states that the *eidos* is immanent or separate depending upon our point of view because "in its very immanence it is separate and it is immanent by reason of its separation" (p. 266), while the *iδéa* which is real and which engenders the *eidos* in the physical world and its *idea* in our minds (p. 267) turns out to be the content, product, or manifestation of a Mind with which in one way or another the Idea of Good is identified.<sup>25</sup> Is this not to make the ideas in effect

<sup>24</sup> "Elle (scil. l'Idée) est certainement l'image primaire qui préside à la réalisation d'une Structure; mais d'autre part elle reste identique à elle-même comme contenu de *Nous*, et doit par conséquent, nécessairement, coincider avec l'image idéale qu'on fait correspondre à telle structure, dans l'Esprit ou dans l'âme (p. 68).

<sup>25</sup> "Every Form and every Measure supposes a . . . creative Cause which is precisely the Idea of Good. This . . . is a rational and reasoned power which must have its location in a Spirit from which it

the thoughts of God? And, since Brommer says further (p. 268) that the *iδea* that we have in ourselves must be identical with that which encloses the *eidos* and consequently our *Noūs* must be identical with the creative *Noūs* and our soul directly related to the Principle of which the essential function is to be the Idea of all Reality, surely the idealists would be justified in asserting that of their interpretation he has rejected only the name and has adopted as his own the essential meaning.<sup>26</sup>

There is a similar reversal and confusion in Brommer's analysis of Plato's "dynamism," of which he takes *Sophist* 247 E to be a "frank confession" (pp. 128-9). Although he tries to establish the "dynamic" character of the *eidos* throughout the whole of Plato's work, pressing every appearance of

emanates spontaneously as its specific manifestation" (p. 73); cf. p. 71 ("the creative Image which has its seat in the divine Mind"), p. 89 (. . . "God who alone has the power to form the real as he informs himself: the Idea of Good engendering the good"), p. 252 ("What is more natural than to identify the *Noūs* and the Idea of Good, it being understood that *Noūs* is the 'place' of the Idea"), p. 274 ("God is the measure of everything; by reason of the Eidos of Good which is his Being, the divine Idea is the Standard . . .").

<sup>26</sup> *Phaedrus* 247 D Brommer interprets as follows (pp. 100-101): "The gods rejoice in the comprehension of the One which is as the summit of the celestial vault; but its full intelligence carries them outside, where above Being (*ἐξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*) Reality in all its immaculate purity is enthroned. This supra-celestial place . . . is at once the ineffable domain where in the divine Mind are drawn up the creative images which will engender Justice and all the moral values . . . but it is also the serene region in ourselves where we have Intuition in its purest actuality . . ." Brommer then immediately protests that these two "regions" are not one and the same, for, if they were, "the Real would be reduced to a subjective Ideal." He should not have read into this passage then that of which it contains no hint, with the result that he has to ascribe to Plato confused subtleties for which there is no support in his words to save him from a danger to which he never exposed himself but to which in the end Brommer himself succumbs. There is in *Phaedrus* 247 no mention of "the One"; the supra-celestial region is not "above Being," for Plato says *ἢ . . . οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα . . . τούτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον* and what is seen there is *τὸ δύναται*; all the ideas are there (*τὰλλα ωσαύτως τὰ δύναται οὖτως*), and the figures and the language all imply that they are *not* in a divine mind or in anything else. Certainly there is no suggestion that this supra-celestial region symbolizes "the region of intuition in us."

*δύναμις* and its cognates into evidence for this conclusion,<sup>27</sup> he is constrained to admit in the end that "dynamism" in the sense of efficient causality or cause of all movement is assigned by Plato to the soul; but he seeks to compromise this admission by insisting that the *eidos* ultimately is not static in its original sense but has a "static dynamism" and then that the *Being of the Eidos* has also a character of spirituality which raises it above every formal and dynamic function (pp. 269-72).

Brommer's insistence upon finding in *eidos* and *ἰδέα* the distinctive technical meanings that he has assigned them *ex hypothesi* is responsible for most of his difficulties of philosophical interpretation and for the distortions and mistranslations of the Greek which alone would be sufficient to disprove his thesis. Instead of attempting so much as to list even the more flagrant of his mistakes, I shall here examine a few crucial passages which should show whether or not Plato when he used *eidos* and *ἰδέα* in a technical sense gave them the distinctive meanings which Brommer maintains that he did or, if not these, any distinction of meaning at all.

In *Republic* 596-597 Brommer (p. 89) says that *eidos* and *ἰδέα* are not used indifferently but that Plato means that the true *ἰδέα* such as the perfect artisan contemplates in his soul is not fashioned but is in direct relation with the essential structure which alone constitutes the real in all similar objects and which structure is the creation of God who alone has the power to form the real just as he informs himself. Now at the beginning of this passage Socrates says (596 A 6-7) *εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἔκαστον εἴώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἔκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταῦτὸν ὄνομα*

<sup>27</sup> E. g. on p. 55 he states that the *eidos* is "une force, une puissance qui est même qualifiée de 'divine,'" referring for this to *Phaedo* 99 C which has nothing to do with the *eidos*; on p. 28 he finds the dynamic nature of structure in *Hipp. Maj.* 296 D, translating by "la puissance vers le bien" Socrates' dialectical definition *τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι*; and on p. 26 he professes to see in *τὸ διὰ πάντων πεφυκός* of *Laches* 192 C, which he translates "la nature qui pénètre toutes les formes particulières," the dynamic concept of "real power."

With regard to the passage of the *Sophist* Brommer does not mention 247 E 7-248 A 2, which shows that Plato did not consider *δύναμις* a final definition or even characteristic of reality, or 249 D 6-251 A 4, which states that nothing hitherto said is the answer to the question, "What is reality?"

*ἐπιφέρομεν.* In 596 B 3 in doing this for chairs and couches he says that there is one *iδέα* for each of these classes. In 596 B 7 he says that the craftsman makes the couches we use by looking to the *iδέα* and in 596 B 9-10 that none of the craftsmen makes the *iδέα* itself. In 597 A 1-2 he asks: “Did you not just now say that the couch-maker does not make the *εἶδος* ὁ δῆ φαμεν *εἴναι* ὁ *ἔστιν κλίνη*,” and to this the answer is “Yes, I did.” Later he calls this ὁ *ἔστιν κλίνη* (cf. 597 C 3) ή ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα κλίνη (597 B 5-6, C 2). In short Plato here *says* that what he has called ή *iδέα* is what he also calls *τὸ εἶδος* and that both or either can be called ὁ *ἔστιν* and *τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει*. None of Brommer’s subtleties can circumvent this passage; but there is worse behind. In 596 A 6-7, quoted above, *εἶδός τι ἐν ἔκαστον τίθεσθαι κτλ.* is called “the customary method.” In 507 B 5-10 Socrates had said *καὶ αὐτὸ δῆ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἡ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν πάλιν αὖ κατ’* (or *καὶ*, cf. Adam, *ad loc.*) *iδέαν μίαν ἐκάστον ὡς μᾶς οὖσης τιθέντες, “ὁ ἔστιν” *ἔκαστον προσαγορεύομεν* (cf. *τὰς iδέας* in the next sentence, B 9-10). This is “the customary method” referred to in 596 A 6-7, and in one expression of it *iδέα* is used exactly where *εἶδος* is in the other. The verbal similarity shows beyond the possibility of cavil that Plato *did* use *εἶδος* and *iδέα* indifferently and by both or either meant just ὁ *ἔστιν* *ἔκαστον* or that which later became the standard term for a Platonic idea, *αὐτό* prefixed to any common noun or neuter adjective.*

In the same way *εἶδος* in *Phaedrus* 249 B 7 must mean exactly the same thing as *iδέαν* in *Phaedrus* 265 D 3. This correspondence Brommer finds no way to eliminate and is reduced (pp. 101-2) to explaining *εἶδος* in the former passage as a purposeful etymological pun on *εἶδεν* in the next sentence (249 C 2); but this is incredible, for in the preceding sentence and nearer to *εἶδος* than this *εἶδεν* appears in the same sense *ἰδοῦσα* (249 B 6), so that, if Plato’s choice of a term was to be determined by etymological considerations, *iδέα* would more probably have been used than *εἶδος*.<sup>28</sup> In any case, if the choice between *εἶδος* and

<sup>28</sup> It is amusing to notice that when on p. 145 Brommer tries to read into *Politicus* 292 a reference to the ideas he says: “In view of Plato’s inclination toward etymology it is not improbable that the term *ἰδεῖν* (292 D 5) contains an allusion to the *εἶδος* or better to the *iδέα* that is to be tracked down.” Incidentally Brommer takes with deadly seriousness the etymologies of the *Cratylus*, as if they were really meant to

*iδέα* could have been determined by the desire for an etymological pun, the distinction between the two cannot have had any real importance for Plato's thought.

Perhaps the best example of the reasoning by means of which Brommer tries to extricate himself from difficulties into which his own thesis has thrown him is his explanation of *Republic* 518 C, 526 E, and 532 C, in all of which Being appears to be ascribed to *τάγαθόν*, although in 509 B the idea of good had been said to surpass Being in majesty and power. Brommer decides (pp. 79-80) that in these three passages there is no question of the *idea* of good but of the good simply and that the good as *eidos* is Being in its plenitude. In other words, he maintains that these three passages, since they say *τάγαθόν* and not *ἡ iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* must mean *ἀγαθόν* as *eidos* which is something different. In 526 E 1, however, the whole phrase *τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ iδέαν* does occur, and *τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος* two lines later must refer to this. This Brommer tries to avoid by referring to "the confusion or rather the assimilation of the creative image of the Good which is before all Being to the inspiring image as we conceive it in the soul"; and anyway "the parallel with 518 C indicates that the object of immediate research is the *ἀγαθόν* as it is expressly called in that passage." Let that pass; but what of 509 B itself where supposedly it is said that the *idea* of good surpasses Being? There is no *iδέα* mentioned there but only *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* expressly in this form and twice (509 B 7 and 8-9). Either we accept the rigid formalism of Brommer and try to maintain that it is not the *idea* of good that surpasses Being even in the famous and unique passage of 509 B or we have to admit—what is obviously true—that *τὸ ἀγαθόν* "tout court," like *αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν* (540 A 8-9), is used by Plato to mean *ἡ iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, that *δὲ ἔστιν ἔκαστον* is *ἡ iδέα*, that in short there is no difference between *iδέα* and *eidos*.<sup>29</sup>

express tendencies of Plato's philosophy; *Cratylus* 406 C 1-3 was lost on him. The fantasies of the *Cratylus* are not sufficient for him; and he sees "etymologies" everywhere, reaching the height—or depth—in his statement (p. 124) that the *ἄποπος τόπος* into which the sophist has dived (*Sophist* 239 C) is a deliberate reference at once to the *τόπος* of the *Timaeus* (by which, I suppose, he means *χώρα*) and the *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus*!

<sup>29</sup> Brommer (p. 68) assumes that in *Republic* 479 A (mistakenly referred to by him as 479 D) a distinction is made between "le Beau

Finally Brommer is quite mistaken in arguing (p. 257) from *Eth. Nic.* 1096 B 13-26 that Aristotle's usage proves the distinction between *eîdos* and *iðéa* to be genuinely Platonic. Without introducing the extra complication of Aristotle's use of *eîdos* in his own system and to take but two examples for many, a comparison of *Metaphysics* 1078 B 9-10 (*τὴν κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν δόξαν*) with B 12-13 (*ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα*) or of 1078 B 33 (*iðéas*) with 1079 A 1 (*εἴδη*) will prove that Aristotle was unaware of any Platonic distinction between the two terms.

Brommer's semantic and historical study must be said to have failed to prove either that Plato made any technical distinction between *eîdos* and *iðéa* or that his employment of them shows any kind of change or development throughout the course of the dialogues. Moreover, Plato used both terms without technical significance for the ideas much more often than is admitted by Brommer<sup>30</sup> and in many important passages concerning the ideas used neither (e.g. *Symposium* 210 E-212 A, *Phaedrus* 247 C-E, *Philebus* 58 A, 59 C, 61 E), a fact which of itself should make one hesitate to ascribe to these two words

"en soi" and "l'Idée de la Beauté," the former being *eîdos* to which the latter is anterior. The passage runs: . . . ἀποκριέσθω ὁ χρηστὸς ὃς αὐτὸν μὲν καλὸν καὶ ιδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται δεῖ μὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ὠσαύτως ἔχονσαν πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει. The *αὐτὸν* καλόν and *ιδέαν* . . . *κάλλους* are not two things but one and the *καὶ* is explicative, as the position of *μέν* reinforced by its repetition after *δεῖ* and answered by the *δέ* after *πολλά* shows. The *αὐτὸν* καλόν is one of the *αὐτὰ ἔκαστα καὶ δεῖ κατὰ ταῦτα ὠσαύτως ὄντα* (479 E 7-8, cf. 480 A 3-4) and these are the *ιδέαι*.

<sup>30</sup> Some examples of the extreme cases in which Brommer forces the technical sense upon these terms are *φρονήσεως τὸ συμπρότατον εἶδος* (*Laws* 689 D), *ἐν μέροις εἴδει* (*Timaeus* 30 C), *ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα οὖσα* (*Cratylus* 418 E), *ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ιδέα* (*Politicus* 289 B), *τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν* (*Symposium* 210 B), *βίον εἶδος* (*Philebus* 35 D). When in *Philebus* 23 C 12 *eîdos* is used of *ἄπειρον* (as well as *πέρας*), he says in his embarrassment (p. 183) that "in a slightly paradoxical fashion Plato applies the denomination of structure to the absence of structure." He says nothing of *τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρον ιδέαν* in *Philebus* 16 D 7. In none of these cases does *eîdos* or *iðéa* mean "idea" or "structure" in any sense. It is far more disastrous, however, when Brommer (pp. 193-5) gives his technical sense to *τρίτον οὐσίας εἶδος* in *Timaeus* 35 A and then through misconstruction of the passage, misconception which is no longer excusable after Grube's clarification (*Class. Phil.*, XXVII [1932], pp. 80-82; cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 59-61), supports his mistaken conclusion (p. 196) that the soul is an idea.

in his vocabulary as much significance as this study presumes from the outset.

A word will suffice for the "chronological" aspect of Brommer's study. He adopts in principle Constantin Ritter's order of the dialogues, but that counts for little against his assumption that Plato reworked them throughout his life so that there are "later modifications" in the earliest and "earlier parts" in the most mature of the writings. This assumption is employed with such abandon, vagueness, and lack of system and supporting evidence that it is impossible to be sure just what part of any dialogue Brommer himself believes is early or late, since almost every one appears to belong in part before and in part after almost every other.<sup>31</sup> Since the marshalling of proofs in such matters seems to Brommer to be an archaeological task of little interest from the philosophical point of view (p. 95), it is difficult to understand why he added the adjective "chronological" to the title of his book.

The books of Moreau and Brommer would have offered Professor Richard Robinson many examples of the five types of misinterpretation against which he protests in the introductory chapter of his study, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*.<sup>32</sup> Mosaic inter-

<sup>31</sup> For example, the *Phaedrus* is the earliest dialogue; but the third discourse is late, in fact parts of it are later than the *Timaeus* and are built upon the *Epinomis* (pp. 95, 99-100). Then again the *Phaedrus* and the last reworking of the *Symposium* both fall between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* (p. 102), though the last part of Diotima's speech presupposes both the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* (p. 49), although the *Republic* is, of course, supposed to have undergone so many revisions that almost anything in any other dialogue may be earlier or later than some part of it. So the "supreme idea" in the *Republic* is the reply to the criticism of the ideas in the *Parmenides* (p. 156), but the second part of the *Parmenides* is the transcendent mathematics for the lack of which the mathematicians are criticized in the *Republic* (p. 170); yet Plato was writing the *Parmenides* during all the period in which he was working on the *Sophist* and *Politicus* (p. 6), and the last part of the *Theaetetus* is later than the *Sophist* (p. 117), although the *Theaetetus* in its first form is intermediate between the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* (pp. 110-111) while the section on method in the *Phaedo* and the final argument in that dialogue are later additions (p. 57).

<sup>32</sup> Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1941), pp. viii + 239.

pretation, misinterpretation by abstraction and by inference, insinuating the future, and going beyond a thinker's last words—in order to avoid these errors Robinson proposes "not to attribute to Plato any inference that he does not make in so many words or any abstraction that he does not have a name for, without giving a special reason for doing so." In addition to this rigorous canon he enunciates two fundamental assumptions of his interpretation: 1) "to possess a single name for an idea is a later stage than to be able to express it only in a sentence" and 2) "there is an evolution of ideas, transcending the lives of individuals, even the most obvious ideas were once obscure and still earlier unknown, and this evolution, while often proceeding by sudden leaps or 'mutations,' often also advanced by very gradual 'variations'?" However obvious these assumptions may appear to the "historically minded" majority today, they are nevertheless not free of danger for the interpreter. The former assumption must be carefully qualified in its application to dialogues written by a philosopher who in them may purposely have avoided the use of technical terminology (cf. *Theaetetus* 184 C; *Politicus* 259 C, 261 E; *Republic* 533 D 7 ff.). The latter assumption disregards the fact that some notions held by some individuals to be true have become obscure, have been forgotten, and after many years have been rediscovered by other individuals. Robinson objects (pp. 29-30) to the belief that certain propositions *must* have been obvious to Plato because they *are* so obvious to any intelligent person; but it is no less objectionable to believe that what is obvious to any intelligent person was not obvious to Plato, just because he lived a long time ago, or even that a true proposition of which I have only recently become aware could not have been obvious to Plato for the same reason. Robinson states that the belief to which he objects "is destructive of any true history of human thought"; it is so only on the assumption that the true history of human thought is "an evolution of ideas, transcending the lives of individuals," an assumption against which there are contradictory instances to be cited.

Professor Robinson announces his subject as the examination of what Plato has to say about method apart from the theory of synthesis and division, prominent in the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*, and the methodology of the *Parmenides*.

des.<sup>33</sup> His book is consequently divided into two parts, one on Socratic elenchus and definition, which is said to be the outstanding feature of the early dialogues, and another on dialectic and specifically hypothesis, which is supposed to be prominent in the middle dialogues.

Of the elenchus as depicted in the early dialogues Robinson draws a picture "by no means favorable." The method, he says, involved persistent hypocrisy, showed a negative and destructive spirit, and caused pain to its victims (p. 10). He believes that he can conjecture what answers Plato would have made to his objections that the elenchus only tells you that you are wrong without telling you why and that it would in any case be more effective without the Socratic irony; but these conjectural answers apparently do not mitigate his disapproval of the method which, he says, in the middle and later dialogues loses its irony, is incorporated into the larger whole of dialectic, and, though often referred to and recommended, gradually ceases to be actually depicted. A certain scepticism of this chronological distinction and its implications is aroused by the fact that of the three passages cited by Robinson as alone offering any general discussion of the purpose of elenchus one, *Sophist* 229 E-230 E, and that the one which calls the method "the greatest and most sovereign of the purifications" is from a dialogue of the "middle period"; and this scepticism can only be intensified when one recalls that the *Theaetetus*, which is not mentioned here, is one long and complicated elenchus highly seasoned with the irony that should have disappeared. Later (pp. 87-88) the elenchus of the *Theaetetus* is represented as a kind of independent personality adopting subterfuges "to maintain itself in Plato's alien mind," the figure of Socrates' midwifery being a purely Platonic invention which "serves the unconscious purpose of enabling the elenchus to maintain a good standing in an otherwise very un-Socratic mind." One need not take too seriously this personification and conscious invention for an unconscious purpose which hardly conform to Robinson's severe canons of interpretation, for in the last chapter of the book (p. 216) it is suggested that not only the long elenchus of the *Theaetetus*

<sup>33</sup> The *Parmenides* is the subject of an article by Professor Robinson in *Class. Phil.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 51-76 and 159-86.

but that of the *Cratylus* and of the *Parmenides* too represent what after a long detour Robinson practically identifies with the dialectic of the "middle period."

The main contention of chapter 3 is that Plato, though unaware of the logical distinctions involved, thought of elenchus as being always indirect, as never using an independent premise, and as always reducing the thesis to a contradiction. This proposition Robinson seeks to establish by citing examples of refutations in the dialogues which are in fact direct but to which Plato refers in words which Robinson believes must imply that they are indirect reductions to a contradiction. There is a highly questionable literalism about Robinson's interpretation of most of these examples;<sup>34</sup> but apart from these *Phaedo* 101 D is the strong evidence on which he really rests his case. This passage according to him shows Plato to have consciously assumed that the consequences of a single thesis may contradict each other without the aid of any extra premise. This "logical monstrosity," Robinson says, is a natural accompaniment of the assumption that all elenchus reduces the thesis to self-contradiction; but later in his longer discussion of the *Phaedo* passage he points out (p. 137) that an hypothesis really can have consequences which contradict one another or itself if the hypothesis is not an atomic proposition and that a definite distinction between complex and atomic propositions probably cannot be made.

The main conclusion of the next chapter is that Plato shows

<sup>34</sup> They are (pp. 30-31) *Republic* 341 C-343 A, *Republic* 380 C, *Gorgias* 487 B, *Theaetetus* 155 B. The last is a half-humorous passage which is correctly explained by Campbell, *The Theaetetus of Plato*<sup>2</sup>, p. 53. The statement in the *Gorgias* that Polus and Gorgias διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾶ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν is not a technical description of the "direct" refutation of Gorgias; it occurs in the ironical speech to Callicles and is a purposeful echo of the statement of Callicles in 483 A who has there introduced the "contradiction" of φύσις and νόμος. In *Republic* 380 C οὐτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς does not say, as Robinson states, that Homer's and Hesiod's tales about the gods contradict themselves; it refers to κακῶν αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα at the beginning of the sentence. As regards the first passage, Robinson's notion that ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοὺναντλον περιειστήκει (343 A 2) must mean that the thesis entailed its own contradictory has been adequately refuted by Friedländer in *Class. Phil.*, XL (1945), p. 253.

no methodological consciousness of epagoge and that therefore his depiction of it in the earlier dialogues made no impression on his own theory of method (pp. 47-8). In fact, Robinson finds epagoge to be much less frequent in the early dialogues than it seems to be on a casual reading and explains the chief reason for this to be that it is only a part of a more pervasive feature which he calls "the use of cases" or "analogy."<sup>35</sup> In this connection he observes (p. 45) that where epagoge is conceived as a form of intuition each case is sufficient by itself, an observation which has some bearing upon his earlier remarks that Plato did not distinguish intuitively certain, enumeratively certain, and probable epagoge (p. 38) and that the elenctic dialogues show no trace of entertaining in the abstract such a connection between epagoge and intuition as Aristotle proposes in *Anal. Post.* 100 B (pp. 39-40). The kind of explanation offered by Aristotle in that chapter Plato had already rejected (*Phaedo* 96 B 5-8); and, considering that the particular serves only to remind us of the universal to which we then refer it (*Phaedo* 75 B-E, 76 D-E; *Phaedrus* 249 B-C), he speaks of *ἀνάμνησις* where Robinson talks of intuitively certain epagoge. There would be for Plato then no question of "enumeratively certain" and "intuitively certain" epagoge, for in any case just enough particular instances must be cited to "remind" the interlocutor of the universal or, since Plato was writing dialogues, to make it seem plausible that the particular interlocutor would be so reminded.

The final chapter on the elenchus is concerned with the Socratic quest for definition or, as Robinson puts it, "the What-is-X question." Robinson says that in the early dialogues no justification is offered for the unlimited priority assigned to this question;<sup>36</sup> and to the argument for this priority in *Phaedrus* 260 he replies that we can and do make useful statements about

<sup>35</sup> By this he means substantially what Aristotle calls *παραβολή*, a sub-class of *παράδειγμα* which is *ὅμοιον ἐπαγωγῆ*, and ascribes to Socrates in *Rhetoric* 1393 B 3-8 (cf. A 26-27), a passage not mentioned by Robinson in his discussions of the Socratic use of cases and of Aristotle on Socratic epagoge.

<sup>36</sup> In view of *Protagoras* 360 E-361 D the course of that whole dialogue might be taken as a proof by example of the necessary priority of the question. Cf. also *Meno* 86 D and 100 B.

X without being able to say what X is in the way Socrates desires. In rejoinder one can almost hear Plato asking the "twentieth-century philosopher" what he means by "useful" in this context and how he knows that his statements are "about X" at all if he does not know what X is. Robinson analyses thoroughly the possible ambiguities of "What is X?", which he considers the vaguest of all questions, at least out of context; but he admits that Socrates' explanations give a context determining this vague form to mean the search for essence (p. 61). Moreover, Socrates was not asking the question merely as an exercise in method. People in Athens used the words "virtue," "justice," "good," "useful" as if they were univocal and used them to justify all sorts of actions and theories; it is in the case of such words, Socrates points out (*Phaedrus* 263 A-B), which people use without clearly defined agreement as to their meaning that oratory has its greatest power of deception, words which, as Robinson says (p. 55), Socrates and his companions would be said in unphilosophical circles to know the meaning of perfectly well. Socrates' question was designed to suggest that they did not know the meaning so well as they supposed and that perhaps their actions and theories were not so well supported by these words as they assumed. "For unless you clearly understood 'pious' and 'impious' it is not possible that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your father for murder," Socrates says to Euthyphro at the end—ironically, no doubt; but is not irony in place? "I say that 'pious' is what I am now doing," Euthyphro had declared; and any newspaper will show that Euthyphro is neither a straw-man for Socrates' "What-is-X question" nor an archaeological monument of the history of human thought and action.

The second part of the book opens with a chapter on dialectic in general and another on hypothesis, which, Robinson maintains, is the keyword for dialectic in the middle dialogues, *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Parmenides*; and these are followed by chapters on hypothesis in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* respectively. The first of these chapters contains many sound observations on what may be called the constant characteristics of dialectic and is concluded by a demonstration that Plato invented both the notion and the name, a demonstration which is on the whole cogent despite the desperate and unnecessary

contention (p. 94) that *Philebus* 16 C is to be taken seriously as Plato's "deliberate statement that he was himself inspired in inventing dialectic."<sup>37</sup> Quite unsatisfactory, however, is Robinson's notion of the real reason for Plato's doctrine that the supreme method of dialectic entails question and answer. Question and answer, he says (p. 87), being necessary to the Socratic elenchus, entered into the blood of Socrates' pupil who never fully appreciated the distinctness of Socrates' destructiveness from his own constructiveness. That dialectic demands question and answer because it demands elenchus which demands question and answer was not a reasoned conclusion but merely an assumption carried over from Plato's pupilage; otherwise, he asserts, it could not have still commanded his absolute confidence even in his late period when dialectic had taken the form of division and synthesis. Now, that the dialectic of the late period was thus radically different from that of the early and middle periods is a highly questionable assumption; but as an assumption not argued in this book it falls outside the scope of this review, although it should be observed in passing that one of Aristotle's objections to diaeresis is that it *does* depend upon question and answer (cf. *Anal. Post.* B, chap. 5). Robinson himself, however, cites *Theaetetus* 189 E and *Sophist* 263 E, dialogues of the "middle period," for Plato's definition of thinking as the dialogue of the soul with itself; and it is a work of the "late period" in which Plato applies this notion of the internal dialogue even to the case of simple perceptions (*Philebus* 38 C-E). It is most unlikely that this notion would be developed precisely in that period when according to Robinson "the pretence of question-and-answer misfits the form" of the writings, if it had been merely an unconscious assumption carried over from Plato's pupilage. It is more reasonable to say, as Robinson in fact does later say (p. 93), that the idea of using exclusively conversational question and answer in dialectic is the result of reflecting on the Socratic elenchus. Nor is Plato's conclusion from that reflection antiquated, despite Aristotle's dicta of which Robinson apparently approves (p. 88), for it has been affirmed even in this century that the scientific investigator proceeds to discovery by putting to himself pertinent questions.

<sup>37</sup> Are we to take seriously *οἱ παλαιοὶ κτλ.* (16 C 7) too; and, if so, how can διά τινος Προμηθέως refer to Plato himself?

The most important conclusions of the next chapter (chap. 7) are that for Plato an hypothesis is not necessarily existential or of any other form (pp. 104-9) and (pp. 115-17) that an hypothesis, being a proposition posited at the beginning of a train of thought, is naturally and normally posited for the proof of some other proposition, a premise and not a demonstrand. There is difficulty in maintaining the latter conclusion in the face of the many passages where the refutand is called an hypothesis; Robinson does so by contending that hypothesis has this sense only subordinately and came to have it because of Plato's conception of elenchus as always indirect. This conclusion as to the primary meaning of hypothesis is Robinson's reason for deciding in the next chapter (pp. 122-3) that the hypothesis in the *Meno* is "if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable"; and, having come to this conclusion, he declares (p. 126) that Plato by choosing this as his hypothesis practically destroys the essence of the hypothetical method as it afterwards became. Despite Robinson's analysis, however, it seems certain that the hypothesis is not the alternative on which he has decided but the one which he rejects, namely "virtue is knowledge";<sup>38</sup> and, if this is so, the procedure in the *Meno* is in accord with that recommended in the *Phaedo* (save, of course, that no *ikavόν* is reached), for "virtue is good," which is unquestionably called an hypothesis (87 D 3), is posited in order to deduce from it that virtue is knowledge, which was first set up as an hypothesis from which the teachability of virtue was deduced.

The first part of the chapter on the *Phaedo* is devoted to the "metaphor" of *συμφωνεῖν* in 100 A and 101 D. Robinson decides that the word means "consistency" in both passages,<sup>39</sup> although

<sup>38</sup> This is also the conclusion of Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 255) who points out that 87 B 3-4, *ὑποθέμενοι* αὐτὸς *σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἔστι* demands this interpretation and rightly interpreted makes the analogy with the mathematical example precise. In this example τὸ συμβαινόν is not part of the hypothesis itself, which is just τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτόν ἔστι; and similarly with virtue the hypothesis is ἀρετὴ τούτη τι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δύτων (87 B 5), namely ἐπιστήμη. This is further proved by 89 C 2-4 where the position of ὅτι shows that the sentence means "it is clear that it is teachable according to the hypothesis if virtue is knowledge" (cf. 89 D 2).

<sup>39</sup> The meaning of *συμφωνεῖ* need not coincide with either "is con-

he thinks that in the first case Plato really had in mind two things, implication and inconsistency, but expressed himself inadequately in order to preserve conversational simplicity and he has in the second to explain how the consequences of an hypothesis can be inconsistent one with another. As to the *iκανόν* of 101 E which is the end of the process of hypothesizing a higher hypothesis, Robinson states that it means an hypothesis adequate to satisfy the particular interlocutor and that, since Plato is merely aiming at an hypothesis that the objector will agree to, epistemology does not enter into the matter at all and as a consequence there is no connection between the *iκανόν* of the *Phaedo* and the *ἀντόθετος ἀρχή* of *Republic* 511. Plato does not say, however, that you will not posit the higher hypothesis *unless* the interlocutor objects to your present hypothesis. If he does so object, you will *not* at once set up the new hypothesis (101 D 3-5); but *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον* certainly does not imply that you won't do so at all unless he does so object. Socrates' statement at 107 B 5-6, *τὰς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον*, surely shows that a serious thinker must of his own accord in the proper course proceed back to a *iκανόν*. Nor has Robinson any reason for saying that this *iκανόν* is meant to be an hypothesis in the same sense as the hypotheses which lead up to it. The very wording *τι iκανόν* in contrast to the *ὑπόθεσιν ἡτοι . . . βελτίστη* immediately preceding implies that Plato is thinking of it as something different, and the *περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς* immediately following suggests that he is thinking of it as an *ἀρχή* in a special sense, while *εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν* (101 E 3) shows that he is not here concerned simply with methodology divorced from ontology. There is every reason then to take the *iκανόν* here as the equivalent of the *ἀρχὴ ἀντόθετος* of the *Republic* or rather to take the latter as a special case of the former.<sup>40</sup>

sistent with" or "is implied by," as Robinson assumes that it must (pp. 131-2). It is certainly not equivalent to the latter, but the neutral logical meaning of the former is not specific enough for it either. It has rather the positive meaning of "fitting together" as its use in *Sophist* 253 B illustrates, where it is used of the "kinds" that mix or join as opposed to those which *ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται* and is parallel to *συναρμόττει* in 253 A.

<sup>40</sup> There is a curious echo of this in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where the

Robinson believes, however, that the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή* of the *Republic* is a distinctive addition to the hypothetical method of the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* which changes it from a merely approximative method, at variance with Plato's belief in the possibility of incorrigible knowledge, to a means of reaching absolute certainty. This, of course, determines his interpretation of the "upward path." After examining at length and criticizing with acuteness the principal interpretations, 1) the view that the dialectical procedure is merely self-criticism and self-correction, the readiness to reconsider and go behind any postulate,<sup>41</sup> 2) the "synthesis" theory, 3) the mathematical interpretations, and 4) the "intuition theory," he adopts what he calls the "elenchus theory," which is in fact a combination of 1 and 4 above and his description of which (p. 179) may be summarized as follows. You take an hypothesis and deduce its consequences, trying to discover some contradiction in those consequences. When you do, the hypothesis is refuted and you take another, designed to avoid the contradiction. You continue this process for a long time. One day you reflect that this hypothesis has endured every test; and it dawns upon you that this hypothesis is true, is in fact no longer an hypothesis but an anhypotheton. The "dawn" is equivalent to an intuition; all that precedes is the hypothetical method as previously elucidated but here exercised solely in order to test the hypothesis itself. According to Robinson's interpretation, therefore, the hypothesis which in the *Meno* was only a premise and in the

*ἀνυπόθετον* in 1005 B 14 makes the philosopher's *ἀρχή* in his field equivalent to the *ἰκανόν* of the special sciences (1005 A 25).

Robinson's view of the discrepancy between the *ἰκανόν* and the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή* appears to be responsible for his notion that Plato in the *Phaedo* made the abandonment of the search for the Good simultaneous with the adoption of the hypothetical method. Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 256) has adequately shown that there is in the *Phaedo* no renunciation of the search for the kind of causal explanation that Socrates had hoped to get from Anaxagoras; and, as I have suggested elsewhere (*Aristotle on Plato*, p. 451), the very wording of the *Phaedo* indicates that Plato had in mind here the account of causality given in the *Timaeus*.

<sup>41</sup> What Robinson gives as the "second theory of the upward path," namely that it is the process of giving an account of your hypothesis described in the *Phaedo* (p. 168), was conceived by Shorey to be the same as the first, which Robinson gives as Shorey's interpretation.

*Phaedo* was mainly a premise but secondarily a proposition to be tested by the consistency of its consequences becomes in the "upward path" primarily and exclusively a proposition to be tested by means of the elenchus. The new claim for certainty, according to Robinson (p. 184), is made on the ground of the old hypothetical method; and the hypothetical method itself is even older than it was in the *Phaedo* or the *Meno*, for it has gone back to being practically the Socratic elenchus.

It is certainly true that elenchus is an important factor in the highest section of the "line"; but Robinson's attempt to restrict this to elenchus is certainly an erroneous limitation.<sup>42</sup> If it were accurate, there would be no "upward path" in any sense; but that *μέχρι τοῦ ἀνποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν οὐν* (511 B 6-7) means motion "upward" in some sense is guaranteed both by the following *πάλιν αὖ . . . ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνη* and by the preceding *οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν οὐσαν ως οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ἵποθέσων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν* (511 A 5-6). There is no reason—except Robinson's gratuitous refusal to equate *ικανόν* and *ἀνπόθετον*—for not taking this upward motion to be the *ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ἵποθέμενος οὗτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φάνοιτο ἥσις ἐπὶ τι ικανὸν ἔλθοις* of *Phaedo* 101 D-E; and only this can explain the *πορεύεται τὰς ἵποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν* of *Republic* 533 C 8, for each hypothesis as soon as it is deduced from a "higher" hypothesis ceases to have the character of an hypothesis. This "destruction" occurs at each step on the upward path and is *not*, as Robinson says it is (p. 167), "contemporary at the earliest with the final instant of that progress," although one cannot be sure that the destruction is final and correct until one has reached the *ικανόν* or *ἀνπόθετον*. The tense of the participle *ἀναιροῦσα* itself proves this, and to make doubly sure that this sense should not be overlooked Plato put the participial clause between *πορεύεται* and *ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν*.

As to *ἀνπόθετον*, Robinson rightly observes (p. 163) that Plato apparently coined it for use here in the *Republic*; but it is

<sup>42</sup> "Division" is certainly not absent from Plato's conception of the method represented by the highest section of the line, for not only is it given in 454 A as the distinctive mark of *διαλέγεσθαι* as opposed to *ἐρίγειν* but in 534 B-C, a passage which Robinson calls "complementary to the Line itself" (p. 181), the process is unmistakably described (B 8-C 1) as part of the distinctive method of the *διαλεκτικός*.

strange for him to add (p. 164) that it seems to be equivalent to "beginning" in Plato's terminology here, for in the first of its two appearances it is an adjective modifying *ἀρχή* (510 B 7). Since it is a coinage and not merely a negative of *ὑπόθετος*, a form which Plato does not use, it probably has an etymological sense connected with the etymological turn given to *ὑπόθεσις* in 511 B 5-6, *τῷ ὅντι ὑποθέσεις οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμας*, in which sense *ὑποθέσεις* is contrasted to *ἀρχάς*. It ought not then to be thought of as "unhypothesized," the negative of the *action* "to hypothesize," but as "not resting under something else to which it is a stepping-stone." On Robinson's interpretation of the Divided Line or that of anyone else the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή* is an "hypothesis" in the sense that it has been "posited," at any rate at first—how else did you reach it?—but it is *ἀνυπόθετος* in the sense that you cannot posit another hypothesis from which you can deduce it, and that is why it is a *true ἀρχή*. The idea of good is such an *ἀρχή*, not because all else is ontologically derivative from it but simply, as Cornford has said (*Parmenides*, p. 132), because "you cannot ask for a reason for goodness; the good is an end in itself."

Chapters 11 and 12 constitute a kind of pendant to the study of hypothesis. In the first of these it is argued that there is no precise correspondence between the Divided Line and the Cave. This position, so long as the limitation "precise" is observed, is certainly correct, although some of Robinson's supporting arguments are exaggerated.<sup>43</sup> At any rate, the main points of this

<sup>43</sup> Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 259) properly criticizes Robinson's interpretation of *Republic* 515 D and 532 A-C (pp. 195-6). The important point, however, is that, since the chained inhabitants of the cave can see only the shadows on the wall and because of the echo suppose these shadows to be speaking, the shadows cast on the wall of the cave symbolize *all the sensible objects* of our world, not merely the lowest division of the line (cf. 515 C 1-2, 516 C 8 ff. and E 8 ff.). The objects which cast these shadows are simply necessary machinery (cf. Shorey, *Idea of Good*, p. 237 and Cornford, *Republic*, p. 223, n. 1), which, if they stood for anything, would have to symbolize the ideas. Nor is there in what we are told of the functioning of *διάνοια* which uses as *eikónes* the objects imitated by the lowest section of the line (*τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν*, 510 B 4), that is the sensible objects themselves, any parallel with the shadows and reflections outside of the cave or with the figurines within.

chapter are both right and well brought out: 1) the division of the upper line is one of method only, the point being that we must distinguish a lower and a higher way of getting at the intelligible world, 2) there are no "objects of mathematics" apart from the ideas,<sup>44</sup> and 3) Plato in the Line is proposing not a change in mathematics but a step out of and beyond mathematics.

The final chapter develops the thesis that whereas the hypothetical method is recommended in the "middle dialogues" very little use is made of that method in these works, which rely rather on analogy and imagery although what Plato says of analogy and imagery is usually unfavorable. That Robinson can be so much troubled by this apparent incoherence between Plato's method and methodology despite his own interpretation of the method used in the *Theaetetus*, the *Cratylus*, and the *Parmenides* and despite his recognition of *Politicus* 277-279 as a justification of the use of analogy is the natural result of his attempt to treat Plato's "logic" apart from his epistemology and ontology. The questions raised by Robinson and his method of treating them are important especially because they bring into sharp juxtaposition the attitude toward philosophy of the modern logician and that reflected in Plato's dialogues. Plato wrote no treatise on method; and the passages which are the subject of Robinson's study not only constitute but a tiny part of the writings from which they are extracted but all occur in those writings in contexts which are something other than "methodological." Moreover, the form of these writings itself constitutes a "method," behind which with important bearing upon its usefulness and justification lies Plato's theory of ideas and reminiscence with all of its consequences for discovery, demonstration, and teaching. Professor Robinson, like Glaucon, desires Plato to give an exhibition of the dialectic leading to an "anhypothetos arche"; he does not notice the way in which Socrates excuses himself from complying with Glaucon's request (*Republic* 533 A), a request which overlooks the very nature of dialectic and its necessary propaedeutics which by the figures of the sun, the line, and the cave Socrates has just tried to explain.

<sup>44</sup> These points are made by Moreau also in *La Construction*, pp. 343-6, though he arrives at the conclusion in quite a different manner.

If, then, Plato often points out the dangers of analogy and imagery and speaks scornfully of imitation, he still can hold that there is a proper and necessary use of these devices for those who are not yet dialecticians; for man, so long as he is man, one kind of imitation remains the highest goal, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, and even of the imitation which is tragedy there is a good kind as well as a bad: ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἄμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὅντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην (*Laws* 817 B).

HAROLD CHERNISS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

## THE DESCENDANTS OF ASINIUS POLLIO.

C. Asinius Pollio died in 5 A. D. at the age of 79, surrounded by wealth and the respect of the world. One son, Herius Asinius, had already preceded him to the grave, but he was survived by his daughter, who had married into the ancient noble family of the Claudi Marcelli, and by his son of consular rank, C. Asinius Gallus, who had in 12 B. C. married Vipsania, daughter of M. Agrippa and ex-wife of the future emperor Tiberius.

The son C. Asinius Gallus, who was a very considerable orator himself, continued the cultural tradition and in other ways imitated his father, but he had also great political ambitions. Even if the real talents of Asinius Gallus fell far below his ambition, it indicates the eminence both of the man and of the family that near the end Augustus is said to have considered the desirability of leaving the principate to Asinius Gallus.<sup>1</sup>

Distinguished for wealth, culture and in public affairs, the Asinii were now one of the great houses of Rome, revered throughout the empire; hence its membership and connections call for close examination.

The five sons of C. Asinius Gallus bore different praenomina as well as different cognomina. The eldest son, who became consul in 23 A. D. in what was doubtless the first year of his eligibility according to the custom for nobles who co-operated with the government, was born in 10 B. C. and was named for his famous paternal grandfather, C. Asinius Pollio. The second son, who became consul in 25 A. D., was accordingly born in 8 B. C. and was named for his famous maternal grandfather, M. Agrippa. The son who bore the father's own cognomen Gallus (but not the father's praenomen already bestowed upon the eldest son) surely came next in order. There are still two others, Celer and Saloninus. Servius Asinius Celer did not arrive apparently until all the more suitable relatives had already been honored with a namesake. Asinius Saloninus, although he hardly derived his cognomen from a paternal uncle<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Dubiously attested by a scholiast according to whom he smiled once

who died in infancy, may have been the fourth, and Celer the youngest son. We have no means of calculating the ages of the last three exactly, but for a rough estimate we might postulate at least a two-year interval in each case. For example, Gallus might have been born in 6 B. C., and of Saloni<sup>n</sup>us and Celer, one in 4 and the other in 2. A *terminus ante quem* for the birth of Servius Asinius Celer, who became consul in 38 A. D. just after the death of Tiberius, would be 5 A. D., but in his case we assume that, even if eligible as to age, he could not have risen to the consulate in the later years of Tiberius who killed the father. Asinius Saloni<sup>n</sup>us died in 22 A. D., when he could hardly have been more than twenty-six years old and may have been two, three or even four years younger. He had had no chance to attain the age for an important office, and yet because of the great family to which he belonged his death was notable. "In that year," wrote Tacitus, "there died the illustrious men Asinius Saloni<sup>n</sup>us . . . and Ateius Capito": *obiere eo anno viri inlustres Asinius Saloni<sup>n</sup>us, M. Agrippa et Polione avis, fratre Druso insignis Caesarique progener destinatus, et Capito Ateius*, etc. The inscription at Puteoli, *C. I. L.*, X, 1682, which concerned Saloni<sup>n</sup>us or Gallus, provides at least another *praenomen*:

Cn· Asinio  
Polianis· et· Agrippae· nepoti  
Puteolani· patrono· publice

It is interesting to note that a special tie connected the family with the spiritual capital of Hellenism. First of all two Athenian inscriptions honor an Asinius who may have been Gallus' eldest son Pollio:<sup>3</sup>

and died, he is justifiably rejected by R. Syme, "Pollio, Saloni<sup>n</sup>us and Salona<sup>e</sup>," *C. Q.*, XXX (1937), pp. 39-48.

<sup>3</sup> The first of these is *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4158. The text of the second is given just as I read and restored it at the beginning of the war during the composition of this article; subsequently the document was published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XV (1946), pp. 231-3, as follows: [Ο δῆμος] | Γάιου Ἀ[σίνιον Γαῖον ὑ]δν| στρατη[γὸν ἀποδεδειγ]μένον| ἀρετῆς [τε καὶ εὐνόias τῆς| eis ἡα[ντὸν ἔνεκα] ἀνέθη[κεν]. On the main point, however, the character and subject of the inscription, we are in agreement.




FIGURE 1. The family tree of the Asini. The fall of C. Asinius Gallus occurred in 30 A.D. For Asinia's connections see Figure 2. Vipsania's first marriage (to Tiberius) was dissolved in 12 B.C. Of her children Saloninus and Gallus, one certainly had the praenomen Cnaeus while the other may have been Quintus (cf. Figure 3).

'Ο δῆμος  
Γάιον Ἀσίνιον  
Γαίου νιὸν  
στρατηγὸν  
5 ἀποδεδειγμένον  
ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα  
καὶ εὐνοίας  
τῆς εἰς ἑαυτὸν  
ἀνέθηκεν

Γάιον Ἀ[σίνιον Γαίου ν]ὸν  
στρατηγὸν [όν ἀποδεδειγμ.] ἐνον  
ἀρετῆς [ἔνεκα καὶ ε]ὐνοίας τῆς  
εἰς ἑα[τὸν δῆμος] ἀνέθη[κεν]

Then another member of the family appears in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4172 which Graindor<sup>4</sup> dated after the Augustan Period and before the Hadrianic:

['Η πόλις]  
[Γάι]ον Ἀσί[νιον - - -] νὶὸν  
Πλακεντε[ῖνον ἀρετῆς ἔνε]  
κα καὶ εὐνοί[ας τῆς πρὸς τὸν]  
δ[ῆμον]

The family tree is sufficiently familiar so that we may exclude for C. Placentinus, who is otherwise unknown, both the generation of Gallus and that of his five sons, on the basis of the praenomen spatially most acceptable. On the other hand, the style renders improbable a date under Trajan or Domitian. Placentinus, accordingly, appears to be a grandson of Gallus.

Still another member of the family, I propose to show, was honored at Athens in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4111 (with addendum on p. 352), which I edit with the erasures restored as follows:

'Η βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου καὶ ἡ βουλὴ  
τῶν Ἐξακοσίων καὶ ὁ δῆμος [Κ[λαύ]δ[ιον]]  
|[Μάρκελλον Αἰσερνεῖνον καὶ]| Καλονει  
σίαν Φλακκίλαν Καλονεισέον Σαβείνον  
5 θυγατέρα Κλαυδίον Μαρκέλλον γυναικα  
σωφροσύνης ἔνεκα

Because of conservative and even archaic tendencies among Athenian stonecutters, it is extraordinarily difficult to date accurately many inscriptions which fall within the period from 60 B. C. to 60 A. D., but in my judgment the lettering of this inscription falls definitely within the first half of the first century after Christ. This view based on the style of lettering

<sup>4</sup> P. Graindor, *Athènes de Tibère à Trajan* (Cairo, 1931), p. 30.

finds further corroboration in the erasure of lines 2 and 3, for such erasures of the names of prominent Romans strongly suggest condemnations for *laesa maiestas* from the reign of Tiberius on.<sup>5</sup>

A recent editor<sup>6</sup> pointed out the marked similarity between the lettering of this inscription and that of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4106 in honor of the proconsul Τάιος [.]κώνιος Ταίον νιός. The latter document really dates from the principate, but mistaking the man honored therein<sup>7</sup> for one known from an inscription of

<sup>5</sup> See R. Cagnat, *Cours d'Epigraphie Latine* (4th ed., Paris, 1914), p. 175. In one case Antony's name was erased and then re-engraved. The first permanent erasures cited by Cagnat are from the reign of Tiberius. In 20 A.D., moreover, the consul Aurelius Cotta proposed that the name of Germanicus' enemy Cn. Piso be erased from the *fasti*, but Tiberius objected: *ne nomen Pisonis fastis eximeretur, quando M. Antonii, qui bellum patriae fecisset, Iulli Antonii, qui domum Augusti violasset, manerent* (Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 18, 1).

<sup>6</sup> O. Broneer, *A. J. A.*, XXXVI (1932), pp. 393-7.

<sup>7</sup> Th. Mommsen (*apud* Lolling, Δελτίον τῆς Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἐταιρείας, 1889, p. 133) identified the man as the father or brother of M. Paconius who was legate of the proconsul of Asia, C. Silanus, in 22 A.D. and who was put to death by Tiberius for *laesa maiestas*. P. Graindor, *Athènes sous Auguste* (Cairo, 1927), p. 70, accepted this identification and dated the inscription to the reign of Augustus or to that of Tiberius. Broneer, however, thought that he had rediscovered the proconsul ..κώνιος in the C. Orconius C. f. honored in a Delphian inscription of 66 B.C., *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 4, p. 70, No. 46. This identification, on the other hand, was rejected by the late E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian*, coll. 13 f. (= *Acad. d. Wiss. in Wien, Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abt.*, IX [1939]). Groag argued 1) that because of the lettering the Athenian inscription was very much later, perhaps Augustan; 2) that in 66 B.C., before the creation of the province Achaia, a proconsul would have had to be a proconsul of Macedonia, in whose relatively complete fasti no governor named Orconius can be found. Either of these arguments is in my opinion convincing by itself, and I cannot imagine anyone with the name Orconius obtaining between 68 and 66 B.C. so coveted a province as Macedonia. The Orconius of the Delphian inscription, let it be remembered, is not described as a proconsul, nor is there any indication that he belonged to a senatorial family. Since the name of the proconsul ought to be sought among the senatorial families, it was probably either [As]conius or [Pa]conius, that of a family which rose to prominence in the double revolution of Caesar and Augustus. Broneer's restoration and date reappear *apud* S. J. De Laet, *De Samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat gedurende de eerste Eeuw van het Principaat*, no. 469

66 B.C., he dated also *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4106 near 66 B.C. Furthermore, largely because of its similar lettering he assigned the above inscription in honor of [Claudius Marcellus and] Calvisia Flaccilla to the middle of the first century B.C. and identified the Claudius Marcellus with the enemy of Caesar, C. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 49 B.C., who died at Athens in 45 B.C. and was honored by the Athenians with a monument after his death.<sup>8</sup> Clearly this was not the monument because our Marcellus was very much alive and unlike the other he was accompanied by a not insignificant wife. Moreover, why the erasures if it was Caesar's enemy? The Athenians, who were partisans of Pompey as later of Antony, had no reason to insult an opponent of Caesar, while the latter, who paraded his magnanimity and clemency, would hardly have injured a dead enemy by ordering the erasure of his name.

Again it is unlikely that before the dictatorship of Caesar a prominent man from a great noble family like the Claudii Marcelli would have sought a wife among the still obscure Calvisii. It might have worked the other way: a Calvisius might have married a daughter of the Claudii Marcelli as Marius married a Julia, but in that era of political marriages a Claudius Marcellus would have spurned an alliance with a mere Calvisia. Furthermore, the father of Calvisia Flaccilla is unnecessarily recorded as if he added to her glory. This situation points definitely to the principate when the Calvisii Sabini had risen to be one of the great families of Rome.

The filiation, moreover, is never recorded by the praenomen of the father when the son's praenomen is omitted, so that whatever may have stood in the gap in line 3 did not include the phrase *Máρκον vióv*.<sup>9</sup> Thus neither Calvisius Sabinus nor Claudius Marcellus nor his father is mentioned by the praenomen, the omission of which would be very rare under the republic but is again very common under the principate when the praenomen tended to become less and less important.

If then the restoration *Máρκον vióv* cannot be considered for line 3, what followed the nomen and cognomen of Claudius

bis (= *Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, Faculteit van de Wijsbegeerte en Letteren*, 92<sup>e</sup> afl. [1941]).

<sup>8</sup> Letter of Sulpicius Rufus to Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, IV, 12.

<sup>9</sup> So Broneer, followed by Kirchner and Groag.

Marcellus must have been an additional cognomen, for a title would not have been erased. Apart from the nephew of Augustus, the Claudii Marcelli who were prominent in the early principate belonged to the branch of the Claudii Marcelli Aesernini. Now it is surely no mere coincidence that the cognomen Aeserninus fills exactly the rest of the space. If we are right in our date for the inscription, the Claudius Marcellus would almost have to be a member of this branch, and his name, formally registered as that of the person honored, would have to contain either the praenomen and filiation or the element Aeserninus. Also both methods of formal identification could of course be combined. He was commonly called just Claudius Marcellus, as by Seneca and as here in line 5, but not where his name was registered with independent identification.

One Marcellus Aeserninus, who was banished by Caesar but later recalled and covered with honors under Augustus, achieved the consulate in the year 22 B. C. Another, who was a grandson of Asinius Pollio, is known to have been praetor peregrinus in 19 A. D. As Groag<sup>10</sup> has convincingly argued, the latter cannot be the son of the former, who held the quaestorship as early as 48 B. C., but ought to have been his grandson. Thus still another Marcellus Aeserninus must have been the son-in-law of Asinius Pollio and the father of the praetor of 19 A. D.

The Marcellus Aeserninus whose name has been erased in the Athenian inscription cannot well have been the husband of Asinia because Calvisia Flaccilla is recorded as his wife. Nor can he have been the consul of 22 B. C., who seems to have antedated the inscription and to have passed the latter part of his life in honor and security. By elimination, therefore, he was the praetor of 19 A. D., after whose death the old name of the Claudii Marcelli Aesernini appears to have come to an end.

He was a gifted orator, one of the four to whom the consul designate Silius, addressing the senate in the year 47 A. D. against fees for advocates, pointed as to the greatest and noblest orators of the last three generations: *meminissent Asinii, Messalae, ac recentiorum Arruntii et Aesernini, ad summa proiectos incorrupta vita et facundia.*<sup>11</sup> These famous orators had not

<sup>10</sup> *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, II (1936), p. 215.

<sup>11</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, XI, 6, 4.

accepted fees. "They could afford such generosity, but not we," replied the opponents of Silius: *facile Asinium et Messalam, inter Antonium et Augustum bellorum praemii refertos, aut ditium familiarum heredes Aeserninos et Arruntios magnum animum induisse.*<sup>12</sup> From this it appears that L. Arruntius and Marcellus Aeserninus both inherited great wealth and rose to the top by means of their eloquence, personality, and social position. Of Arruntius it is well known that he became consul in 6 A. D. The phrase *incorrupta vita*, moreover, applies primarily to their refusal to accept fees for their services. It does not mean that they could not have been condemned for *laesa*




FIGURE 2. The relatives-in-law of Asinia, daughter of Asinius Pollio.

*maiestas* in the reign of terror. Indeed, Arruntius took his own life in 37, because he felt sure of conviction and execution or at least because life under the terror had become too much for him. So it went also with Marcellus Aeserninus, whose name significantly has been erased in the inscription at Athens. *Sub Tiberio Caesare fuit accusandi frequens et paene publica rabies, quae omni civili bello gravius togatam civitatem conficit.*<sup>13</sup>

It may be possible to date the Athenian inscription honoring Aeserninus and his wife for their *σωφροσύνη*. It was not the

<sup>12</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, XI, 7, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Seneca, *De Ben.*, III, 26, 1. For a reply to recent attempts to whitewash the character of Tiberius compare C. W. Mendell, *Yale Classical Studies*, V (1935), pp. 1-53, especially pp. 19-23 and 44-53. In the last years of the reign of Tiberius there was a veritable plague of trials and executions under the *lex maiestatis*. Even Tacitus, who mentions one hundred and eight senatorial cases of this type, has presented only a selection, enough to give the atmosphere and indicate the development.

year of his praetorship, but it presumably postdated his rise to international prominence as praetor peregrinus. From an Athenian standpoint the orator conspicuously displayed wise restraint when in 20 A.D. like C. Asinius Gallus he refused to defend Piso against the accusation of having murdered Germanicus.<sup>14</sup>

A new branch, the Asinii Marcelli, appear from the middle of the first century to the middle of the second century after Christ. At the beginning we have two consulars, Q. and M. Asinii Marcelli. The career of Quintus began under the Julio-Claudian emperors, because, although a patrician, he served as *decemvir stlitibus iudicandis*, a post not held by patricians from the time of Vespasian on.<sup>15</sup> Since, moreover, he is known to be the son of another Quintus, Marcus Asinius Marcellus was not his father. Yet because of the similar nomenclature they must have been related, and it is not too rash to assume that they were brothers. The consulate of M. Asinius Marcellus occurred in 54 A.D. If he advanced to this post in the minimum time, as a noble might advance, then he was born in 21 A.D. His brother may have been born about two years earlier, for example.

M. Asinius Marcellus, *Asinio Pollione proavo clarus*,<sup>16</sup> must have been descended from Asinius Pollio through Herius Asinius, through one of the five sons of C. Asinius Gallus, or through Asinia the mother of the Marcellus Aeserninus who was condemned, we have shown, for *laesa maiestas* toward the end of the reign of Tiberius.

Descent through an unrecorded son of Herius Asinius appears unlikely, and if Q. and M. Asinii Marcelli were grandsons of C. Asinius Gallus, cos. 8 B.C., descent of M. Marcellus from Agrippa would have been emphasized equally with that from Asinius Pollio, as in the case of Saloninus. There remains only the line of Asinia. Q. and M. Marcelli were mere children in the reign of Tiberius, and when Marcellus Aeserninus was condemned, his relatives would presumably have looked after the children.

That Q. and M. Marcelli were not descended from Asinius Pollio through the male line is further suggested by the invari-

<sup>14</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 11.

<sup>15</sup> E. Groag, *P. I. R. 2*, I, p. 250, no. 1234.

<sup>16</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIV, 40, 3.

ability of the cognomen, which was not bestowed in order to honor a relative or friend in the occasional manner of earlier generations of Asinii but in order to assert membership in a separate branch of the *gens*. It records the noble family out of which the boys had been adopted by a relative of their father. The adoptive father, Q. Asinius ( ), could have been, hardly an unrecorded son of Herius Asinius who died so young, but a son of C. Asinius Gallus cos. 8 B. C. If he was a son of C. Asinius Gallus, it could only be Gallus because Salonus died too young, while Pollio, Agrippa, and Celer are known to have had praenomina other than Quintus. By elimination, furthermore, it would establish Cnaeus as the praenomen of Salonus.

The M. Asinius Marcellus who became consul in 104 A. D. is more likely to have been a son than a grandson of the M. Asinius Marcellus born in 21 A. D., for nobles were no longer being advanced to the consulate with the same rapidity and certainty. The consul Q. Asinius Marcellus of 96 A. D. can scarcely have been a man born around 20 A. D., so he must have been the son of the first Q. Asinius Marcellus. They are not identical. The consul of 96 A. D., however, born before 64 A. D. at the very latest, would probably not have been that proprietor of the tile factory who died in 141. Thus we are dealing, I rather suspect, with three men who bore the name Q. Asinius Marcellus. The tiles stamped with this name begin in the Trajanic Period,<sup>17</sup> and the *figlinae* in which they were produced may at first have belonged to the consul of 96 A. D. as later to the Q. Asinius Marcellus from whom the factory passed in 141 to Asinia Quadratilla.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See now the careful study of H. Bloch, "I bolli laterizii e la storia edilizia romana," *Bull. Arch. Com.*, LXIV (1936), pp. 142-225; LXV (1937), pp. 83-187; LXVI (1938), pp. 193-353. Tiles of Q. Asinius Marcellus are found at Rome in the Atrium Vestae in a wall which belongs to the Trajanic Period, as Bloch demonstrates, *loc. cit.*, LXIV, pp. 208 and 218 (cf. LXV, pp. 88, 90 f., and 175).

<sup>18</sup> H. Bloch, *Bull. Arch. Com.*, LXVI (1938), p. 195, assumes that the name Q. Asinius Marcellus on the stamps applies to one person, namely the consul of 96 A. D., and that Asinia Quadratilla, accordingly, was not the granddaughter of the consular but his daughter. E. Groag, *P. I. R.<sup>2</sup>*, I (1933), p. 250, lists the proprietor of the tile factory under no. 1236 and the consul of 96 A. D. under no. 1235, where he comments: "vel idem atque Q. Asinius Marcellus qui sequitur vel pater eius."

In the third century after Christ the cognomen and the Italian descent of the consular (and historian) C. Asinius Quadratus suggest that he and his son the consular C. Asinius Julianus<sup>19</sup> were relatives of Asinia Quadratilla; but a family connection, if it existed, might have gone back merely to an adoption.

From the generation after Asinius Pollio, who created the greatness of the family, its history may be summarized as




FIGURE 3. The Asinii Marcelli.

follows. Under the leadership of C. Asinius Gallus cos. 8 B.C. it became one of the most influential families of Rome. Gallus, himself, appears repeatedly in the pages of Tacitus as the senatorial spokesman. In the factions which grew up during the reign of Tiberius, the Asinii were closely connected with Germanicus, whose wife Agrippina was a half-sister of the wife of C. Asinius Gallus. The latter's nephew Aeserninus became praetor<sup>20</sup> in 19 A.D. and an Arval Brother; one of the sons

<sup>19</sup> On this family see the remarks of E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian*, coll. 90-91 (= *Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien, Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abt.*, IX [1939]).

<sup>20</sup> Later perhaps also consul as suggested by K. Th. Schneider, *Zusammensetzung des römischen Senates von Tiberius bis Nero* (Diss., Zürich, 1942), p. 43, no. 79.

of Asinius Gallus became consul in 23 A. D., and another in 25 A. D. It was intended that another son who died in 22 A. D., *Caesari progener destinatus*, should marry the emperor's grand-niece, daughter of Germanicus. At Athens, which had been rudely castigated by Piso<sup>21</sup> and treated with deference by Germanicus<sup>22</sup> and his friends, a statue was erected at least to Aeserninus. Relations with Tiberius, despite the insinuations of Tacitus, appear to have been excellent so far. Gallus cultivated Sejanus.<sup>23</sup> In 23 A. D. occurred the death of Drusus Caesar, and the children of Germanicus were now in line for the succession. The ambition of Agrippina, widow of Germanicus, and the influence of Sejanus aroused the suspicion and hostility of Tiberius against Agrippina and her friends. Her open display of hostility to Tiberius is recorded by Tacitus<sup>24</sup> among the events of 26 A. D. In 29 Tiberius openly assailed Agrippina. In 30 occurred the condemnation of Gallus,<sup>25</sup> who was now seventy years old. Subsequently Tiberius accused Agrippina of adultery—a common cloak for an unavowable political motive—with Asinius Gallus and of being in despair because of the latter's death. Aeserninus too was condemned.

From 26 A. D., the whole family of the Asinii, including Marcellus Aeserninus, must have been seriously compromised with Tiberius, and all advancement closed. On the other hand, they were highly esteemed by Agrippina and were favorably treated in the memoirs of her daughter, Agrippina the Younger.

But as soon as Tiberius died and Caligula, son of Germanicus, succeeded, the Asinii were restored to something like prominence, and Ser. Asinius Celer achieved the consulate in 38 A. D.

Under Claudius the Asinii lost their special influence, and in

<sup>21</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 55, 1.

<sup>22</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 53, 3-4: *hinc ventum Athenas, foederique sociae et vetustae urbis datum, ut uno lictore uteretur. excepere Graeci quae sitissimis honoribus, vetera suorum facta dictaque preferentes, quo plus dignationis adulatio haberet.*

<sup>23</sup> Dio Cassius, LVIII, 2.

<sup>24</sup> *Ann.*, IV, 54.

<sup>25</sup> Dio Cassius, LVIII, 2. The pertinent section of the *Annals* of Tacitus has not been preserved. It was surely Gallus whom Agrippina in 26 A. D. had wanted to marry, as suggested by F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931), p. 179, note 4, and by R. S. Rogers, *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), p. 155.

his disaffection Asinius Gallus conspired against the emperor. When his bungling machinations were uncovered, he himself was punished and the family was once again seriously compromised so that they forfeited the imperial patronage necessary for political advancement.

But with the rise of Agrippina the Younger, daughter of Germanicus, to a position of controlling influence, the Asinii once more emerge into political prominence. M. Asinius Marcellus achieved the consulate in 54 and Q. Asinius Marcellus at some unknown date in the same period. With a sense of favors to come, Athens at this time erected the dedication for C. Asinius Placentinus.

Agrippina, it seems, was distributing patronage, but the favors were not all one way. Especially at a time when a change of regime was ripe or had to be consolidated, the support of the illustrious old and wealthy families, to whose *clientela* other families and even cities naturally still gravitated,<sup>26</sup> meant a great deal both for prestige and for immediately practical reasons.

No further consulates are recorded for the family until 81 when Asinius Pollio Verrucosus achieved that distinction.<sup>27</sup> In 96 another Q. Marcellus and in 104 another M. Marcellus became consuls.

The connection of the family with Athens went back to the days of T. Pomponius Atticus. When Agrippa married the

<sup>26</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.*, I, 4, 3: *pars populi integra et magnis domibus adnexa*.

<sup>27</sup> The proconsul of Sardinia, C. Asinius Tucurianus (= *P.I.R.*<sup>2</sup>, I, 1254), whose date is not recorded, probably belonged to the second half of the first century A.D. like Placentinus and Verrucosus. It is tempting to identify him with the benefactor of Corone in Messenia and to restore his name in the inscription published by N. Valmin, *Rapport préliminaire de l'Expédition en Messénie*, pp. 44-46 (= *Kunl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, Årsberättelse*, 1934-1935, I): 'Α πό[λις] | ἀ τῶν Κο[ρωνίων] | Γ. Ἀσίνιος [Τοκούρι] | αὐτὸν τὸ[ν ἔαυτας] | εὐερ[γέταν] | ἀπετᾶς [ἔνεκα]. The photograph indicates that the lacuna in line 3 requires a restoration longer than the name of C. Asinius Julianus, for whom, moreover, the inscription is surely too early. The cognomen, which I presume to be derived like Tocernius and Togernius ultimately from the Etruscan praenomen *θucer*, may have been written in Greek with tau or theta.

daughter of Atticus, he inherited these ties and made them for the Athenians vastly more important. The huge monument at the approach to the Acropolis was rededicated to Agrippa, who thus received with other honors one even beyond his legitimate expectations. From him the tie had descended to the families into which his daughters had married, namely to the Asinii and to the house of Germanicus. This is the background which influenced the behavior of Germanicus and of his enemy Piso on their visits to Athens, and it is the background which called forth more than one monument at Athens in joyful celebration of the impending praetorship of a young Asinius.

#### P. APPULEIUS VARUS.

The Athenian inscriptions *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4106 and 4111, for which on pages 150 ff. above we have proposed a date in the first half of the first century after Christ, resemble both in lettering and in general appearance another Athenian base with an inscription which B. D. Meritt publishes in *Hesperia*, XV (1946), pp. 234-5. Meritt would admit a date from the second century B. C. to the second century after Christ. It reads:

'Η βουλὴ η ἐξ Ἀρήον Πάγου  
καὶ ὁ δῆμος Πόπλιον Ἀππολήιον  
Οὐăρον ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐνοίας  
ἔνεκα

While monuments are commonly erected by the *πόλις* or the *δῆμος* or the Areopagus alone, also by the Demos in conjunction with the Council of the Six (or Five) Hundred with or without the Areopagus, monuments erected by the Areopagus and the Demos in conjunction, without mention of the Council of the Six (or Five) Hundred, are less frequent. Two such monuments, *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3258 and 3259, are securely dated in 18 A. D. or close thereto. This reinforces our impression that the new monument in honor of P. Appuleius Varus belongs in the first quarter of the first century after Christ or close thereto.

The man is not otherwise known, but in view of the date a likelihood exists that he was not some *negotiator* but a representative of a distinguished Roman family. At this time the Appulei, producing consuls, were indeed a great family, among whom the cognomen Varus appears in the feminine form Varilla. Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 50, identifies Appuleia Varil<l>a (= *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, I, 968) as *sororis Augusti neptem*. She was accused in 17 A. D. of adultery. P. Appuleius Varus was, I think, a relative of hers and then almost certainly a senator.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

## THE FIRST ELEGY OF SOLON.

The reflective elegy of Solon, 1 Diehl,<sup>1</sup> has already been made the subject of extensive and intelligent discussion.<sup>2</sup> The poem is, however, so full of matter, and presents so many problems, that finality of demonstration has not yet been achieved; and a re-reading of the text suggests that certain passages have not even yet received full analysis. In particular, attempts to outline the structure of the elegy have invariably encountered difficulties, since there are apparent inconsequences in the articulation of parts, and even internal contradictions in sense, so that it has been thought to be a mere patchwork.<sup>3</sup> I believe

<sup>1</sup> Diehl's text has been followed throughout this study. All other references to lyric poets are also to Diehl's text.

<sup>2</sup> The following works have been consulted: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 257-75; K. Reinhardt, "Solons Elegie *eis ἑαυτόν*," *Rh. Mus.*, LXXI (1916), pp. 128-35; I. M. Linforth, *Solon the Athenian* (*Univ. of California Publ. Class. Phil.*, VI [1919]), pp. 105-13; K. Ziegler, "Solon als Mensch und Dichter," *Neue Jahrb.*, XLIX, 1 (1922), pp. 193-204; G. Perotta, "L'elegia di Solone alle Muse," *Atene e Roma*, V (1924), pp. 251-60; T. Hudson-Williams, *Early Greek Elegy* (Cardiff and London, 1926); P. Friedlaender, "In Solonis c. 1," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), pp. 381-3; W. Schmid, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, I, 1 (Munich, 1929), pp. 367-8; E. Roemisch, *Studien zur älteren griechischen Elegie* (Frankfurt, 1933), pp. 1-37; 70-76; J. M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1931); C. M. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 90-8; K. Bielohlawek, *Hypothese und Gnomus* (*Philologus*, Supplbd. XXXII, 3 [Leipzig, 1940]), pp. 27-8; W. C. Greene, *Moira* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), pp. 36-7; W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Eng. trans. G. Highet, 2d ed., New York, 1945), I, pp. 144-7. References to these works will be made in the simplest possible form.

<sup>3</sup> So Perotta. He argues that to the genuine opening (1-8) is appended a string of gnomic lines, including some from the works of Solon himself. The true conclusion he outlines from the concluding couplet in the parody by Crates, 1, 10-11:

τῶν δὲ τυχών 'Ερμῆν καὶ Μούσας Ἰλάσομ' ἀγνά  
οὐ δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς, ἀλλ' ἀρεταῖς ὁσίαις.

There is nothing in our poem which corresponds to this, but (so Perotta) there must once have been; namely, the true, original ending of Solon's prayer. The alternative would be that Crates began, but did not end, with a close parody.

a new approach may help to clarify some of the obscurities in structure and sense, which are interdependent. This discussion is put forward in all humility as a contribution toward the understanding of a poem of enormous interest and admitted difficulty.

To discuss as a unit an elegy of 76 lines is, as Wilamowitz has complained,<sup>4</sup> a very awkward task. In this study the structure will be analyzed first by following the textual transitions as they appear; then by studying the character of the construction as a whole. Finally, certain passages will be re-examined from the point of view of content. This method is cumbersome and involves some repetition, but under the circumstances appears to be the only one practicable.

If, instead of trying to articulate the poem according to some known or postulated framework, we proceed inductively from passage to passage, looking for the occasion of each new subject in the implications of the previous subject, a new impression is received. The elegy seems no longer to fall into a series of sections, or even into two main parts,<sup>5</sup> but becomes a progression of thought, each subsequent stage being an expansion, or revision, or illustration of a previous stage. It is thus a self-generating series of connected ideas.

Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὄλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,  
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτέ μοι εὐχομένοι.  
ὅλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων  
ἀνθρώπων αἰὲν δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν.  
5 εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὅδε φίλοισ', ἔχθροισι δὲ πικρόν,  
τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἴδειν.

It has been pointed out that elegy is always addressed to someone.<sup>6</sup> In this case, the opening address to the Muses gives

<sup>4</sup> P. 258. Wilamowitz prefaces his analysis with a paraphrase in Greek prose.

<sup>5</sup> So Bowra, Greene, and even Wilamowitz, with whose analysis of the poem I find myself in general agreement.

<sup>6</sup> See Jaeger, p. 89. This poem has been named Solon's Prayer to the Muses or, alternatively, his Elegy *εἰς ἑαυτόν*. Both are justifiable titles but likely to be misleading, the former because the reflections wander so far from the initial prayer, the latter because the elegy is not addressed by the poet to himself (like Archilochus, 67, which is trochaic self-exhortation, Odysseus-like) but is rather written for himself.

the poem the formal appearance of a prayer. But the prayer is contained entirely in these lines or, at most, in lines 1-8. This does not mean that the proem is conventional and meaningless.<sup>7</sup> The prayer is real and is a real beginning, but in itself simple. Of the three things prayed for, wealth, reputation, and power (to help friends and injure enemies, the product of wealth and reputation combined) the latter two are not developed. The word that leads to expansion is ὅλβον.

χρήματα δ' ἴμείρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι  
οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὑστερον ἥλθε δίκη.<sup>8</sup>

*χρήματα* repeats ὅλβον and the couplet completes the modification of the prayer. The request in its first form was too simple. Solon's surviving work shows throughout a disapproval of greed for money, of those persons who always want more when they already have enough.<sup>9</sup> This feeling, a directing force in political activities presumably subsequent to this poem, could almost be called an obsession, were it not so well justified by the realities of his time. The prayer in the first six lines has given the impression that the poet is simply asking for wealth, whether deserved or not, and this will not do. Hence the modification.

πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρί  
10      ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφὴν·  
      δὸν δ' ἄνδρες μετίωσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον  
          ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκοισ' ἔργμασι πειθόμενος  
      οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται, ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτη·  
          ἀρχὴ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ὡς τε πυρός  
15      φλαύρη μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνηρὴ δὲ τελευτᾶ·  
      οὐ γάρ δῆ<ν> θνητοῖσ' ὕβριος ἔργα πέλει,  
      ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἔφορᾶι τέλος, ἐξαπίνης δέ,  
          ὥστ' ἀνεμος νεφέλας αἷψα διεσκέδασεν  
          ἡρινός

*πλοῦτον* resumes ὅλβον (3) and *χρήματα* (7). ἀδίκως (7) is expanded to ὑφ' ὕβριος and the implied δικαίως to ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> So Bielohlawek.

<sup>8</sup> Compare Sappho, 92; Pindar, *Pyth.*, V, 1-4.

<sup>9</sup> As later in this poem, 72-73. See also 3, 5-6; 4, 5-7; 5, 9-10. For *χρήματα* ἄνηρ see Solon's contemporary, Alcaeus, 101; later, Pindar, *Isth.*, II, 11, also Theognis, 699-700.

<sup>10</sup> Compare Hesiod, *Op.* 320: *χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἀρπακτά, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω.*

The prayer is done, but the opposition of just and unjust money-making, and the simple statement that punishment attends the latter, can be developed. The imagery shifts, from standing grain ready to be reaped, to an unwilling follower being dragged along by violence, then to a fire, finally to a hurricane. The point that punishment follows unjust profit has already been made (8); we are now told why, because it is against nature, therefore against the gods. But line 8 needed expansion also in another way. It implied that punishment came immediately or simply; and Solon knows that this is not true. Punishment may be delayed, or may seem at first insignificant; the end is terrific, and no one can tell when Zeus will strike. Yet the very statement "Zeus strikes" is missing, because we are involved in mid-sentence in another sort of progression, in which anacolouthon is characteristic.

ὅς πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτοιο  
 20 πνθμένα κινήσας, γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον  
 δημώσας καλὰ ἔργα θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἵκανει  
 οὐρανόν, αἰθρίην δ' αὖτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν·  
 λάμπει δ' ἡελίου μένος κατὰ πίσσα γαῖαν  
 καλόν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

This progression is in the manner of the Homeric simile. It differs from previous stages in that there is no expansion or development of thought, but pure illustration. *ὣστ' ἄνεμος* originally was to form part of a statement like "Zeus strikes as the wind does." But now not meaning, rather imagery, expands, and the imagery is anchored at the beginning in its context but free at the other end. So the simile of the gale ends with calm, and cloudless skies, because the figure of the gale once started transfers interest from the preceding context to itself, until it has been run out to its conclusion. Solon drops his text for the moment to follow this splendid storm he has started. This progression is quite different in content from the organic expansion of thought we have been tracing hitherto. It is at home in the epic,<sup>11</sup> and can also appear in close forms, such as the

<sup>11</sup> On the characteristics of the Homeric simile see Schmid, I, 1, pp. 102-3. This manner of digression is not restricted to the simile; compare *Il.*, I, 234-239, where Achilles, about to swear by the king's staff, interrupts himself to describe it and tell its story.

Sapphic ode.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, on the formal side it represents, through a known and familiar technique, the projection of a sequence irrelevant to the original context.

25 *τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἔκάστωι  
ῶσπερ θυητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὁξύχολος,  
αἰεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ λέληθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρόν  
θυμὸν ἔχῃ, πάντως δέ εἰς τέλος ἐξεφάνη·  
ἀλλὰ δὲ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, δέ δὲ ὑστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν*  
30 *αὐτοί, μὴ δὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιοῦσα κίχηι,  
ἥλυθε πάντως αὐτις· ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν  
ἢ παῖδες τούτων ηγένετος εἰς οπίσω.*

*τοιαύτη* accordingly goes back to the beginning of the simile, not to its end, or rather beyond the simile to include also the statement which occasions it, *ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾶν τέλος*. The complement to this is *οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἔκάστωι ὕσπερ θυητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὁξύχολος*. Like the storm, which destroys *καλὰ ἔργα*, Zeus seems somewhat indiscriminate. His view, unlike ours, is the long one, and he is not concerned about details. Again, the fact of delay in punishment is reaffirmed more precisely. The escape of the guilty, the punishment of their innocent children, are expansions of the above thought, which springs originally from *τέλος* (17).<sup>13</sup>

θυητοὶ δέ ὡδε νοεῦμεν ὄμως ἀγαθός τε κακός τε,  
*εἰς δὲ εἰς ηγένετος αὐτὸς δόξαν ἔκαστος ἔχει,*  
35 *πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δέ αὐτις ὀδύρεται· ἀχρι δὲ τούτου  
χάσκοντες κούφαιος ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.*

Those who have considered that the poem falls into two main

<sup>12</sup> See for example Sappho, 98, 6-14, where *ὡς . . . μῆνα* introduces the full unfolding of a moonlit night.

<sup>13</sup> *ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾶν τέλος* is resumed, after the interruption of the simile, by *πάντως δέ εἰς τέλος ἐξεφάνη*.

<sup>14</sup> I have given this line as it stands in Diehl's text. Yet this emendation (which is Buecheler's) of the MS *ενδηηην*, though attractive, is unlikely, implying as it does *δεινός* = "terrific" = "magnificent." To other proposed emendations cited in Diehl's commentary, now add Jaeger's *ἔρδειν ην* and see his note, *Paideia*, pp. 450-1. I believe, but hardly expect to convince others, that the right reading is *ἔνδον ην*, so that the line means "each man keeps himself his own inward ideas." For the quantity, compare Homer, *Il.*, XVII, 260: *τῶν δέ ἄλλων τίς κεν ητι φρεσὶν οὐνόματ' εἴποι.* That is, a short vowel followed by a consonant before oblique cases of *ὅς* is syllaba anceps. See also *Od.*, I, 5; IX, 34; XIX, 400, etc. Thus *ώδε νοεῦμεν* would be left intransitive, its content being supplied in the following line.

divisions<sup>15</sup> would place the break here. But there is no real break. The essential point has been made that Zeus looks only in the large and toward the end (17; 25-28); this brings us, via *θυητοί*, to the contrasted human way, which is to look at what is immediate and *not* to see the end.<sup>16</sup> In ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε *kakós te* there is an indication that the subject has now proceeded from the consideration of evil and divine punishment to the question of human, as contrasted with divine, intelligence. Against the absolute knowledge of Zeus, our flimsily founded expectations (*κούφαιο'* ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα) whenever we try to go beyond the immediate.

χῶστις μὲν νούσουσιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέησι πιεσθῆ  
ώς ὑγής ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·  
ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνήρ  
40      καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων·  
εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται,  
κτήσεσθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ.

These lines are a simple expansion of the foregoing, to exemplify the way in which we delude ourselves with false interpretation of our own nature<sup>17</sup> or false expectation of the close future. Such expansion is characteristic of the poem. To belong strictly in sequence, *ώς ὑγής ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο* should mean "thinks he will be healthy," but from the construction it is more likely to mean "makes plans to become healthy." In either case, it expresses an optimistic hope. With the last couplet in this sequence, and the important word *χρήματα*, we are back on the important subject of money and money-making, which while not originally selected as the subject of the poem is a matter of such absorbing interest to Solon that it is likely to generate a further expansion of thought. Again, the methods of making money are various. *χρήματα* therefore launches us once more on an illustrative series, within illustrative series.

σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὃ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλᾶται  
ἐν νησὶν χρήζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν  
45      ἵχθυόντ' ἀνέμοισι φορεύμενος ἀργαλέοισιν,

<sup>15</sup> See above, note 5.

<sup>16</sup> So Wilamowitz, p. 265.

<sup>17</sup> *δοκέω* can refer to the future as well as the present, and *ἐλπίζω* to the present as well as the future; thus we are prepared (*δέξαν, ἐλπίσιν*) for either. The point is that we cannot break loose from our subjective notions.

φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος·  
 ἄλλος γῆγ τέμνων πολυδένδρεον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν  
     λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ' ἀρτρα μέλει·  
 ἄλλος Ἀθηναῖς τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω  
 50     ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν ἔυλλέγεται βίοτον,  
 ἄλλος Ὄλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθείς,  
     ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος·  
 ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἔκαεργος Ἀπόλλων,  
     ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,  
 55     ῷ συνομαρτήσωσι θεοί· τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως  
     οὐτε τις οἰωνὸς ρύσεται οὐθ' ἵερά·  
 ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες  
     ἴητροί, καὶ τοῖσ' οὐδὲν ἐπεστι τέλος·  
 πολλάκι δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης ὁδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος,  
 60     κοῦκ ἄν τις λύσαιτ' ἥπια φάρμακα δούς·  
     τὸν δὲ κακῶς νούσουσι κυκώμενον ἀργαλέησιν  
     ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἷψα τίθησ' ὑγιῆ.

The transition to this series was, as we have seen, obvious.<sup>18</sup> As to its inner structure, there may be a progression from the life of the merchant, most obviously controlled by motives of profit (even to the risk of life<sup>19</sup>), toward those professions, farmer, smith, poet, seer, doctor, in which this motive is less clearly dominant. Even if the transitional idea of *χρήματα* is considered to have faded by the end of the series, this is once again only the technique of the simile (progression of imagery) applied to the progression of ideas; fast at one end, free at the other. There are also modifications of statement within the passage. Concerning the seer, the first couplet (53-54) could, logically and grammatically, stand by itself. The three previous exponents of their professions have had only one couplet apiece; but to finish with the *μάντις* here would be over-simple, since it might leave concerning his powers an impression that would be false. For, first, the seer can read the future only if the gods help him (55), that is, if the godlike view is conferred from without, since as man he is fallible like other men; and, secondly, no foreknowledge, no omen, can prevent what is fated to happen

<sup>18</sup> Note that the famous parallel in Horace, *Carm.*, I, 1, is an *initial* series without preliminary context. Horace perhaps has in mind also Pindar, *Isth.*, I, 47-9.

<sup>19</sup> For sea-faring as an example of the most desperate need or desire for money, see Hesiod, *Op.*, 632-4; 646-7; Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 411-18; Tibullus, I, 1, 49-50.

from happening (55-56).<sup>20</sup> This correction-in-stride of a too-simple statement parallels the correction of line 3 by lines 7-8. Next, the physician. He also does not see or control the end (*τέλος*) when he goes to work.<sup>21</sup> The meaning of *καὶ τοῖσ’ οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος* becomes clear, I think, if we remember ἀλλὰ *Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾶ τέλος* (17) and *πάντως δὲ ἐς τέλος ἔξεφάνη* (28). *τέλος* in any sense, perfection of power,<sup>22</sup> perfection of vision, ability to see to the end, belongs to the gods; the physician is without final authority, a mere mortal doing his best with immediate appearances, and subject to favorable as well as unfavorable surprises (59-62).

Μοῖρα δέ τοι θυητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,  
δῶρα δὲ ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.  
65 πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργμασιν, οὐδὲ τις οἴδεν,  
ἥτι μέλλει σχῆσεν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·  
ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν εὐ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας  
ἐσ μεγάλην ἀτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,  
τῶι δὲ κακῷς ἔρδοντι θεός περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν  
70 συντυχίην ὀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

These last phenomena, unexpected aggravation of disease (59-60), unexpected recovery (61-62), now are summarized and generalized, first as (respectively) *κακόν* and *ἐσθλόν* bestowed by fate, then together as *δῶρα θεῶν*.<sup>23</sup> In other words, the success and failure of the doctor contrary to the expectation of his judgment are examples which can be extended to apply to human experience in general. It simply follows from this that the man who tries to proceed the right way may fail, the mistaken man may succeed. This completes the description of mortal knowl-

<sup>20</sup> It is nowhere said to be the business of the seer to *control* the future; yet such lines as *Il.*, I, 108: *ἐσθλὸν δὲ οὐτε τι πω εἰπας ἔπος οὐτ’ ἐτέλεσσας* seem to indicate that such might be his function according to popular belief.

<sup>21</sup> Edmonds translates: "for these too there's no end to their labors." Plausible in itself, but the endlessness of work has not been the main point.

<sup>22</sup> See Liddell-Scott-Jones, *s. v. τέλος*.

<sup>23</sup> The terms *Μοῖρα* (63), *θεοί* (64), *Ζεὺς* (76), *ἀθάνατοι* (74) are not here used with particular circumspection, but are at least roughly equivalent. At any rate, *Μοῖρα = θεοί*, since the *δῶρα θεῶν* (64) are the same as the *κακόν* and *ἐσθλόν* given by *Μοῖρα* (63). It would be as futile to try to make accurate distinctions here as to distinguish among *ὅλβος* (3), *χρήματα* (7), and *πλοῦτος* (9).

edge, its extreme inadequacy as contrasted with the divine. *οὐ προνοήσας* attaches no particular blame.<sup>24</sup> It is not through want of trying, but through sheer lack of vision and power, that no man can count on the success of his careful plans.

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·  
οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,  
διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἀν κορέσειν ἄπαντας;  
κέρδεα τοι θυητοῖσ' ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι,  
75 ἀτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἦν δπότε Ζεύς  
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἀλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Here the link is least obvious, the transition most abrupt. Yet the last six lines must be generated from *συντυχίην ἀγαθήν* (70). This means, of course, success. But since Solon is haunted throughout this work by the idea of money, it is not unnatural that he should seize on that aspect of *συντυχίη ἀγαθή* which particularly fascinates him, and proceed from "success" as if it meant "financial success." Those who have won this undeservedly bring him back at last to the present, to Attica here and now (*οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων*). It is they who are at the heart of troubles in Athens, and the thought of them at the outset made Solon modify his simple prayer to become rich. Such men are short-sighted; they do not realize that wealth has come to them by divine dispensation, not through their own cleverness; and they want more. With a reminder that this brings *ἀτη* (75, recalling 17), and the more sinister reminder that Zeus works in a large way and is not troubled concerning details (25-32), so that no man can tell who will suffer on account of these greedy ones, Solon comes to a close.

If the above analysis is justified in detail, the poem is, then, a progression from idea to idea, self-generated; we are in effect watching Solon think. Wilamowitz describes the structure as a chain,<sup>25</sup> and so far this view repeats his. He also warns us

<sup>24</sup> The essential meaning of these lines is repeated in the lines which appear at the end of several plays by Euripides. See the endings of *Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Helen*, *Bacchae*.

<sup>25</sup> "Glieder einer Kette" (p. 265). He adds: "Da ist die Aufgabe des Erklämers zu sehen, erst das jedes Glied nach vorn und hinten seinen Anschluss hat; so viel kann der Dichter leisten, können wir also fordern; aber als Ganzes und Geschlossenes zu erfassen müssen wir die Kette als Ganzes übersehen und vor allem darauf achten, woran sie

against trying to force the work into any pattern or scheme, as in stylized forms such as drama or oratory. Further, however, he would make this simply a matter of the paratactic archaic style, characteristic of one who lacks training to subordinate. If this were so, the poem would find closer analogies in the rest of Solon's work and early elegy in general. Wilamowitz also, as do others, believes that the thought is guided by a single idea: the universal desire for wealth.<sup>26</sup>

The assumption of such a guiding theme, if taken seriously, contradicts the analysis made above and indicated previously by Wilamowitz. The initial prayer becomes, except for one element, a decorative forefront; the passages on punishment become digressions, not progressions. What is the subject of the poem? The desire for wealth and its effect on human conduct and experience? The difference between mortal and divine intelligence? The nature of divine punishment? The point is that there is no subject. Solon is simply proceeding from thought to thought; talking to himself, that is, thinking,<sup>27</sup> in such a way that we are not given the end product, with reasons, but follow the train from its outset. Hence the contradictions, which arise from a shift or advance in thought. Yet it is also true that the direction of the thinking is dictated much (not all) of the time by a consideration which was of constant and absorbing interest to Solon: the desire of all men, including himself, for prosperity. In other words, so far as there is any guiding idea, it is subconscious, not formal.

It is this absence of subject which makes such descriptions as "paratactic" and "archaic" not incorrect, but inadequate. In detail, we find development not only by epic simile and analogous projections, but also by paratactic arrangement. But the series of progressive thoughts which composes this poem has no exact parallel. Not in Tyrtaeus, in whose work as we have it each fragment and each complete piece is dominated by a single idea. Tyrtaeus had an assignment and a program, and was not

hängt: das ist hier der Wunsch, reich zu werden." I regard the first part of this as absolutely correct, the second part as at least misleading.

<sup>26</sup> See also Schmid, p. 307, note 1.

<sup>27</sup> See Plato, *Theaet.* 189E: τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἱνδάλλεται (*sc.* ψυχή) διανοούμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴν ἔαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα.

at liberty.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, elsewhere Solon has either chosen a single idea for elaboration (as in 19, on the ages of man) or, as in the political poems, he has a position to vindicate, a point of which others must be convinced, and is therefore restricted by his own purpose. Even Archilochus, who talks to himself in verse, restricts himself (in what we possess of his work) always to a single idea. The nearest resemblance is to be found in the iambic meditation of Semonides, the influence of which on Solon's poem is marked,<sup>29</sup> and which is also carried out by expansion much in Solon's manner.<sup>30</sup> Semonides, however, develops only one thought, and his development is summarized in a definite conclusion.

Our poem is, then, the work of a man who had much to say, but—unlike Homer, Tyrtaeus, Pindar, Herodotus, and Solon himself elsewhere—no definite assignment or purpose to dictate the form in which he must say it. We do in fact find parallels to Solon's method in both Pindar and Herodotus, but these parallels are limited in that the self-generated sequences do not extend to an entire work. Once again, the presence of contradictions left standing in the text is evidence for the style of composition. Pindar's progressive manner in the evocation of image by image, in the transition to, and even selection of, certain myths, is better understood in the light of this poem by Solon. Particularly reminiscent is Pindar's way of dealing with a thought which he himself has expressed and sees immediately he must reject or modify. Pindar, instead of cancelling the passage in question and starting over again, leaves it standing

<sup>28</sup> Wilamowitz considers (p. 257, note 1) that Tyrtaeus, 9 cannot be a genuine archaic poem because the logical structure belongs to or after the age of the sophists. This view has not been generally accepted. The single idea: "Any other virtue, or all others together, will be meaningless without courage" is so simple and concise compared to the welter of big and disturbing thoughts drifting through Solon's mind, that the sequence can be far more easily manipulated.

<sup>29</sup> Semonides, 1. Note ἐλπὶς δὲ πάντας κάπιτειθεῖ τρέφει/ ἀπρηκτον δρμαλινοντας (6-7) and τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος (1).

<sup>30</sup> The development is: men's ἐλπὶς (6) and δόκησις (9) are unfulfilled, since men are overtaken first by old age or death ('Αἰδης, 14). Different modes of death are then run out. The conclusion is that life is evil, and we should not torture our hearts about it. There is more articulation than in Solon's poem, but the reflection is shallow.

and proceeds *from* it toward renunciation or modification,<sup>31</sup> exactly as Solon has done here. This indicates for Pindar also a development in progress during the actual process of composition, rather than a scheme worked out before composition was begun. But for Pindar, at least in the epinician odes, much of the subject matter must always have been dictated in advance.

Herodotus also, though concerned with narrative rather than reflection, uses a method reminiscent of Solon's. He possesses what we found lacking in Solon, a main theme: namely, the story of the rise of the Persian empire and its collision with the Greek states. But within that tremendous framework there is a great deal more which he has to tell, the telling of which constitutes a more loosely defined second purpose. So, within the limits of his general task, he is sometimes in the position of Solon in the elegy under consideration: with much on his mind that he wishes to say, and free to say it. Accordingly, in so far as the train of narrative and exposition can be called analogous to the expansion and reconsideration of ideas, the digressions of Herodotus are likely to develop themselves in the progressive style of Solon's elegy.

Within the main narrative, also, there are aspects of development which find analogies in our poem. Consider Herodotus, I, 5, 3-26, 1. After dealing with legendary hostilities between Europe and Asia, the historian passes to "that man who to my knowledge was the first to do injuries to the Hellenes": namely, Croesus. He proceeds to recount how the family of Croesus, the Mermnadae, came to be kings of Lydia when Gyges usurped the throne of Candaules; then chronicles the deeds of Gyges and his descendants until he returns, once more, to Croesus.

There are two important points here. First, the narrative is allowed to develop itself from a point of departure (Gyges) until its return to Croesus, so that we proceed, for instance, from Alyattes' war with Miletus under Thrasyboulus to the alliance

<sup>31</sup> See for example *Ol.*, IX, 28-41. The sequence is: "Men are wise or brave by the divine element in them. How else could Heracles have fought against the gods? Yet, do not touch that story, for to belittle the gods is hateful." More subtle is the weighing of thought against counter-thought, *Ol.*, IX, 100-112; *Pyth.*, II, 72-96. On this subject, see G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 80-1.

of Thrasyboulus with Periander, and from Periander to his protégé Arion and the story of Arion and the dolphin. Secondly, it appears during the account that Gyges and all the intervening kings did in fact make attacks on Greek cities, so that the introductory statement—that it was *Croesus* who opened hostilities against the Greeks—has now been contradicted and is not strictly true. Without thinking of the contradiction, possibly forgetful of it, Herodotus chose Croesus as his starting point. Now, instead of making a fresh beginning, or returning to cancel the original statement or correct it by some simple qualification, as for instance “the first to do injuries to the Hellenes *on a large scale*,” he simply lets it stand, while the correction is made without advertisement during the development of the narrative. “He (Gyges) also invaded the territory of Miletus and Smyrna,” etc.; this is not a contradiction, but a correction.<sup>32</sup>

The common factor in these specimens taken from different orders of literature is, therefore, that all are written *forward*, as if the writer were speaking<sup>33</sup> rather than writing, so that, if he must reject a certain element, of thought or fact, already set down, he is not allowed to turn back and remove it but must, driven forward, negate the content by some further statement which will express the truth as he now understands it. The greater the complexity of the subject or the uncertainty of the author, the greater is the effect of disorder and inconsequence in the writing. This effect in our poem arises from a failure to control, not so much medium, as material. Solon has blundered into problems too hard for his solution, but goes sturdily forward from the comfortable simplicity of *πάντως ὑστερον ἥλθε δίκη* to the perplexities of a universe ruled by gods whose ways are different in kind from ours and whose purposes cannot be measured in terms of human feelings and understanding. The result is a poem often uncouth and graceless in expression, but written throughout with great honesty. It was in the same spirit that, without optimism but also without resignation,

<sup>32</sup> I hope in the future to deal in greater detail with Herodotus and his methods of composition.

<sup>33</sup> Thus Plato, in the Socratic dialogues, contriving a representation of *oral* discourse, avoids all appearance of *a priori* design. Conversation is made to generate itself, and new subjects arise as the interest of the speakers extracts them from what has gone before.

Solon faced the social problems of Athens, prepared to do what he could, strenuously, but without hope of perfect success.

During the analysis of the stages in the poem, it seemed advisable to be brief, in order that the transitions in the series might not be obscured. Several passages require more detailed comment than was given them before. We return to these passages.

25 τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐ δ' ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ  
     ῶσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὁξύχολος,  
     αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέληθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρόν  
         θυμὸν ἔχῃ, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη.  
     ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὃ δ' ὕστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν  
 30     αὐτοί, μὴ δὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιοῦσα κίχηι,  
     ἥλυθε πάντως αὖτις· ἀνάτιοι ἔργα τίνοσιν  
         ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γέ<ν>ο<s> ἐξ>οπίσω.

These distinctions are occasioned by the inadequacy noted by Solon in his own previous account of the punishment of the unjust. The impression there given was that, despite occasional delays, retribution generally must descend swiftly, surely, and conspicuously, upon sinners. Such also is the impression to be derived from stories like those of Aias the son of Oileus,<sup>34</sup> Lycurgus,<sup>35</sup> and other legendary exponents of *ὕβρις*. Yet Hesiod has already been visited by doubts, though he puts them aside, *Op. 270-273*:

νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μῆτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος  
     εἴην μῆτ' ἐμὸς νιός· ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον  
     ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἔξει·  
     ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' οὐ πω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

*Are the wicked always punished?* Solon is too honest to insist that they are, once he has examined his initial claim and found it fallacious. He clings to his faith that the gods are just, but acknowledges that their anger is different from ours, and therefore the wicked themselves often continue to prosper. This thought sticks in the back of his mind, and breaks out once

<sup>34</sup> *Od.*, IV, 499-511.

<sup>35</sup> *Il.*, VI, 130-140, a passage perhaps in Solon's mind when he wrote, since οὐ γὰρ δήν seems to recall οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος νέος, κρατερὸς Δυκόδοργος/ δήν ἦν.

again (67-68). It was to exercise others after him.<sup>36</sup> Yet in general Pindar, Herodotus,<sup>37</sup> and the Attic tragedians tend to retire from the advanced position of Solon and to speak as if the proud and greedy man were always struck down by catastrophe. This simpler view, or greater faith (whichever it may be), was perhaps partly occasioned by the striking examples of debacle in the early fifth century, in the careers of Miltiades, Cleomenes, Pausanias, Themistocles, above all in the downfall of Xerxes with his outrageous armies. Solon, when he wrote this poem, could perhaps think of comparatively few edifying examples, in real life, of the punishment of *ὕβρις*.

That the entire passage influenced Attic tragedy seems to require no proof.<sup>38</sup>

36 *χάσκοντες κούφαισ' ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.*

*ἐλπίς* in this sense has appeared before, in Hesiod, *Op.* 498-499:

*πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνήρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων,  
χρηζῶν βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ.*

Closer, however, is Semonides 1, 6-7:

*ἐλπὶς δὲ πάντας κάπιπειθείη τρέφει  
ἀπρηκτον ὄρμαίνοντας.<sup>39</sup>*

This, coming from a poem which Solon had evidently studied, is plainly the inspiration of our passage. Yet where Solon has borrowed, he has also improved. Homer's use of *ἐλπίς*, *ἐλπομai* (the substantive twice only),<sup>40</sup> is somewhat colorless, as is Hesiod's. But as the substantive is here more vivid than the

<sup>36</sup> See in particular Theognis, 373-80; also Pindar, frag. 201 Bowra; Plato, *Rep.* 358E-361D.

<sup>37</sup> See, for instance, Herodotus, I, 34, 1: *μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὡς εἰκάσαι, δτι ἐνόμισε ἑαυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων δλβιώτατον.*

<sup>38</sup> See Jaeger, pp. 144-5. Yet the influence of Solon on tragedy seems to have been generally underestimated, when we consider the nature of his concepts and the fact that his work continued to be read in Athens (see Plato, *Tim.* 21B).

<sup>39</sup> See also Semonides, 29, 4. This poem may not, however, be the work of Semonides of Amorgus.

<sup>40</sup> For an essentially delusive expectation, Homer seems to prefer a special sense of *φημί*, as *Il.*, II, 37: *φῆ γὰρ ὅ γ' αἰρήσειν Πριάμον πόλιν  
ἥμετι κείνω.*

verb-forms, the *plural* of the substantive is more vivid than the singular since, especially in the company of the adjective *κοῦφος*,<sup>41</sup> it calls up the image of a swarm of unsubstantial, winged, and ravishing illusions. Finally, there is the use of that superb word of comedy, *χάσκω*,<sup>42</sup> which may denote the dropped jaw of sheer fatuous incomprehension, Semonides 7, 110-111:

κεχηγότος γὰρ ἀνδρὸς—οἱ δὲ γείτονες  
χαίρουντ' ὄρῶντες καὶ τόν, ὡς ἀμαρτάνει,

or the amorous smirk of illicit desire, Anacreon 5, 8:

πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τυνὰ χάσκει,

Aristophanes, *Nub.* 996-997:

μηδέ εἰς ὄρχηστρίδος εἰσάπτειν, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κεχηγώσ,  
μήλῳ βληθεὶς ὑπὸ πορνίδον, τῆς εὐκλείας ἀποθραυσθῆσ.

Solon seems to fuse the two meanings; that is, our doting upon our own attractive and flighty fancies is like the idiocy of those besotted through love. Thus also Sophocles, *Ant.* 615-617:

ἀ γὰρ πολύπλαγτος ἐλπὶς  
πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν,  
πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἔρωτων.<sup>43</sup>

Now the plural, with its amplified *κοῦφος*, is transferred so that the image is that of a swarm of desires.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> In Attic tragedy, Hesiod's *κενός* tends to replace *κοῦφος* as descriptive of hope or hopes; see Aeschylus, *Pers.* 803-4; Sophocles, *Ajax* 477-8; Euripides, *Phoen.* 396-9. *κενός* is more logical and precise, but certainly less evocative. Compare also Pindar, *Nem.*, VIII, 45: *κενεᾶν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῖνον τέλος*.

<sup>42</sup> *χαῖνος* describes greedy and false optimism in Solon, 8, 6 and 23, 16. See also Pindar's phrase quoted in the note above.

<sup>43</sup> This seems to have been adapted by Euripides, *Iph. Aul.* 548-51:

δίδυμ' Ἔρως ὁ χρυσοκόμας  
τόξ' ἐντείνεται χαρίτων,  
τὸ μὲν ἐπ' εὐαίωνι πότμῳ,  
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς.

Note that here *ἔρως* has actually replaced *ἐλπὶς*, so that hope, instead of being attended by desires, has been transformed into love. In Sophocles, *Ajax* 693: *ἔφριξ* *ἔρωτι*, the word *ἔρως* must actually mean "hope." See also Thucydides, III, 45, 5.

<sup>44</sup> On *ἐλπὶς*, *ἐλπίδες* in this general sense, see also Pindar, *Pyth.*, III, 19-23; frag. 38, 31-32 Bowra; Theognis, 637-8; Euripides, *Supp.* 479; F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (Cambridge, 1907), pp. 167-8;

Line 36 with what follows is also a very early description of day-dreaming combined with what is called wishful thinking. What Solon applies to all judgments of all men, Pindar conjures up in an amused way from the delights of the symposium.<sup>45</sup>

The complete contempt expressed in this line of Solon is intensified by the fact that the poet certainly means to include himself in the condemnation. Yet it is to be noted that in practice Solon tried to take the godlike long view so far as he was able.<sup>46</sup> One of his most endearing characteristics is his unwillingness to suffer fools gladly, particularly those fools who pass as realists and practical men.<sup>47</sup>

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·  
οἵ γάρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,  
διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἀν κορέσειν ἄπαντας;  
κέρδεά τοι θηγοῖσθ' ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι,  
75 ἀτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἦν δόποτε Ζεύς  
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

"There is no established (*κεῖμαι* = passive of *τίθημι*) limit of wealth that can be discerned" (71). This means, perhaps, that wealth (unlike, for instance, strength) is capable of infinite expansion. Solon then passes from the infinite nature of wealth to the desire for infinite wealth. Whether he actually wrote *διπλασίως* or *διπλάσιον*,<sup>48</sup> he probably means the latter. "Those

221-8; H. M. Hayes, *Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod* (Diss., Chicago, 1918), pp. 207-9. On the nature of these alive and sinister abstractions, see Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (2d ed., Cambridge, 1908), pp. 163-217.

<sup>45</sup> Frag. 109, 4-8 Bowra:

καὶ κυλίκεσσιν Ἀθαναίσι τέντρον·  
ἀνίκ' ἀνθρώπων καματώδεες οἵχονται μέριμναι  
στηθέων ἔξω, πελάγει δὲ ἐν πολυχρύσοιο πλούτου  
πάντες ἵστα νέομεν φευδῆ πρὸς ἀκτάν·  
δο μὲν ἀχρήμων, ἀφρεδες τότε . . .

Compare Bacchylides, 20 Suess.

<sup>46</sup> See in particular 23, 8-12.

<sup>47</sup> See 8, 5-6:

ἡμέων δ' εἰς μὲν ἔκαστος ἀλώπεκος ἵχνεσι βαίνει,  
σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος.

The point here seems to be that the foxy selfishness of individuals makes them collectively, and therefore ultimately, into a set of fools.

<sup>48</sup> *διπλασίως* in Solon (Stobaeus) but *διπλάσιον* in the MSS of Theognis where these six lines are repeated (Theognis, 227-32) with several varia-

of us who now have the most money want twice as much as they have got. Who can ever satisfy them all?" (72-73).

"It is the gods who dispense money to men, but ruin grows out of money, and when Zeus sends punitive ruin, various persons get it in turn" (74-76).

There are two questions here. First, the object of *ἐχει*. Nearest and most natural is *ἀτη*. Ziegler would, however, make *κέρδεα* the object.<sup>49</sup> There can be no doubt that this is possible; that is, when Zeus sends *ἀτη*, the *money* changes hands. Such an interpretation would be supported by Solon 4, 12; while virtue is constant, *χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀλλοτε ἀλλος ἔχει*. On Ziegler's view, then, while Solon has not expressed himself very clearly, *ἀτη* means loss of money, which goes elsewhere. Is this strong enough for the content of *ἀτη*? Perhaps. On the other hand, if *ἀτη* is the object of *ἐχει*, we are reminded of the indiscriminate character of divine punishment. The greed of men already rich threatens disaster not only to themselves (or not to themselves at all) but to others who are innocent (families, or fellow-citizens).

Next, to what does *αὐτῶν* refer? I would refer it to *κέρδεα*.<sup>50</sup> Does Solon mean, then, to contradict his earlier statement (9-13). He has said that money given by the gods stays with men, and only what is won by violence (*ὑφ' ὑβριος*) brings retribution. Now he says that all wealth is given by the gods, and that wealth given by the gods brings retribution.

Solon has worked away from the earlier thought. He implied then that the righteous must prosper, the wicked must be punished. The realization that this was too simple, therefore false, led him to evaluate more carefully the difference in outlook between gods and all men, good or bad. He has, therefore, progressed from the distinction between just gain (given by the gods) and unjust gain (taken by force in spite of nature, that

tions. It seems likely that Solon wrote *διπλασίως* meaning *διπλάσιον* and the author of the Theognidean repeat, so understanding it, made a "correction."

<sup>49</sup> Ziegler, p. 204. See also Jaeger's important note, p. 451, note 52. While making *ἀτη* the technical object of *ἐχει*, he considers that the idea of money changing hands is implicit in the thought.

<sup>50</sup> Wehrli, cited with approval by Greene, would refer it to men (*θυητοῖς*). This is also possible, but not, I believe, necessary.

is, of the gods); for since the intervening development, the difference between man and god forbids us any longer to imagine man's doing anything which the gods seek to prevent. In that way, all wealth is the gift of the gods.

It does not follow that *ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται* means that *ἄτη* arises equally from all wealth, good or bad. In the two lines preceding this, Solon has been speaking specifically of new wealth piled up by greedy rich men who do not need it. Nevertheless, he is too vague; and any person reading this passage without consideration of the full context might be justified in assuming him to mean that all wealth, sheer wealth, breeds *ἄτη*.<sup>51</sup> This is, again, that apparent incoherence which can be directly traced to Solon's intellectual honesty, his unwillingness to be content with a statement once made when the pressure of his thought has carried him beyond it.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

<sup>51</sup> It may be that these lines are referred to by Aeschylus, *Agam.* 750-62, as a "saying of long ago which has grown old among men"; that is, that the mere fact of great prosperity begets sorrow. Certainly this would be one way in which our passage could be read, and the respectful manner of Aeschylus in introducing a view with which he proposes to take issue is suitable for an allusion to Solon. But the terms *ὅλβος*, *οἰχύς* used by Aeschylus do not appear in these lines of Solon, and it is possible that Aeschylus is not alluding to any specific pronouncement.

## PROGRESS AND PRIMITIVISM IN LUCRETIUS.

The Epicurean view of civilization has been the subject of much controversy in the last sixty years. It was the French scholar, Guyau, who first maintained that Lucretius' picture of man's rise from savagery presents a conception of progress, and one that was new in human thought.<sup>1</sup> The conventional view had been that of the Golden Age when earth bountifully satisfied all men's needs, and man himself lived in god-given wisdom and peace, untroubled by the passions and complexities of so-called civilization. In striking contrast Lucretius' account sets forth vividly the earliest struggles of the primitive savage, his grim, relentless battle for existence on the purely physical plane. We hear of his discovery of the use of fire, of his first crude shelters, clothing and weapons, discoveries and inventions which came from dire need and experience; then the growth of language, the beginnings of social life in the family group, the uniting of neighbors in larger groups from the need for mutual protection, the origin of concepts of justice and morality in utility. All these and more are described with an imaginative power and vividness which have made this one of the most famous and familiar passages in Lucretius. The account concludes, after setting forth the development of various special arts, with these words:

Navigia atque agri culturas moenia leges  
arma vias vestes et cetera de genere horum,  
praemia, delicias quoque vitae funditus omnis,  
carmina picturas, et daedala signa polire,  
usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis  
paulatim docuit pedetemtim progredientis.  
sic unumquicquid paulatim protrahit aetas  
in medium ratioque in luminis erigit oras.  
namque alid ex alio clarescere corde videbant,  
artibus ad summum donec venere cacumen

(V, 1448-57).

Here we find perhaps the most explicit statement which has been regarded as an affirmation of progress. With the further

<sup>1</sup> F. Guyau, *Morale d'Epicure* (Paris, 1886), pp. 157 ff.

claim that Lucretius was the first to give adequate expression to the concept we shall not concern ourselves. Reinhardt has convincingly argued that it was Democritus, not Epicurus, much less Lucretius, who first developed in any detail the view that primitive men were animal-like savages rather than god-like dwellers in a pastoral idyll, and that Epicurus simply incorporated this view into his system with some few modifications.<sup>2</sup> Our concern will be rather with the relation of this view as found in Lucretius with the system as a whole.

The assertion that the poet has actually given expression to a concept of progress has met with some vigorous denials. Robin, in a careful analysis,<sup>3</sup> with special reference to the arguments of Guyau, maintains that Lucretius regarded primitive man and primitive society as constituting a condition of life superior to that of civilization. Man's physical strength was admittedly superior, his needs were simpler, he was free from specific perils and vices inherent in the complex civilization of a later time; moreover, as a product of atomic combinations which have their laws of growth, maturity and decay, the ultimate answer can be only dissolution when the *moenia mundi* give way and leave not a rack behind. Man may to be sure find some amelioration for his increasing wretchedness through his inventive power, but this very power has brought him more distress. Robin not only finds the very negation of progress, he finds also the idealization of the simple life of nature, free, to be sure, of the fantasies of a mythical golden age, but perilously close to Rousseau's "natural man." This position is substantially repeated and further developed in some details in the edition of the *De Rerum Natura* on which he collaborated.<sup>4</sup>

More recently the fundamental pessimism of Lucretius has been stressed, as by William Green in his analysis of the poet's anticipation of the end of the world and its relation to his outlook on human history. He marshalls considerable evidence to show that Lucretius believed that decline had already set in, with earth's powers failing, man's own achievements past their

<sup>2</sup> K. Reinhardt, "Hekataios von Abdera und Demokrit," *Hermes*, XLVII (1912), pp. 492-513.

<sup>3</sup> "Sur la Conception Épicurienne du Progrès," *Rev. de Metaphysique et de Morale*, XXIII (1916), pp. 697-719.

<sup>4</sup> Ernout and Robin, 1925. See especially vol. III, pp. 126 ff.

peak, the final dissolution of the world itself perhaps even imminent.<sup>5</sup>

The analysis in the chapter devoted to Lucretius in Lovejoy and Boas' *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*<sup>6</sup> concludes that Lucretius' position is not wholly clear; that whereas no case can be made for the life of the first earth-born savages, the account of the intermediate phase, with its stress on the simple pleasures and healthy tone of the pastoral or early agricultural society, in contrast to the vices of later times, reveals a sense of retrogression and loss on the one hand, while granting certain values in the advances in the arts on the other.

It is then evident that there is a problem here. The denials of a concept of progress have been carefully and cogently set forth, for the most part blandly ignored by those who assert the affirmative. And the idea persists that a new note has been struck.<sup>7</sup>

There are of course many connotations of the word "progress." We speak of man's progress in the knowledge and control of nature. With regard to the past and apart from the moral issue, there can be on this point only one answer. Savagery has given way to civilization because man out of his need and experience has learned to use fire, to forge weapons, to destroy or tame wild animals, to grow food and construct shelters for himself. The argument begins only with the question of the desirability of this advance in knowledge and power. The knowledge and power have been achieved and furthermore, the end is not yet come. "Even now, certain arts are being perfected, even now they are in a stage of growth" (V, 332 f.).

It does not follow that this process will or can continue throughout an infinite future. Basic to the Epicurean view is the theory of growth and decay, and above all the mortality of man, his earth, even his universe, of everything *praeter spatium et primordia caeca* and his baffling gods. The point needs no laboring and admits of no denial. If the concept of progress necessarily implies a process which is infinite, the argument is

<sup>5</sup> "The Dying World of Lucretius," *A. J. P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 51-60.

<sup>6</sup> Baltimore, 1935, pp. 222-42.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. e.g. T. Frank, *Life and Literature of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley, 1930), pp. 237-42; J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress* (New York, 1928), p. 3.

closed. He would today, however, be bold indeed who would deny all meaning to the concept of the progress of knowledge without the guarantee of an infinite future for man and his world.

The matter may seem to acquire a different hue, however, if one acknowledges that decline has set in and the end may be even imminent. It is difficult to reconcile two passages in Lucretius which are especially relevant here: in V, 324-37, the brief span of human history is cited as evidence for the youth of the world, with the explicit statement,

Verum, ut opinor, habet novitatem summa recensque  
naturast mundi, neque pridem exordia cepit.

On the other hand, in the gloomy finale of the second book, we hear that earth's strength is spent, that we are already suffering from the decay which leads to the ultimate dissolution.

It is perhaps impossible to find a completely satisfactory solution of this contradiction. These passages must of course be considered in their contexts, and it is natural that signs of earth's decay and senility should be stressed when the theme is earth's mortality, while vitality and freshness on the other hand belong to the story of creation. The poet's mood and emotional response will intensify each in turn. With all such allowances, however, something of a contradiction remains.<sup>8</sup>

Even if we accept the darker picture, it should be observed that the poet nowhere envisions man's gradual loss of the knowledge and arts which he has won, in a retrogression to savagery. Catastrophes of world-wide scope might conceivably blot out man with his civilization (V, 338 ff.), but such temporary disasters are cited neither as incontrovertible facts of the past nor probabilities in the future, rather to suggest that if you believe them, you must accept their implications and admit the cogency of the argument for ultimate dissolution. A little later (V, 380-

<sup>8</sup> Green's contention (*loc. cit.*, pp. 53-4) that the notion of the imminence of earth's doom was Lucretian and not Epicurean would help to account for the inconsistency. He demonstrates very convincingly that the finale of the second book is out of harmony with Epicurus' cheerful outlook. He does not discuss the inconsistency between these two passages in Lucretius, but if he is correct, as seems to me probable, it would be the result of the imperfect amalgamation of Lucretius' own view with that of his master.

415) the poet recalls the myths of Phaethon and Deucalion which have been supposed to symbolize disasters from fire and flood in the past, and thus augur the potential triumph of one or another of the elements as the possible route of the ultimate dissolution. He reminds us that the stories themselves are imaginary (405-6), but even in depicting hypothetically such an unlikely catastrophe he nowhere suggests the loss of the arts—short of the destruction of man himself. Rather, in accordance with the view that necessity has spurred man to invention in the past, one might more reasonably assume that as earth's powers fail he will be driven to find new techniques. Progress in knowledge and mastery of the natural environment is a fact in the past, continues in the present, and presumably will continue as long as man exists, whatever view we may take as to the duration of his future.

More complex and controversial is the question whether this advance in knowledge and the arts has been desirable, in other words whether we can speak of progress in human history in the sense that man's lot has really improved, that he is better and happier in the civilization he has achieved than was his savage ancestor. Here the answer is not so obvious, since now the subjective connotations of "better" and "happier" enter the picture. We must clarify our approach to the problem at this point. Progress has meaning only in terms of an ideal or goal. Any discussion of progress in relation to Epicureanism should then be related to Epicurean values. And here the goal is clear. It is of course the life of pleasure, in the Epicurean sense of freedom from pain and fear, that serene *ataraxia* enjoyed by the gods. Has there been any progress towards this goal and has man's advance in knowledge and the arts of civilization aided or hampered him?

We have grouped knowledge and the various arts together. Lucretius does so in the lines already cited, where he refers to new developments in navigation, in musical instruments, and finally the knowledge of nature's laws, all of these achievements recent enough to indicate that the world is still young (V, 333-7). Again, at the close of the book, after describing the various practical arts of civilization, he includes poetry, painting, and sculpture, *delicias vitae*, all the products of *usus*, *experientia*, and *ratio*. The knowledge of nature's laws, the achievements of

philosophical speculation are derived from the same impulse as his technical skills, namely that desire for security and freedom from fear without which happiness is unattainable.<sup>9</sup>

The achievements of philosophy—Epicurean philosophy—are of course infinitely more important for human happiness than any specific art or craft. This is explicit in the prooemium of Book V where Epicurus' gifts to humanity are extolled above those attributed to Ceres and others. What is significant here for our purposes is that these great truths could never have been discovered or shared without man's rise from savagery. This is particularly clear in the poet's discussion of language (V, 1028-90). Human speech, we are told, was slowly and laboriously developed in answer to man's need, as were the first crude dwellings, the first stages in social organization. Ultimately it made possible man's crowning achievement, philosophical truth. Lucretius' own struggles with the paucity of the Latin vocabulary may be cited in this connection. The discovery of adequate words he felt to be essential to convey his message (I, 136-45). Again only recently in terms of human experience have nature's laws been discovered and Lucretius claims to be the first to set them forth in the Latin tongue (V, 335-7), an achievement evidently included among the *artes* of line 332.

One should observe too that Lucretius recognized the contributions of the long line of Epicurus' predecessors in philosophy. Epicureanism did not spring full-grown from the head of a founder oblivious of human thought before him. Here too the achievement was the culmination of long ages of effort.<sup>10</sup>

It is surely obvious that some development in the arts was indispensable to the good life, given the Epicurean interpretation of human history and the good life. The conditions of savagery precluded any possibility of attaining even elementary physical security, much less the more important peace of the soul. Man's first conquests of nature, his primary skills were early and fundamental aspects of the great cumulative process which included language and thought. On this supremely important point, then, we can speak of progress in terms of human values.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Epicurus, *Princ. Doctr.*, XI-XIII.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. L. Edelstein, "Primum Graius Homo," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 78-90, especially p. 85.

during the past and even up to the poet's day. The question remains, how far and how long?

Much emphasis has been laid on the Epicurean acknowledgment that in the growing complexity of civilization many vices have been produced or accentuated which were unknown or certainly less prevalent in simpler days. Lucretius' assertion of the greater physical vigor and stamina of primitive man, his charming idyll of a rustic festival (V, 1390-1407) which concludes with comparisons highly unflattering to more "civilized" ages, not to mention his many scathing indictments of contemporary morality, have been cited to prove that deterioration is already well under way; if the world and mankind are becoming steadily weaker and more vicious, talk of progress has an empty ring.

Before examining further Lucretius' attitude toward the virtues of a simpler age, it may be instructive to recall certain similarities and contrasts with various Stoic views on this subject. One can scarcely speak of an "orthodox" Stoic theory, so wide were the divergencies within the school, but some sort of ideal condition, superior at least to later ages, is usually assumed or described in any account of man's remote past. Its character ranges from the poet's fantasies of innocent perfection, peace and beauty of a truly golden age, to the more realistic "hard primitivism" of a simple, toilsome but essentially healthy and virtuous society. Striking parallels between accounts of the latter sort and the Lucretian picture have often been observed, notably in Polybius and Seneca. The rôle of the arts of civilization in these accounts is of particular interest. To Seneca these arts have been a curse to mankind, introducing or enhancing greed and all the vices. In the ninetieth epistle he directs his argument on this point against Posidonius who attributed the various techniques and crafts to the early philosophers, and who speculated on their invention and development with evident interest and sympathy. Seneca claims agreement with Posidonius in describing the life of earliest humanity as one of peace and virtue under the guidance of philosopher-kings, under whose beneficent and just sway there was neither incentive nor inclination to evil conduct (XC, 4-5). It was in accordance with nature that the better—and in the case of man that meant the rational—rule the worse. Posidonius appears to have believed that these gifted rulers, because of their superior talents, had

made the discoveries and inventions which have improved the physical lot of mankind, giving him greater mastery over the world about him. Knowledge of the ultimate laws of nature and interest in the details, in man's mastery of specific techniques, were closely related, both belonging to the province of the philosopher. In this combining of the arts with philosophy Posidonius and Lucretius would stand together in opposition to Seneca.<sup>11</sup>

But that there could have been no practice or understanding of the good life without the arts seems not to follow in Posidonius' view, since we have the philosopher-kings at the very beginning. Furthermore, however great his interest in the process of discovery, if he looked back, as Seneca says, to the time when men were *incorrupti*, closer to their divine origin and true nature, he must, like Seneca, have regarded human history as a long process of moral degeneration. This is entirely consistent with the Stoic doctrine of cyclical creation and *ekpyrosis*, in which Posidonius probably concurred.<sup>12</sup> Men were at the start of the cycle actually *a dis recentes*, to use Seneca's phrase, living in peaceful conditions to which violence was unknown, and all subsequent change until the ultimate conflagration could only be for the worse.<sup>13</sup>

The fact that the picture of primitive society presented in Polybius is closer in spirit to that of Lucretius may perhaps be related to his different view of the cycles. They are referred not to a universal conflagration but to periodic destructions of civilization, not of all mankind, as a result of tremendous natural disasters which ravage but do not destroy the earth. The struggles of mankind to survive, the slow development of the arts are only suggested, not described in detail, as the historian is more

<sup>11</sup> This is not to imply the derivation of Lucretius' views from Posidonius, a problem which in any case is beyond the scope of this paper. The likelihood of such influence is rejected by E. Reitzenstein, "Theophrast bei Epicur und Lucrez," *Orient und Antike*, no. 2 (Heidelberg, 1924), pp. 63 ff.

<sup>12</sup> See L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A.J.P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 294 f., especially note 37.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921), pp. 392-401, especially pp. 400 f. Controversies of scholars as to what is Posidonian and what Senecan in later sections of this epistle have no bearing on the main point here.

concerned with the cycles of government. There is little to conjure up thoughts of a golden age in those early days when men herded together like animals for protection (VI, 5, 5-9). As in Lucretius the development of concepts of morality is attributed to self-interest (VI, 6, 1-9). It is probable that this account was influenced by or at least in harmony with the views of Panaetius.<sup>14</sup> In any case Panaetius' rejection of the ekpyrosis seems practically certain<sup>15</sup> and it appears not unlikely that there is a logical connection between this fact and the values he assigned to the rôle of the arts in the development of civilization. The natural virtue of those first men still close to their divine origin in the cosmic fire seems very remote from the desperate plight of survivors of a terrible cataclysm, embarking on a new cycle in the grimdest of conditions.

We have important testimony to Panaetius' evaluation of the arts in Cicero, *De Off.*, II, 4, 15, where we are told that it is thanks to them that human life is so far superior to that of the beasts. Elsewhere in the same treatise (I, 4, 11) it is observed that the same fundamental instincts of self-preservation and propagation of the species are common to man and beast, whereas by the light of his rational faculty man is set apart; it is moreover thanks to this power of reason that man has produced his civilization. The implication is clear that the arts are to be considered a gain. It is also true that in the vices of an increasingly complex civilization the arts through their material gifts and powers play an important rôle (I, 7, 24).<sup>16</sup> Thus the view of Panaetius and Polybius is in many respects close to that of Epicurus and Lucretius, in spite of the gulf between the schools.

Returning to the summary of Polybius, it must nevertheless be stressed that in his account of the first organized societies he attributes the highest degree of virtue and wisdom to the early kingship which succeeded the regime of savagery, when men had first received from nature their concepts of the good and the just (VI, 7). The kings themselves were chosen for their superior intelligence and ruled in the interest of their subjects.

<sup>14</sup> R. Philippson, *Phil. Wochenschr.*, L (1930), pp. 1183 ff. N. Tatakis, in his *Panétius de Rhodes* (Paris, 1931), pp. 102 ff., stresses their differences, denying to Panaetius the hopeless determinism of Polybius.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, *N. D.*, II, 46, 118; Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, I, 414.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Polybius, VI, 7, 6.

There is a moral superiority in this early stage which is succeeded by cycles of degeneration and political revolution, brightened, to be sure, by better conditions at the beginning of each new type of government. The deadly inevitability of the cycles, however, precludes any ultimate hope and the brightest period was at the beginning.<sup>17</sup>

Thus in spite of the similarities between these Stoic views and the Lucretian account, we find as a consistent element in the Stoic outlook an inevitable deterioration in the lot of man. From this inevitability the Epicurean is free, to a point, within the physical limitations of his atomic universe.

But, inevitable or not, does Lucretius actually present us with a comparable picture of decline as has been asserted? Here again we must underline the Epicurean conception of the good life, the goal of all activity in pleasure, in bodily and mental peace. To Lucretius possibly in even greater degree than to his master, freedom from fear is the absolutely indispensable condition for any happiness, and fear itself ultimately the root of all evil. One need only recall the prooemium of the third book.

As one looks back over the poet's picture of primitive life with this principle in mind, it loses some of its charm. It is hard to see that on any basis his picture of the earliest phase, that of pure savagery, could be considered superior to the later. Physical vigor and hardihood were of course conditions of survival, and the survivors at least had found the means to satisfy their primary needs. Their perils, however, were quite as real as those of a later age and more immediately pressing at times. We hear of the fugitives fleeing their rocky caves in the dead of night, *paventes*, at the approach of some hostile beast of prey (V, 982-7). This is followed by the fearful description of death from the jaws of these beasts, or the horrible mangling for which the victim in his pitiable ignorance knew no cure. As Robin notes in his comment on these lines, the poet adds that at least the savage escaped the fears of organized warfare and shipwreck. Lucretius certainly held no brief for the virtues of organized war, but the length and vivid horror of the account of the death or mutilation of the savage in this instance makes it preposterous to assume that such a fate seemed preferable to the poet.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. VI, 9, 12-3 for his explicit assertion of the degeneration which must inevitably overtake Rome in time.

Even in passages in which human vice and folly are assailed there is implicit the recognition that the comparative security of civilized life is a gain. In the prooemium of VI the poet makes this physical security the ground for castigating the false values which bring men such unnecessary misery. Since life's basic needs can be satisfied so easily under present conditions and life is as far as possible safe (VI, 9-11), man's folly is the more culpable. But surely it is a gain to have surmounted the conditions in which any security at all was unattainable. Epicurus' message was scarcely designed for the struggling savage.

Lucretius also stresses the point that changes from savagery had the aim, probably but dimly realized, of greater security. Mutual protection and help were the rewards of the first formation of any social group, rewards dependent upon the members' recognition of the *foedera*. But for such association, he says explicitly, the human race would never have survived at all (V, 1026-7).

But these first associations developed into more complex communities, the consequent increase of possessions brought the familiar vices in its train. And it is just here that for many the poet has abandoned the concept of progress, assuming there had ever been one. His indictment of contemporary life is indeed a powerful one, depicting its contemptible false values, lust for power, violence, wretched new fears. And when we envisage the simple country festival described in connection with the first invention of musical instruments (V, 1379-1411), the sheer pleasures of which were quite as keen as any to be derived from the more complex equipment and lavish entertainment of later days, one readily grants that the poet dwelt happily upon the scene and found a health and soundness in the simple peasants which later urban civilization had lost.

But the issue is not settled by observing that earlier ages have, in their ignorance, escaped some of the worst features of later times. This escape was due to ignorance, not inherent virtue. The peasant was unaware of his blessings or he would not have altered his way of life. Change is a sign of dissatisfaction with one's present lot (V, 170-3), or the thoughtless response to novelty for its own sake (V, 1412-15). The ignorant peasant by the very fact of his ignorance was not only the victim of the same primary fears which beset modern man, a point to which we

shall revert, but he was incapable of truly appreciating the kind of security he had.

Apart from this, however, what of the picture as a whole? Was that simple life really so pleasant and secure? Lucretius tells us that the man who made himself a coat from some wild beast's hide was probably murdered by his jealous neighbors and the hide itself torn to pieces in the struggle for its possession (V, 1419-22). He adds that we are more culpable for like conduct in our wars for wealth and power, in that we actually need the wealth and power far less than our freezing ancestor needed that hide. Still, the picture is hardly conducive to nostalgia for those happy by-gone days. Although this last instance belongs more properly to a stage earlier than that of the rustic festival which had just been described, the poet cites it as an example of the greed which leads to violence and the destruction of all true pleasure, and is characteristic of all stages of human history.

In the account of the growth and changes of political systems there is much to remind us of Polybius. Conspicuous by its absence, however, is that early stage in which wisdom and virtue prevailed. Man's first leaders were to be sure distinguished by physical strength and intelligence, but there is nothing to suggest superior virtue. The physical endowments yielded to the power of greed with the increase of material possessions. It is not until the violence incited by tyranny has become in itself intolerable that we hear of the emergence of law, rooted in man's longing for security (V, 1136-60). That this was a very real gain is clearly stressed in these lines. The human race which was worn and weary under the regime of force has now achieved at least comparative security, inasmuch as man cannot hope to attain happiness through the violation of the laws (1154-5).

Man's basic impulses have always been much the same. The process of civilization has been the result of struggle for security, freedom from fear. Progress in the arts has been a fact in the past and is a possibility for the future. These arts have been a blessing in part in so far as they have contributed to his physical security and to the knowledge of nature's laws which alone can free him from fear. In so far as they pander to luxury and greed, they may be productive of evil. The diatribes against contemporary excesses which we find in Lucretius are of course

common to all the moralists, regardless of philosophical dogma. That the arts have been misused does not condemn them of themselves.

But in all this matching of profit and loss, there is one dominant consideration, always of paramount importance to Lucretius. The ultimate good, the goal, can be attained only by casting out fear, the ultimate root of evil. This fear is twofold, fear of death and fear of the gods. From neither could man possibly free himself without knowledge—that knowledge of the laws of nature which could only be attained in a condition of civilization. Those shepherds with their simple holidays may well have been better off than many a restless and equally unenlightened millionaire, but they still were the victims of ignorance and the terrible curse of fear and for them, unlike the millionaire of later times, there was no salvation at hand in the gospel of Epicurus. The fundamental causes of fear, the *simulacra* which made men believe in the gods but failed to bring understanding of their true nature, and which also led to a false and terrifying belief in survival after death, together with the grandeur of the cosmic order, which in their ignorance men attributed to divine powers, arbitrary and therefore fearful—these fears could only be allayed by knowledge of the truth, in other words of the Epicurean doctrine.<sup>18</sup>

And this knowledge, this insight into the laws of nature, is inconceivable for savage or primitive man. While not specifically stated this is surely self-evident. The immediate and pressing physical perils which threatened the life of the savage presumably left him little time to speculate on the perils of the unseen. In fact Lucretius implies as much in noting that he accepted the changes of day and night without alarm, preoccupied as he was with threats from wild beasts (V, 973-87). It was precisely in the succeeding age, the much extolled simple life of the shepherd and farmer, that the poison of superstitious fear made its way. In the charming description of the phenomenon of echo (IV, 572-94) we are told of the fanciful beliefs of ignorant peasants who attributed the sounds to nymphs and satyrs lest they be supposed to dwell in places deserted by

<sup>18</sup> V, 82-90, and especially 1161-93; cf. III, 1053-75; IV, 29-41; VI, 50-67.

the gods. Lucretius elsewhere attributes superstition to the ignorance of the uneducated. Thus notions of Centaur and Scylla, Cerberus and the ghosts of the dead are due to chance combinations of the *simulacra* (IV, 732-48). Against these fears and the terrifying phenomena of the heavens which impressed him profoundly, the simple peasant had absolutely no defense. Neither had he, on the positive side, equipment or opportunity for the study of nature, which Lucretius regarded as the most rewarding life (III, 1071-2). Time and experience had been essential to the discovery of the great truths which alone could bring peace of soul. Only "recently," as one reckons the whole span of human life, had these truths been revealed (V, 335-6).

Thus progress, in the only sense in which it was important to the Epicurean, had been achieved and was still possible. In comparison with this enlightenment the concomitant evils of a complex civilization become less significant. They were serious, and we should not underestimate them. It would be absurd to insist that the outlook was truly bright. One may even grant that Lucretius himself was profoundly pessimistic as to the future, and may well have believed that the ultimate dissolution would come before any large proportion of mankind could be persuaded of the enlightenment which would bring him happiness. He surely believed that earth's powers would fail and physical conditions become increasingly severe. Nevertheless the fact remained that man had achieved the knowledge which was indispensable to the good life, and that the way was open for further development in the present and future. The potentiality was there. "There is nothing to prevent his leading a life worthy of the gods" (III, 322). Lucretius was surely no primitivist, dreaming of the glories of a pastoral age of innocence—and ignorance. As he believed that fear was the great root of evil, he believed that only knowledge could cast it out, since ignorance was its cause.

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest  
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei  
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque (I, 146-8).

The Epicurean's vigorous insistence upon the freedom of the will and his view of the soul did not assure him of inevitable

progress, but neither did it preclude hope, as the familiar Stoic doctrine of the cycles ultimately did.

It is within this framework and in the light of the concept of the final good that we find a limited truth in the assertion, often repeated and often challenged, that some concept of progress is found in Epicureanism. Man was not searching for what had once been his and then lost in a long retrogression. The physical security and enlightenment which were essential for the attainment of the good life could only have come with the process of civilization, and despite the new problems which that process entailed, the door was still open to further knowledge and enlightenment. There is, we repeat, nothing inevitable about it and Lucretius himself frequently dwells on the darker side of the picture. But that he would have exchanged the knowledge and security which civilization had brought for the life of savage or primitive man is surely inconceivable in the light of his own ideals. His very diatribes against contemporary society are the more bitter because man fails to avail himself of the happiness within his reach. It remains within his reach—as long as the world shall last.

*MARGARET TAYLOR.*

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

## THE ATTIC ARCHONS DIOKLES-TIMARCHOS.

The discovery of an inscription near Athens in 1933, and the publication of its text by Kyparissis and Peek,<sup>1</sup> have given new evidence for the Athenian archons of the second century before Christ. The inscription is a decree of orgeones, dated in the archonship of Timarchos, honoring their ἐπιμελητής Serapion, son of Poseidonios, of Herakleia, who served in his appointed capacity in the archonship of Diokles. The opening lines of the decree read as follows:

[·Αγ]αθεῖ Τύχει· ἐπὶ Τιμάρχου ἄρχοντος, Θαργηλιῶνος  
ἀγορᾶν κυρ[ίαι].  
[·έ]δοξεν τοῖς ὁργεῶσιν· ἐπειδὴ Σεραπίων Ποσειδωνίου  
Ἡρακλεώτ[ης]  
ἐπιμελητῆς κατασταθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ Διοκλέους ἄρχοντος  
ἐνιαυτ[όν]

The editors record the fact that the normal interpretation of these lines places Diokles in the archon-year immediately preceding that of Timarchos, but they reject the identification of Timarchos with the known archon of that name in 138/7 for two reasons: (a) The archon Diokles of the Delian inventories cannot have been later than 141/0, and (b) the year 139/8 is already occupied by Apollodoros of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 973. Neither argument is binding, for Pritchett has shown that the Diokles of the Delian inventories was a Delian, not an Athenian, archon,<sup>2</sup> and Apollodoros may be assigned to any year near the middle or end of the second century B. C. where a secretary from Oineis is in order. There is no tie between him and Timarchos and the only reason for dating him in 139/8 has been the exigency of the secretary-cycle. It was the suggestion of Kyparissis and Peek that the new combination of archons Diokles-Timarchos might be put in any pair of unoccupied years earlier in the century. Theoretically, of course, this is true, but, as the editors remark, the character of the lettering of the new inscription is remarkably like that of *Hesperia*, IX (1940), No. 26, which belongs in

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Mitt.*, LXVI (1941), pp. 228-232, with photographs in Plates 75 and 76.

<sup>2</sup> Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. 129.

the year 135/4, and they take it for certain that the date cannot in any case have been far from the middle of the century; so for practical purposes there is no place to put the two new archons except in the years of uncertainty between 154 and 147.

The alternative is to make the natural assumption that the Timarchos of the new text is the same as the Timarchos of 138/7. Diokles then falls in 139/8 with the usual interpretation that the archonship in which the incumbent of an office served precedes immediately that in which he was honored. The necessary readjustment to be made in the archon tables is to provide a new date for Apollodoros of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 973.

There are many places where Apollodoros cannot belong. Within the range of the second century secretaries from Oineis (VII) are known for 199/8, 187/6, 175/4, 163/2, 127/6, and 103/2. Furthermore, Apollodoros cannot belong in 115/4, for that year is occupied by Nausias;<sup>3</sup> nor can he belong in 139/8, for that year has just been assigned to Diokles. This leaves 147/6 as the only other year where the present tables call for a secretary from Oineis, and apparently Apollodoros cannot be assigned there because the year is already occupied by Archon, who is tied to his successor Epikrates of 146/5.

The secretary in the archonship of Epikrates was from the deme Sypalettos (VIII).<sup>4</sup> Here an old problem comes once again to our attention. The presence of a secretary from Sypalettos (VIII) in 146/5 immediately before a secretary from Lamptrai (I) in 145/4 indicates a break in the cycle. Another break has been assumed between 154/3 and 153/2, where there is no evidence, by way of compensation. There are consequently two unexplained breaks in the secretary-cycle in the middle of the second century and both of them could be avoided if one would only assume that part of the deme Sypalettos had been assigned in 201 B.C. to the new tribe Attalis which after its creation became XII in the official order. The possibility that this subdivision took place has been raised several times but has always been denied.<sup>5</sup> The evidence favoring the division of the

<sup>3</sup> The exact date is known because of the tribal cycle of the priests of Serapis; see Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, p. 229.

<sup>4</sup> See Pritchett and Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

<sup>5</sup> W. K. Pritchett, *The Five Attic Tribes after Kleisthenes* (Baltimore,

deme seems at first glance good. A dedication to the philosopher Karneades was erected near the Stoa of Attalos by Attalos II and his relative Ariarathes, both of the deme Sypalettos (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3781). Just as Hadrian was later enrolled as an Athenian citizen in the tribe which bore his name, one would have expected Attalos of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3781 to belong to the tribe named after his father and hence to discover in this dedication the indication that Sypalettos, or at least part of it, belonged to Attalis; but later members of the family who are known, also citizens of Sypalettos, were members of the tribe Kekropis.<sup>6</sup> Hence, if one wishes to assume a division in the deme he must also assume a division in the family. This has been considered unlikely and the prevailing opinion is that Sypalettos always belonged to Kekropis.

The difficulty of placing Apollodoros in the archon tables of the second century leads one to inquire again whether there may not have been a division in the deme which perhaps lasted only through the second century or until the time of Sulla. This would permit regular secretary-cycles with no breaks and one could then have Apollodoros with his secretary from Oineis in 151/0. The alternative is to assume: (a) a period of confusion in the secretary-cycle between 154 and 145 in which case Apollodoros might be placed in one of several years during that interval, or (b) that the cycle from 157 to 145 was in allotted order in which case again Apollodoros might be assigned to one of several years, or (c) that the cycle continued unbroken from 157/6 long enough to include a secretary from the seventh tribe in 151/0 in which case that year is available for Apollodoros, and the assumption may be made that the break in the cycle, now posited in 153, may have occurred at some time between 150 and 146.

There are thus four possible ways of tabulating the archons and their secretaries in the cycle from 157 and 145. In two of the schemes Apollodoros falls definitely in 151/0, and in the other two of the schemes he may be dated there anyway; so it is to this date that we tentatively assign him and his secretary

1943), p. 36, note 13, with references; B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XV (1946), p. 239, note 39.

<sup>6</sup> *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1039, fragments b' + c' + p, lines 3-5; see Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 36, note 13.

and the inscription *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 973.<sup>7</sup> The archons Phaidrias and Aristophantos, displaced, may be dated in 153/2 and 152/1 respectively.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

ON VARRO, *DE LINGUA LATINA*, V, 15.

Varro, *L. L.*, V, 14: incipiam de locis ab ipsius loci origine. locus est ubi locatum quid esse potest, ut nunc dicunt, collocatum. ueteres id dicere solitos appareret apud Plautum: "filiam habeo grandem dote cassam atque inlocabilem neque eam quo locare cuiquam." apud Ennium: "o Terra Traeca, ubi Liberum fanum inclutum Maro locauit." 15: ubi quidque consistit, locus. ab eo praeco dicitur locare, quod usque idem it, quoad in aliquo constituit pretium. inde locarium quod datur in stabulo et in taberna, ubi consistant. sic loci muliebres, ubi nascendi initia consistunt.

14 ab *Scioppius*: sub *F* 15 idem it *Turnebus probante Kent*: id emit *F* demit *Madvig an* quid demit *dubitant Goetz et Schoell* idem uendit *L. Spengel uendit Reiter*

As it stands, 15 is pointless. Varro's contention that the root element in *locare*, *locarium*, and *loci (muliebres)* can be reduced to a common meaning, namely that of *consistere*, could serve only to make a preceding etymology plausible. Instead of such an etymology we read *ubi quidque consistit, locus*.<sup>1</sup>

The difficulty disappears once *locus* is replaced by *stlocus*, the

<sup>7</sup> It will be noted that Wilhelm identified the chairman of the proedroi 'Αθη[ν]ογένης---] of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 973 with ['Αθη]ηρογένης Εύνόμου Λευκονοεύς who appears as author of a decree in the year following the archonship of Metrophanes. This is the year 144/3 (cf. Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. 130), and if the identification is correct would suit a date for Apollodoros in 151/0 practically as well as in 139/8.

<sup>1</sup> This first item in Varro's investigation seems also to be the only one for which he gives two etymologies (14 and 15, respectively), representing, perhaps, the different levels of explanation as defined in V, 7-9. The anomaly must be recognized, as there seems to be no way in which 15 could be subordinated to 14 on the theory that only 14 is an etymology.

old form of the word which is cited by Festus and Quintilian and written on two archaizing inscriptions.<sup>2</sup> The *st-* certainly makes *stlocus* and *consisto* (*constiti*) sufficiently similar to satisfy Varro's method and, incidentally, to put him on the right track even by modern standards of etymology.

The corruption, commonplace enough in a manuscript like *F*, was favored by the environment: *consISTITSTlocus*. It is true, on the other hand, that if the passage is amended to read *stlocus* the argument might seem rather abrupt. One misses an explanation to the effect that *locus* was formerly *stlocus*, along the lines of V, 91: *turma terima (e in u abiit)* or VI, 75: *canere . . . ex Camena permutato pro m n.* There is, however, a difference. Unlike *locus*—*stlocus*, examples thus explained are either made-up or unfamiliar<sup>3</sup> items requiring justification. Where Varro deals with well-known archaisms he takes the identity of the obsolete and the current forms for granted, witness, apparently, V, 141: *oppida quod opere muniebant, moenia. quo moenitius esset quod exaggerabant, aggeres dicti, et qui aggerem contineret, moerus*, and, even more to the point, V, 70 *ignis a <g>nascendo, quod hic nascitur*, etc., if K. O. Müller's conjecture is accepted.<sup>4</sup> And that *stlocus* was at all times a stock example is clear from the casual fashion in which our two grammatical informants quote it.<sup>5</sup>

H. M. HOENIGSWALD.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

<sup>2</sup> *G. L.*, IV, 408-9, Quintilian, I, 4, 16; *C. I. L.*, V, 7381 (Tortona), *Not. Scav.*, 1900, p. 148 (Pompeii). On words common to Varro and Verrius (Festus), see R. Kriegshammer, *De Varronis et Verrii fontibus quaestiones selectae* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 101-16.

<sup>3</sup> A characteristic example is VI, 4: *D antiqui, non r in hoc (sc. meridies) dicebant, ut Praeneste incisum in solario uidi.*

<sup>4</sup> Under these circumstances it is of course difficult to determine just how far one should go in putting the archaism into the text. Kent, *Varro on the Latin Language* (Loeb Class. Library, 1938), in discussing V, 141, is inclined to restore *moe-* "possibly in all the words."

<sup>5</sup> Cf. note 2 above.

## REVIEWS.

WERNER JAEGER. *Paideia*, The Ideals of Greek Culture. Vol. I: Archaic Greece; The Mind of Athens (1939 and 1945), pp. xxix + 420. Vol. II: In Search of the Divine Centre (1943), pp. xv + 442. Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato (1944), pp. viii + 374. Translated by Gilbert Highet. Oxford Univ. Press.

To judge fairly a monumental work of scholarship like this, it is necessary to realize clearly the limits within which the work is conceived. Professor Jaeger himself gives us little help here; the Greek *παιδεία* includes, as he says, civilization, culture, tradition, literature, and education. His first preface defines it as "the shaping of the Greek character." He goes on to say later that he will describe the life of the Greek "through the creative literature which represents his ideals" and that "literature is the chief concern of this book." But even these boundaries are too wide, for, in literature, he restricts himself to conscious ideals and opinions. In any study of the Greek character one would have expected a good deal more attention to athletics, the gods, political developments, etc., as factors shaping the character of the people themselves, as it emerges even from their literature. Nowhere is there, for example, any adequate account of Athens' democratic ideals, or of the essential differences between the Athenian and the Spartan characters.

Actually, the work as a whole deals with *the origin and development of a conscious tradition of education in the great writers of Greece, and the kind of character they aimed thus to mould*. And in spite of repeated statements that this *paideia* must be seen against the social and political background of the times, references to such background are in fact very limited. The character and aspirations of the people—no doubt often hard to establish—receive comparatively little attention. Even so limited, however, the subject is still large, and still vitally important, but a clearer statement of aims by the author might have avoided misunderstanding.

Beginning with Homer, Jaeger ably discusses the aristocratic and external nature of the heroic *aretê*, its close connection with noble birth, physical strength, courage, and honour. But then, in spite of his own warnings, he gets involved in the Homeric question, and we get two Homeric strata: the later consisting of the *Odyssey*—the first book being later still—and some parts of the *Iliad* such as Phoenix' speech in IX, and Thersites. This later stratum is used as evidence for the culture of the early Greek aristocracy. There is then a conscious and deliberate educational purpose in this later stratum, very different from educational effects elsewhere. I find the arguments here summarized for this later stratum unconvincing<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The *Odyssey* "portrays a later stage of civilization" and is more influenced by the life of the aristocrats of its own day (p. 15), while the *Iliad* derives its material from the oldest heroic poetry which

and some of the resulting statements fanciful; also largely irrelevant, since the author dates the *Odyssey* before Hesiod. In fact, they obscure some very good discussion, on the place of women in Homer for example, and prevent fuller treatment of the heroic character which (whatever the dates) was clearly at the root of all Greek education, beyond the rather meagre "aristocratic" *aretē* above-mentioned. There is no adequate discussion of the gods, freedom and fate, *aidos* and *nemesis*, barely a passing mention. We miss the substance of these for the shadow of an early Greek aristocratic culture and of an even more ghostly deliberate educational purpose. This is not, unfortunately, the only time that we are side-tracked at the cost of essentials.

With Hesiod we are on common ground, and we can forget our aristocrats for a while. His didactic purpose is obvious to all. There is a good discussion of the ethical tone and intentions of the poet, his ideal of justice, his philosophical conception of Eros, his curious mixture of myth and reason, his gospel of hard work and his protreptic use of the myth. However, the Boeotians cannot claim Hesiod as all their own, for Jaeger puts great emphasis on the ancestral connection with Asia Minor. There is an interesting discussion of the extent to which *aretē* implies success in Hesiod, as in Homer, but we may doubt how far Hesiod "deliberately sets up against the aristocratic training of Homer's heroes a working class ideal of education based on the *aretē* of the ordinary man." The contrast is in any case obvious.

We then come to the city-state, and the oldest, Sparta—"the first deliberate educational effort"—which undoubtedly sought by conscious educational methods the complete subordination of the individual to the state. Was that uncompromising Spartan ideal "imperishable, because it is the expression of a fundamental human instinct"? Its fascination for many Greek thinkers is established, but not so its positive contribution to the main stream of Greek culture until "the two types (i. e. Dorian and Ionian) finally united in the Athens of the fifth and fourth century." Do we gain much by routing Homeric influence via Sparta? I should rather, with

glorified fighting and heroic prowess (p. 18). But the Thersites episode, a political innovation, such as is not found even in the *Odyssey*, shows later influence. In the later epic "every member of this society bears the stamp of decorum and good breeding in all situations"; and "education becomes culture for the first time" (p. 22); the intellectual and social virtues are exalted (p. 22, but cf. p. 8). The women of the *Odyssey* have a very different place (pp. 22-4, Andromache is not mentioned); its morality is universally on a higher plane; "everything low, contemptible and ugly is banished from the world of the epic" (p. 42); "the Zeus who presides over the heavenly Council in the *Odyssey* personifies a high philosophical conception of the world-conscience" (p. 54). As a corrective, I refer the reader to S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (1938) and J. A. Scott, *The Unity of Homer*. Nor can I understand why the use of example and the moral tale—which surely precede any educational tradition—is deemed so important, or the fact that such "examples" are found in direct speeches. Where else would one expect them, in Homer? For other important ethical concepts in Homer, see W. C. Greene, *Moira* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1944), pp. 10-28.

Toynbee,<sup>2</sup> regard Sparta as an "arrested civilization," a dead end in the growth of culture, an extreme and self-destroying experiment in nationalism and militarism, that can be called "a sort of aristocracy" only by courtesy.

Jaeger traces hatred of Sparta to her behaviour after the Peloponnesian war, but surely the *Andromache* and much else prove it an older growth, for that war was ideological as well as imperial.

As a link to prove Spartan influence, Jaeger relies on the fame of Tyrtaeus. Direct references to him, however, date from the 4th century. Much is made of the reference in the *Laws* (628-30) though he is there admittedly criticized for the typical Spartan error of aiming only at bravery in the field. This does not justify the statement that "the place which Plato allotted to Tyrtaeus in his cultural system remained valid for the Greeks of all subsequent ages and was an indefeasible element in their culture" (p. 87). The Athenians did not need the Spartans of Tyrtaeus to teach them patriotism; and what else had the Spartans to teach?

Jaeger looks to Tyrtaeus as the exponent of a new conception: "the first author to describe this ideal of the citizen soldier," the apostle "of one standard of *aretē*, the common good of the *polis*".<sup>3</sup> I find no evidence of this in the fragments. Rather does he glorify war, and little else. The *polis* was a fact when he wrote, and thus fighting is fighting for the city, but the references to it are secondary, scarcely different from Homer, though his glory in war is more brutal. If there is a certain change in background, there is no development. The Tyrtaeus who "opens a window on the development of the idea of *aretē* since Homer and on the crisis which confronted the old aristocratic ideal during the rise of the city state" seems a creature of fancy.

However, Sparta was not, fortunately, the only city-state. *Dikē* acquired new depth and new meaning, the concept of equality arose as other states developed, and the Ionians of Asia Minor contributed also a new freedom and respect for the individual, as Jaeger well points out (pp. 99-114), emphasizing the significance of the demand for written law, *Nomos* as the new ruler, and the growth of a morality rooted in the *polis*.

<sup>2</sup> A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1934), III, pp. 50-79.

<sup>3</sup> The passage referred to is frag. 12 (Edmonds) οὐ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεται ἐν πολέμῳ | εἰ μὴ τετλαῖη μὲν δρῶν φόνον αἰματόεντα | καὶ δῆλων δρέγοιτος' ἔγγυθεν ιστάμενος. | ήδ' ἀρετή, τούτῳ δεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον | κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ νέω. | ξυνὸν δ' ἔσθλον τοῦτο πόληι τε παντὶ τε δῆμῳ, where ήδ' ἀρετή clearly refers to bravery in battle and the last line simply means such virtue is good for the city and the people alike—an echo of

πατρὶ τε σῷ μέγα πῆμα πόληι τε παντὶ τε δῆμῳ

in *Iliad*, III, 50. In another fragment there is a reference to the Heraclid kings of Sparta, the elders and the commons, mere statements of fact. The one passage that gives some colour to the *polis* ideal is frag. 10 on the sufferings of an exile, τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πίστας ἀγροὺς | πτωχεύειν πάντων ἐστ' ἀνηρότατον which again leads to glory in battle with full and gory detail. Even there, however, the sentiment is not essentially different from the πτωχοὶ καὶ ἀλήμονες ἄνδρες of *Odyssey*, XIX, 74. And the fragment on Eunomia is made to carry a burden of philosophy out of all proportion to the text (pp. 94-5).

The author's definite time scheme leads him to speak too much in terms of linear succession instead of depicting these various periods as varying aspects of the forces at work everywhere. This shows also in his treatment of the lyric poets. Further, though rightly insisting that the Greek ethic is political, he is apt to over-emphasize this at times: "Greek expressions of personal emotions and thought have nothing purely subjective in them" (p. 116). Such a statement would, I imagine, have amused Archilochus and puzzled Sappho. In Archilochus we are to see "the completion of Homer's great educational mission: for now the epic is taking possession of individual personality and character, and the formative influence of Homer has contributed above all else to a higher stage of freedom in life and thought" (p. 118); "he drinks his wine and eats his bread in the pose of a Homeric hero." Does he look at his women in the same way? "It was a daring feat then to transform heroism into naturalism."<sup>4</sup> I should say it was an impossibility. The pity of it is that such puzzling generalities obscure the contrast between Spartan and Ionian, Ionian and Homer, which—when he forgets his *post-hoc-propter-hoc* framework,—the author so excellently describes.

Even here, however, this new value put on the expression of personal emotions is not seen as a natural factor in the development of freedom which politically expressed itself in the fight against aristocratic oppression. Jaeger considers it a reaction against the tyranny of the *polis* (and presumably of the growing democracy) when he says (p. 128): "As the city-state tightened the chains of law on its citizens, they strove more and more eagerly to complement its political rigidity by liberty in their own private lives." It would certainly have surprised the champions of democracy to learn that the written laws they fought for were rigid chains—on anyone, that is, but their late arbitrary masters. And if rigidity leads to lyric poetry, the Spartans should have been the greatest lyrists in the world.

Yet the general conclusions on "the hedonist school of poetry" are right, fair and well put, in spite of excessive stress on the odd fragment, supposedly more significant.<sup>5</sup>

Jaeger is on more solid ground when he discusses Solon as one of

<sup>4</sup> Jaeger builds an Archilochean philosophy of Tyche and Renunciation on frags. 25 and 66 (Edmonds), pp. 124-5. The former renounces all desire for wealth and power, the second exhorts his heart to bear triumph and disaster equably, and ends γλυκωσκε δ' ολος ῥναμὸς ἀνθράποιος ἔχει. Most of Archilochus' fragments have no social significance whatever. On the well known Πάτερ Λυκάμβα, ποῖον ἐφράσω τόδε; | τίς σὰς παρήιε φρένας | ἡς τὸ πρὶν ἡρῆρεισθα; νῦν δὲ πολὺς | ἀστοῖσι φαίνεαι γέλως, Jaeger says (p. 123): "Even in the story of his unsuccessful wooing of Neobule and his proud and passionate abuse of her father for rejecting him, it is clear that he thinks of the whole community as his witnesses, while he himself is plaintiff and judge. . . ."

<sup>5</sup> Jaeger fastens on a fragment (14, Edmonds) which refers to bravery in battle to comment (p. 129) that Mimnermus "sometimes speaks with the voice of a statesman and a warrior, and the tense Homeric phrases of his poems vibrate with chivalrous ardour." The not remarkable lines seem to be put in the mouth of "my elders." The famous first fragments on old age are far more characteristic. See also Horace, *Epist.*, I, 6, 65.

the main architects of the Athenian equilibrium between the individual and the state. The attempt to reconstruct the philosophy behind the fragments is also more successful, because Solon was a statesman and a thinker as well as a poet: the growing belief in the responsibility of the citizen, the deeper significance of *Dikē*, and the concept of law. Worthwhile parallels emerge with the developing concepts of philosophy; the justice of Anaximander, the harmony of the Pythagoreans, the deeper consciousness of self that came with Orphism, the *φρόνησις* of Heraclitus, with the psyche sharing in *logos*.

Yet here and there Jaeger again overstates his case and overloads a fragmentary phrase with meaning, such as Heraclitus' ἐδεξησάμην ἔμεωντόν on which he comments, "he expressed the revolutionary tendency of his own philosophy in one pregnant saying: 'I sought for myself.' Humanization of philosophy could not be more trenchantly expressed" (p. 179). The well-known complaint of Xenophanes that the athletic victor receives more honour than he, the *σοφός*, becomes the symbol of: "the inevitable clash between two spiritual forces—the old aristocratic culture and the new philosophical ideal of humanity which now sought to eject it from its place of honour in the social order—that is the essence of the conflict" (p. 173). Yet *σοφός* almost certainly means poet, not philosopher.<sup>6</sup> This is poor evidence for the picture of Xenophanes as a populariser of "intellectual virtue" or an opponent of the old aristocratic culture.

With Theognis and Pindar we return to the supposed development of the aristocratic culture in transition. No one denies that both of them reflect aristocratic views and prejudices; but to turn Theognis, that bitter oligarch, into the codifier of an aristocratic culture taxes even Jaeger's ingenuity. Didacticism is not always education. The narrowness of Theognis' partisan outlook is not in dispute. Of morals he had none. I do not refer to his Dorian Eros—on which pp. 194-6 are very good—but to his negative ethical outlook.<sup>7</sup>

The attempt to set up Pindar as an educational giant is no more successful. The singer of athletic victory seems to become so because athletics, originally aristocratic, were cheapened to "mere sport" by democracy (p. 207) and lost their place in Greek life! He is said to "give a new authority to the old aristocratic code." In

<sup>6</sup> Cf. e. g. Solon, frag. 13, 52. See also p. 219.

<sup>7</sup> One example must suffice. On the well-known lines (149-50)

Χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσι,  
Κύρν· ἀρετῆς δ' ὀλίγους ἀνδράσι μοῖρ' ἔπειται

we are told, "Theognis holds that *aretē* is the quality which characterizes the nobleman when the presence or absence of wealth is left out of account: *namely, the very rare quality of spiritual nobility*" (p. 203, my italics). The italicized words are nowhere in the Greek. Theognis speaks rather like a prince whose finery has been stolen and who should exclaim: "Clothes make not the man." Jaeger himself suggests this contempt for wealth is due to the loss of it! Even ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ συλληθέντη πᾶσ' ἀρετή does not mean much, for a codifier of morals. And many verses are quite unethical. See 173 on the horrors of poverty and 61-8 that you should never trust a friend, and *passim*.

spite of references to heredity, etc., I can find in Pindar no trace of "an entire philosophy, rich with deep meditations" on any subject whatever, or any "deep and spiritual kinship of this aristocratic ideal of paideia with the educational spirit of Plato's philosophy of ideas."<sup>8</sup>

The first book—Archaic Greece—ends with the cultural policy of the tyrants, and their contribution to culture as patrons of the arts and in other ways. But can it be seriously suggested that the Greek hatred of tyranny was derived from the aristocrats, as tyranny was "the bogey of the fallen aristocracy"? And I can see no basis whatever for the statement that "the Greeks always felt that the rule of one supremely able man was, in Aristotle's words,<sup>9</sup> 'according to nature' and they tended to acquiesce in it when it appeared."

I have dealt with this first book at length, because it is the most original and controversial. Its main theme, of a conscious old Greek aristocratic culture and educational effort, as a basic element in Greek culture, with a great contribution to make, is not supported by the evidence.

The careful reader is driven to conclude that this view is due to *a priori* premises from which the author starts. Throughout, there are a number of very doubtful theoretical statements of social and political views, axiomatic in tone, which influence the handling of the evidence.

"The nobility is the prime mover in the forming of a nation's culture" (p. 4); "Culture is simply the aristocratic ideal of a nation, increasingly intellectualized" (p. 4); Tyrtaeus, allegedly sent by Apollo, is "a striking expression of the strange truth that when a spiritual leader is needed, he always comes" (p. 89); of Archilochus: "a man who . . . has realized the baseness of the mass of mankind, has lost all trace of respect for the voice of the people" (p. 120); of Sappho: "Love is the whole of a woman's life . . ." (p. 134); "the ideal of universal political aretē is indispensable because it implies the constant creation and regeneration of a governing class; and without such a governing class no nation and no state, whatever its constitution, can long survive" (p. 114). "Whatever view we may hold of the descent of aretē through noble blood, we must acknowledge the gulf which Pindar points out between natural nobility born in its possessor, and the knowledge and powers which have been merely acquired by learning, for the difference between the two things is actual and right" (p. 220).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Here again, one example: *Nem.*, III, 56, after singing the exploits of Achilles, points out that Chiron brought up Jason, Asclepius, Achilles—*ἐν ἀρμένοις πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων*. On this Jaeger: "Education cannot act unless there is an inborn aretē for it to act upon, as there was in Chiron's glorious pupils, whom he 'fostered, strengthening their hearts with seemly matters.' That pregnant phrase contains the fruits of long thought on the problem. It shows the deliberate resolve of the aristocracy to preserve its position at a time of crisis" (pp. 218-19, my italics). For a fuller discussion of Pindar's views see Gilbert Norwood's *Pindar* (Sather Lectures, 1945), third lecture.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 1288 a 28, but it is not so forthright, and tyranny is *οὐ κατὰ φύσιν*, 1287 b 40, as Jaeger himself notes.

<sup>10</sup> See also p. 7 on "present day educational levellers," and pp. 57, 88

Such statements are here premises, not conclusions, and they dominate the discussions. Throughout the rest of the work, there are references to the old aristocratic ideal here supposedly established, though its content is left vague. These lead to strange comparisons at times, such as that of Aeschylus with Tyrtaeus in spirit and with Pindar in educational purpose. The civilization of fifth century Athens was formed, we are told, "not by its new constitution nor by its new right of suffrage, but by its victory" (p. 240) which is surely an oversimplification. This general view is also responsible for the picture of a fifth century degenerating as soon as it becomes democratic, though Sophocles provides a period of suspense in tragedy as Pericles does in polities. After them, everything is vulgarisation and mob rule. Even so, however, with specific exceptions, this prejudiced view does not affect the discussions of various authors as much as might have been feared.

It is recognized that the achievements were due to the whole people. Aeschylus was the poet of the men of Marathon. The *polis* is of supreme importance in his plays (p. 471). He is concerned to interpret the ways of the gods,<sup>11</sup> and this implies a deeper understanding of the responsibilities of man. Prometheus suffering "the agony of spiritual pioneers" (p. 262), the educational function of the Chorus (265), the mighty spiritual unity of suffering and knowledge, all this and much else make a very fine chapter on what Jaeger calls "the most powerful drama in the history of the world."

With Sophocles our author has less sympathy, and his appraisal of him is both more conventional and more repetitious. Sophocles' greatness is due to his character drawing, to a new interest "in the souls of tragic characters." At the same time he is compared to Phidias, the two being "the two imperishable monuments of the great age of the Athenian spirit"; "form and norm are unified in a special sense"; in Sophocles "form is the immediate and appropriate expression, in fact the full revelation of being, and its metaphysical manifestation"; while at the same time Sophocles "shifted the emphasis from universal to individual." The reader might have preferred a less abstract valuation. There are brief discussions of *Antigone*, *Electra*, *Oedipus*, but they are not so vigorous or effective as that of the *Prometheus*.

The treatment of the Sophists is illuminating and suggestive, though it roams backward and forward in time, discursively. The sophists were "the first to conceive the conscious ideal of culture" (p. 303); "The heirs to the educational tradition of the poets." The time-scheme, however, insufficiently allows for the simultaneous working of opposite forces, and the sophists should be more clearly distinguished. There are, here too, some doubtful generalities. Can we truly say of Athens then that (p. 292): "Ethical qualities now fell into the background"? "Then, for the first time, the intellectual side of man came to the fore . . .," but what of Heraclitus?

(the Spartan ideal), 138 (the superior intelligence of the upper classes), 186 (all higher culture arose from the aristocracy). In later books, p. 290 (the only problem of democracy was to find the right leader), etc., and all the contemptuous references to ever worse mob rule from the death of Pericles on.

<sup>11</sup> Jaeger says the ways of God. See below.

"*σοφία* endangered the aristocratic ideal" (p. 319). Was it not rather the spread of culture? These and other unqualified statements detract from an otherwise attractive chapter on the sophists, which rightly concludes: "Their strength lay in the brilliant new system of education they invented. Their weakness was in the intellectual and moral foundations of their system" (p. 331).

With Euripides, Jaeger has no sympathy at all, and, for that reason, less understanding of his positive contribution. The intellectual sensitiveness and restless curiosity of the times are to him only a sign of "the tragic ruin of a civilization" (p. 332). "The collapse of society was only the outward and visible sign of the collapse of individual character. Even the hardships and trials of war affect a spiritually healthy nation very differently from *a nation whose values are rotten with individualism*" (p. 336, my italics). Such a description certainly does not fit the Athens of Euripides.

The picture of Euripides is conventional, with an extra sting in it. His realism becomes "bourgeois" realism, and Medea the heroine of "a domestic drama of bourgeois life." The epithet bourgeois, applied to Euripides, seems meaningless. Jaeger states quite correctly that criticism of the gods is subordinate to the dramatic motive, and deals adequately with Euripides' mixture of styles, his argumentative eloquence, his rationalist tone, his deeper psychological insight—"he created the pathology of the mind." But this is not linked up with the main thesis, nor does the deep humanism of the poet receive mention. Euripides deserves far more positive a place in a study of Greek culture; the *Bacchants* is not "a world without faith"; the *Trojan Women* is far more than "a powerful attack on the glory of the Greeks who conquered Troy"; the *Hippolytus*, than "the tragic working out of sexual desire unfulfilled."<sup>12</sup>

The treatment of Aristophanes, too, is scanty. The light which old comedy throws on the Athenian's love of laughter is brought out well, but the discussion of the comedies is restricted to the *Knights*, the *Clouds*, and the *Frogs*. Jaeger very obviously shares all Aristophanes' prejudices against Cleon. "His chorus of knights embodied the defensive alliance of nobility and intellect against the growing power of barbarism and political terror." The very fact of the performance disproves any real "political terror" and the intellect, if any, is well camouflaged! And Aristophanes' treatment of the new tragedy, as well as the new education, shows "dreadful anxiety for the future of Athens." Surely, there is much more in Aristophanes that requires discussion here: his comments on the Athenian love of litigation, his comedies on women—are not all these and much else relevant to a study of the shaping of the Athenian character?

The discussion on Thucydides starts very well. "The astonishing concentration of political thought and will revealed in the creation of the empire found full intellectual expression in the history of Thucydides." The political experience of Thucydides is rightly emphasized and the function of the speeches as "the medium through which he expresses his political ideas" explained—though a complication is introduced by considering some, notably the Funeral

<sup>12</sup> See my *The Drama of Euripides* (Methuen, 1941).

speech, to be free compositions embodying post-war reflections (pp. 395, 487).

Professor Jaeger belongs to the school that regards Thucydides as a "cold analyst," even in the Melian dialogue, where Thucydides, he says, is not taking sides. "He thinks only of power" (p. 386), and "By making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and transform God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucydides gave the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine" (p. 401). To me, the Melian dialogue remains a bitter satire. The dramatic element in Thucydides cannot be thus dismissed, and no cold analyst has ever been a great political philosopher.

In any case, that philosophy should not be reduced to a simple belief in the Leader-principle. True, Thucydides venerated Pericles; he may even have thought that Pericles would have won the Sicilian expedition—though Jaeger conveniently dismisses Pericles' advice of no further conquests as probably not Periclean (p. 407). But he goes further: "According to Thucydides, it was because there was no other man who could *eliminate the influence of the people and its mob instincts, surmount the democratic constitution and govern like a king*, that the Sicilian expedition failed" (p. 406, my italics). And again: "Thucydides considers that Periclean Athens was a happy solution of a problem which was becoming acute under *the complete mob rule of the decades following the death of Pericles*—the problem of the relationship which ought to exist between a superior individual and the political community. *History has shown that this solution depends on the appearance of a genius to lead the state . . .*" (p. 409, my italics).<sup>13</sup>

If this were Thucydides' political philosophy, he would certainly not be expressing "the political thought and will" of Athens. The evidence nowhere supports such a view.

The second volume deals with Socrates and Plato (up to and including the *Republic*). It is very much less controversial than the first. The title—In Search of the Divine Centre—points to the one doubtful part, the gods; but in general it can be recommended as a sound, if somewhat lengthy and at times repetitious, study of Plato's theories of education, broadly understood.

We are now in the fourth century. The author draws a somewhat rigid line between the fifth century and the fourth—before and after defeat. But can Socrates, as well as the funeral speech of Pericles, be included in the fourth century? However difficult it may

<sup>13</sup> The references for all this are to II, 65, where we have the famous λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ, ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή, and Thucydides goes on to blame the later disasters, including the failure in Sicily, on the rival ambitions of Pericles' successor. There is, of course, nothing in Thucydides corresponding to the words italicized. ἀρχή does not mean kingship. Pericles was re-elected year by year. Not a word in Thucydides against this or other features of the constitution. There is also a reference to II, 37, 1, where Pericles boasts of equality before the law and career open to talent. Jaeger comments: "Logically, that implies that if one man is supremely valuable, and important, he will be recognized as the ruler of the state."

be to recreate the historical Socrates (and that problem is here very sensibly reviewed), he is certainly a contemporary of Euripides, not of Plato, although there are obvious advantages in dealing with him in relation to Plato. They cannot be separated, but then the fifth century should not thus be cut off from the fourth.

The chapter on Socrates is very good. The picture of him as the teacher is well and vividly drawn. Stress is put on the influence of medical science, the vital and revolutionary Socratic emphasis on the psyche and the inner life, the Socratic *askēsis* aiming at "not the virtue of the monk but the virtue of the ruler," the definitions. A brief general discussion on Platonic *paideia* is followed by a chapter on the Socratic dialogues which are shown to centre round the problem of *aretē*. While maintaining the essential unity of Platonism, allowance is made for the development of Plato himself. The Seventh Letter is accepted as genuine and providing us with background for some of the earlier works.

For the rest of the book (pp. 107-370) the author adopts the method of summary interspersed with comments and so deals with *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. The summaries are good, but the method has certain weaknesses. Comments of importance are thus embodied in a summary. The general reader cannot always be sure where Plato ends and Jaeger begins. The same subjects recur a number of times, with inevitable and avoidable repetition in general comments. The method does not always allow sufficient relief to the most significant passages; and passages equally important, in other than the selected work, receive insufficient notice.<sup>14</sup>

A curious feature is that Jaeger is apt to argue at length, as very controversial, certain points of view that have been generally accepted for a generation by most English-speaking scholars.<sup>15</sup> This

<sup>14</sup> The teachability of virtue in the *Meno*, for example, would gain if related to statements elsewhere on knowledge and utility (*Lysis*); the knowledge of knowledge (*Charmides*); the knowledge of self (*Hippias*), not to mention passages in the *Republic* which later receive separate discussion, and from later dialogues, which, except for the *Laws*, are not dealt with at all.

Passages insufficiently stressed are, for example, in *Rep.* I, the implied difficulty of equating virtue with technical knowledge; the just man will harm no one (335d); the impotence of injustice (352); the *εργον ψυχῆς* (333c) and later, the importance of public opinion, which the Sophist only obeys (492-3), the unusual apology for the many (449e), and the fact that the guardians do achieve virtues without knowledge, since they have only *δόξα* (412-3, 429-30). Generally, the psychology of the *Republic* does not receive adequate treatment.

<sup>15</sup> One example is the relation between the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*. One remembers that the first volume was originally published in 1933, though some additions have been made to the notes. In this volume there are 25 references to British scholars, 16 of them to Burnet or Taylor. There are, in all three volumes, very numerous references to German scholarship for which all students will be grateful, but, in all, there are in the voluminous notes only 79 references to British works, 38 to American, but (omitting all cross references to *Paideia* itself) 141 references to the author's other works! The *Cambridge Ancient History* is never referred to. Cornford's work is not mentioned in

underlines the scantiness of references to British works, both in this and the other volumes. It is the more regrettable as British scholars have concerned themselves, particularly, with general syntheses of the kind aimed at in this work.

The paradox of the *Protagoras*, the search for a standard in the *Gorgias*, the new Socratic knowledge in the *Meno*, the "union of Eros and paideia" in the *Symposium*, all these are discussed with vigour and sympathetic imagination, and with many a vivid comment. One may regret that the *Symposium* is separated from the *Phaedrus*, later discussed largely from another point of view. So one regrets that the discussions of poetry in *Republic* III, and X, are separated by 128 pages of other matter, but that is inherent in the method the author has chosen. And through it all he very rightly insists that these different aspects of Platonic philosophy all bear a direct relation to Plato's philosophy of politics—that his *paideia* is intended for the individual-in-the-community.

It might have helped to give a clear summary of conclusions reached in all previous dialogues before tackling the *Republic*. This the general review at this point does not, and the reader is likely to get lost in this very long commentary (pp. 199-370) unless the different threads are kept clearly before him. In the early books, the author emphasizes the state's responsibility for the education of the "guards" as "a revolutionary reform of unimaginable historical consequences" (p. 210). There can be disagreement only on matters of detail<sup>16</sup> as we follow the growth of the state, and Jaeger makes a very important distinction, too often ignored, when he says that, although Plato borrowed from Sparta, the inmost spiritual essence of his education "is absolutely un-Spartan" (p. 239). There is also a good discussion of "the organic cosmos of the soul" (p. 241).

Plato's eugenic principles are related to the studies of Greek physicians (p. 249) and the military regulations of V are rightly said to be "a new ethical code for war" with practical intent. In discussing the claim of the philosopher to rule, it is clearly stated: "Suppose we deprive the ruler of his absolute knowledge. According to Plato, we thereby destroy the foundation of his authority, for it does not depend on any mystic of personal leadership, but on the power of truth to convince" (p. 264). As the *Politicus* is nowhere discussed, this problem is dropped (see vol. III, p. 236). The section on Constitutions and Characters is especially well written and vivid (on VIII and IX). Finally, the free choice of lives in the myth of Er is rightly emphasized, but the contradictions on this point are not drawn to our attention.

relation to early philosophy, Thucydides, or Plato. And there are many similar omissions.

<sup>16</sup> P. 221: "Plato has no quarrel with those who try to keep a place for aesthetic enjoyment . . ." Plato admits the existence of such enjoyment (387b) but does not leave a place for it, except for the doubtful *ότι μὴ παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα* at 396e. See also p. 223. P. 224: "Sound and rhythm must be subordinate to language." But surely *logos* means content as well as language? P. 281: "detour" is an unfortunate translation for *περίοδος* in 504b; it rather means a longer prescribed course, cf. the use for map and orbit. It is not a pointless going around. P. 341: I doubt if *φιλεῖ* and *ώφελεῖ* are "obvious allusions to the method of medical and biological pathology." The words are very common.

There is, however, one central point that is highly controversial, the identification of the Good with "God" in the discussion of the simile of the Sun. This identification has been made by others, but never by Plato, as Jaeger admits (pp. 285 f.). This is an old controversy and I can only register disagreement.<sup>17</sup> I believe the Ideas, the ultimate reality, always remained, in Plato, distinct from the gods who, at least in the later dialogues, are active souls. Very little is gained by speaking of Plato as "the founder of a new religion or theology," though we may well grant it, if theology is defined as "the study of the highest problems in the universe by means of philosophic reason"—"a higher and purer work of the intellect than any mere religion" (p. 298). That is of course the Aristotelian *θεολογική*, but today it is called metaphysics. The use of modern words such as God, theology, religion, add nothing for the scholar and tremendously confuse the general reader. The *Euthyphro* is mentioned in this connection, and rightly, but that little dialogue makes it quite clear that the Ideas are prior to the gods who love the right because it is right. This was not changed even by the *Epinomis* (see p. 297). And when we are told that "the Daimon mostly means God not in his absolute being but in his relation to man" (p. 345) confusion gets worse confounded.

That does not mean, of course, that the Good is not the model divine in the Greek or that *paideia* may not be called "conversion," provided again we clearly differentiate it from the modern Christian meaning of the word (p. 295) and, as Jaeger points out, it was certainly not a purely intellectual act, for it is closely linked with Plato's theories of Eros (pp. 295 ff.).

The third volume (Book Four) begins with a substantial and interesting essay on Greek medicine (pp. 3-46). After this—except for a chapter on Xenophon and a concluding one on Demosthenes—we are concerned only with Isocrates, and Plato in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*.

Jaeger puts very great emphasis on medicine as "a leading force in the life of the Greek people" and on its influence on Greek writers. He traces the kinship of ideas (of *φύσις*, for example) in medicine and early philosophy, the reaction against the philosophic outlook in the Hippocratean corpus, and a later coming together. He makes out an interesting case for a much deeper influence of the medical methods on Plato than is usually allowed—with an especially attractive discussion of the notorious passage in *Phaedrus* (270 e-d), and insists that the method of studying the forms of the soul is in fact Hippocratean. Aristotle's ethical vocabulary is also said to be medical, as is, of course, the insistence on balance and health of the soul in Plato.

All this is excellent, but we then get involved in a detailed dis-

<sup>17</sup> See Jaeger's notes and references, pp. 414 ff. See also my *Plato's Thought* (Methuen, 1935), pp. 150-78 and references there. It should be added that even the words *ὁ θεός* do not mean God; e.g. in Book III, where Jaeger so translates, *ὁ θεός* no more implies the existence of one God than *ὁ ἀνθρώπος* the existence of only one man, e.g. *ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις* (395d). Both are generic, and throughout III Plato uses *θεός* and *θεοί* quite indiscriminately.

cussion of the treatise *On Diet* and the work of Diocles of Carystus which, though very interesting in itself, seems somewhat out of place, and due to the special interests of the author rather than the requirements of his subject. However, he has rendered a real service in thus putting Greek medicine squarely in the middle of a discussion of Greek culture and education—"the Greek ideal of culture was the ideal of Health."

Isocrates is an important figure in fourth century Athens, and well deserves the place here given to him. He "naturalized" the education of the Sophists though he disclaimed the title—and represents general education as against philosophy in the Platonic sense. Certainly, "sophistry" was still alive, and we agree that "Plato never argued against dead men." The contrast between the educational methods of Plato and Isocrates is therefore important and indeed perennial. It is the greater pity that this contrast—including a very different attitude towards politics—is here largely side-tracked into an argument about specific references to Plato in Isocrates. That question, though interesting to the specialist, is secondary. A greater pity that the evidence is definitely mishandled and that Jaeger, by summarizing in his own, sometimes in Platonic, language, gives the appearance of fact to his own inferences.<sup>18</sup>

By supposing Plato to be included under Eristics in *Against the Sophists*; classed with Antisthenes, but not with Eristics, in *Helen*; and more gently dealt with along with Eristics in *Antidosis*, Jaeger imagines an early hostility between the two men, and gradually a better understanding. There is no evidence for this.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> E.g. Isocrates is said to "make short work of dialectic: he couples it with eristic" (p. 56). There is no reference to dialectic in *Ag. the Soph.*; nor to "aesthetic sense," or "artistically disciplined form" (p. 60). A comparison of the short text of *Against the Sophists* with Jaeger's discussion will make this very clear (pp. 56-67). E.g. *ἰδιωτῶν τύποις* becomes "the mob," p. 58.

<sup>19</sup> *Against the Sophists*, 1-9, condemns a) the excessive promises of some teachers, b) "eristics" who profess to teach the truth but tell lies, c) those who claim knowledge of the future, d) those who tell young men that by frequenting them they will know how to act (cf. *Prot.* 318a), e) those who charge fees and distrust their pupils, f) those who watch for contradictions in words, not deeds. Here we are to see "all the features that make Platonism repulsive to ordinary common sense" (p. 57). Even charging fees is apparently aimed at Plato! Much is made of the use of *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, which are here quite general; and the expression *ψυχῆς ἐπιμελείᾳ* "above all" shows the attack to be against Plato and the Socratics. But that, too, in Isocrates, is used for education, even his own! See *Antidosis* 304. Actually the people attacked here are largely the eristics and sophists attacked also in Plato.

In *Helen*, 1, Isocrates attacks a) those who say *ψευδῆ λέγειν* is impossible (Antisthenes?) b) others (*οἱ δέ*) who say different virtues are *μάτι ἐπιστήμη* c) others (*οἱ δέ*) the eristics. Plato can be only under (b). He goes on to apply 2-5 to (a), and 6-12 to (c).

That Isocrates takes a kinder tone towards other teachers generally at a later date is irrelevant (*To Nicocles* 50-3, *Antidosis* 259-87, where the eristics are distinguished from those who teach the mathematical sciences. In 271 he does use *δόξα*, *ἐπιστήμη* in a more Platonic sense, but we are now in 354 B.C. See also pp. 146-50).

Our general view of Isocrates is not made clearer by proceeding from speech to speech. There are too many contradictions. It is precisely because his "philosophy" has no philosophical basis that he shifts his ground according to circumstances or audience. Jaeger deals too kindly with him and attempts to endow him with a depth and consistency that were not his. The *Nicocles* and other Cyprian speeches evince a belief in kingship—directed by an educator—but *To Nicocles* is a very slight piece to carry any such heavy burden of systematized thought as is here laid upon it. The *logos* of Isocrates is but a brittle and almost empty vessel. If the *Areopagiticus* (which Jaeger attractively dates in 357, before the Social war) is rightly called a "wish fantasy" (p. 112) and also the program of a political group—it is in fact the old back-to-Solon cry—can we at the same time describe it as "a penetrating critique of democracy in its existing form—radical mob-rule" (p. 123)? Should we really seek the influence of Thucydides in one so careless of historical truth?

So with the *Antidosis*, the old man's defence. He did, undoubtedly, insist upon the great value of education to the state, but did he ever define it, beyond the capacity to speak well on great subjects? The apostle of general culture nowhere gives it adequate content. The creation of new intellectual élite (p. 153)? He never says so. We should not therefore speak of basic principles in his thought (p. 146) or describe his school as "a political research institute" (p. 154). Though critical in detail, Jaeger's lengthy valuation of Isocrates too often approaches Isocratean rhetoric itself.

On the other hand, the chapter on Xenophon has something of the straightforward crispness of Xenophon's writing. With all his limitations he certainly is "vivid and likable." As he is a simple person, Xenophon's prejudices are more obvious. Jaeger gives us a brief and businesslike description of his various works from which emerges the Xenophontic ideal of the gentleman-soldier. "What moves us most deeply is not the influence that Xenophon tries to exercise on us, but the lasting impression the strange foreign peoples make on him" (p. 160). That is very true, and this brief clear picture of the conscious uncomplicated *καλὸς κἀγαθός* is a welcome relief between the limpid complacency of Isocrates and the disenchanted power of Plato in his old age.

The *Phaedrus* is here classed as a work of that old age. The style would date it rather in the middle period, but the main argument is not affected thereby. In any case, the unusual naming of Isocrates at the end points to some relation to Isocrates.<sup>20</sup> The analysis of the two speeches on Eros is good, and the thesis of the second part clearly explained: a speech must be an organic whole, the orator must have philosophic knowledge, the knowledge of dialectic which he is to apply to the study of the soul.

<sup>20</sup> Jaeger makes much of the "eulogy" of Isocrates at *Phaedrus* 279a (pp. 184-5), but the later we date the dialogue, the less of a compliment it becomes for Socrates to say that Isocrates is a young man who may go far for he has something of philosophy in him. In the Platonic sense he obviously did not develop into a philosopher. Certainly, the irony is good-natured.

Very rightly, Jaeger insists on the importance of Plato's *Laws*, too often neglected, and shows that there is in that work an increasing emphasis upon the practical, which is illustrated by the passage on the slaves' doctor. Yet at times the contrast with the *Republic* is rather forced. Early education in the *Republic* was not "simply trying to start training the child's intellect young enough,"<sup>21</sup> though undoubtedly there is greater emphasis on the training of emotion in the *Laws*. Indeed, this should have been linked up with the psychology of the *Timaeus*. Jaeger sees Plato as aiming at a synthesis of the Dorian and Athenian natures (p. 218) and he tends to overestimate the Spartan-Tyrtæan contribution, while he does not extract the full value of the contrast in the first book between the Spartan and the Athenian aims. The emphasis there placed on harmony, not victory, and the reasons given for the *προόμια* show that Plato, aristocrat though he was, had yet grasped the fundamental democratic principle, reliance on persuasion rather than force.

Yet we have here, in spite of this, a very adequate account of the popular education of the *Laws*, the education by play, the surprising detail on the education of infants, the attempt to reform *μοναστική* once more, the tremendous importance of all art, and the fact that the Ideas and the philosopher's education are still in the background.

One word of warning must be repeated against Jaeger's habit of translating *ὁ θεός*, *οἱ θεοί* and even *θεός τις* by "God," which is apt to confuse the general reader. At least we should have been warned that the meaning of *θεός* and that of "God" are very different. That Plato's ethic was based on a knowledge of the supreme realities and values, the Ideas, is self evident; that these are more than human and therefore, in a sense, divine, is also true. But we have seen that they should not be called gods, and certainly not God. The introduction of the terms of modern religion, the comparison of his state to a Church (p. 252) require careful qualification and explanation, of which there is none. Two or three passages of the *Laws* are referred to again and again. This points to a strange omission in this work. The gods are nowhere discussed. In view of the importance of this "knowledge of God," in Jaeger's final valuation of the Platonic ethic and *paideia*, such explanation and discussion were essential.

The last chapter, on Demosthenes, is vivid and lively. We are given a closer view of the orator's personality and he is himself kept close to the contemporary background. He is depicted as towering above all his contemporaries. Compared with him, Isocrates is now convicted of an unforgivable political blunder. And, in Demosthenes' youth, the perpetually worsening "mob rule" is allowed to lift for a moment and Athens to recover from the Peloponnesian war (p. 266). As we follow the unfolding political aims of Demosthenes, his mission to educate the Athenians is clear, but can he be called an educator and "essentially a teacher" in any sense approaching that used hitherto? Was his conception of politics "wholly an objective art" (pp. 281-5)? And the suggestion on the debate in his soul between "the practical politician and the idealistic statesman,"

<sup>21</sup> See *Rep.* 377b, the whole discussion on poetry, and 401 b-d, 411 a-c, etc.

though attractive, is conjectural. In short this chapter, good as it is, is not worked into any direct relevance with the rest of the volume.

This review may appear to be a piecemeal valuation, but in this it reflects the impression left by the work itself. There is indeed a framework of very wide generalizations such as the identity of ethics and politics, the progressing importance of the individual in Greek thought. Within each section there are dominant ideas such as the conscious development of an aristocratic ideal in Archaic Greece, the divine centre in Plato. And valuable parallels are worked out, as between early political and philosophic thought, medical and philosophic methods. But the threads are not sufficiently drawn together, the particular sections not sufficiently clearly integrated in the general theme.

The neglect of the character and outlook of the Greek people themselves seems to originate from a belief that the élite of the few chosen spirits not only direct a people's culture, but *are* that culture. Even within the philosophic ideal, however, there are some gaps. The ill-fated desire for *aὐταρκεία*, for example, receives little notice.

The book as a whole contains a great deal of valuable material and discussions, also a great deal of suggestive detail which cannot, in a review, be noted or criticized. All this is of great importance for the scholar and the research student. But, because of the dubious nature of some of its main contentions and general approach, its at times unnecessary length, its highly rhetorical style and repetitious methods, the whole work can be used, by and for the general reader and student-body, only with the greatest caution.

G. M. A. GRUBE.

TRINITY COLLEGE,  
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

EMMA J. and LUDWIG EDELSTEIN. *Asclepius*. Vol. I: Testimonies, pp. xvii + 470. Vol. II: Interpretations, pp. x + 277. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1945. \$7.50. (*Publications of the Institute of the History of Medicine, The Johns Hopkins University*, second series, Texts and Documents, Vol. II.)

After the monumental monograph on Zeus by Professor A. B. Cook, *Asclepius* is the second Greek god to be the object of a great monograph in a work honored by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies. The first volume comprising the testimonies is much larger than the second which contains the interpretations, but this is due to the fact that all testimonies are translated. This is useful because the book will be of interest to other people too besides classical scholars. While Cook takes in everything that is in any way related to Zeus, the Edelsteins put strict limits to their work, perhaps with the understandable and praiseworthy purpose that it might not swell too much. It will not be unfair to the authors and may be useful to the reader to point to these limits.

First, the authors treat exclusively of *Asclepius*. The numerous

healing heroes with whom Greece abounded are mentioned only once in passing (p. 61), although they form the background. Secondly, while the literary testimonies, many of them insignificant, are collected in their entirety, a selection is made of the inscriptions (see the Preface of vol. I). I agree with the authors that it was superfluous to reproduce the many dedications giving only names, but there are more remarkable omissions. Of the famous Epidaurian miracle inscriptions only two slabs (*I. G.*, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, nos. 121 and 122) are reproduced, nos. 123 and 124 omitted with the remark that they are too badly damaged to yield reliable information. This is not perfectly true; in some cases the sense can be made out. And they add some interesting information, e. g. the popular anecdote of the fishmonger who did not pay the promised tithe to Asclepius, which is treated anew ingeniously by Herzog in *Archaologike Ephemeris*, 1937, pp. 522 ff., and the folk-tale of the statue with the golden head, to which Blinkenberg adduced parallels from various ages and peoples in *Danske Studier*, 1928, pp. 97 ff. (in Danish); this folk-tale is especially interesting because, as the month-name Thargelion proves, it is taken over from an Ionian source and adapted to the Epidaurian propaganda. This omission is connected with the failure of the authors to discuss or appreciate the significance of the miracle tales as witnesses of the Epidaurian propaganda. Of the inscriptions from the Asclepius sanctuary at Lebena (*Inscriptiones Creticae*, I, xvii, 6-31) only one is adduced, without a warning that there are many more. The note (vol. II, p. 203, n. 19) on the copies of the Erythraean hymn, of which two are quoted in Testimonies 592 and 592a, would have been more in place there. To other hymns I shall return later.

The preponderance of literary evidence colours the exposition throughout. About the first third part of the Interpretations is devoted to lengthy mythological discussions of which I note the chief points only. They start with the origins. The authors reject, of course, the opinion that Asclepius and his sons were historical personages; they think that Podalirius is interpolated in the *Iliad*, that the myths of Asclepius were originally localized in Messenia as well as in Thessaly, that Asclepius and his sons were physicians upon whom epics imposed a heroic garb. Asclepius as father of Machaon and Podalirius is said to be invented by the epics, the Coronis—*Eoie* of Hesiod to be older than that of Arsinoe and to reflect not Delphic but Homeric spirit, though it fits in better with cyclic epics than with Homer. Asclepius is rightly represented as a physician, a craftsman, a culture hero. That Zeus slays him is strikingly compared with his slaying of another culture hero, Prometheus. Asclepius is said to have been in the beginning the patron of the wandering physicians. Finally it is shown how the myth was expurgated in order to be adapted to the god Asclepius. The old view that Asclepius was a chthonian god is rightly rejected.

The reasoning of the authors is sound and clarifying and they are fully aware of the fact that because of the fragmentary state of the evidence, the results in many respects are uncertain, and in this I agree with them. From my point of view the cult also ought to be taken into account in these problems. Asclepius is one of the healing heroes of whom Greece had an abundance; it follows that he was a

craftsman and was thought to be a man who once had lived and now was dead. The myth had to accept this fact and embroidered it. When it is said that Asclepius originally was nothing but the patron of the physicians, it may be asked why this rôle was attributed to him: clearly because he was concerned with the healing of diseases. I cannot avoid finding the origin therein. That Homer mentioned him contributed much to his popularity, for Homer had a great, though not always fully recognized, influence on the hero cults. The authors' opinion that Asclepius was elevated to godhead at a fairly late date and at Epidaurus seems to be reasonable, but I doubt that this was due to his connexion with Apollo Maleatas; gods are wont to subordinate heroes to themselves. The line between heroes and gods fluctuated in the cult, as is often mentioned in Pausanias and is especially apparent in regard to Heracles. When Apollo became too elevated and too busy with other more important things than the healing of diseases, Asclepius filled the empty place, although for long he kept his connexion with the god.

I subjoin two casual remarks. The importance of family tradition in Greece is certainly underrated (p. 58; cf. the families of artists). What is said of the importance of Asclepius in the house cult (p. 104) is not borne out by the evidence. Of the many house altars found in Thera and in Miletus not one is dedicated to Asclepius, a single one to Hygiea. There remains the inscription quoted in Test. no. 12. Many of these house altars, which belong to Hellenistic and Roman times, are dedicated to Zeus, contrary to the author's assertion.

The authors touch upon a much debated subject when they try to explain the rise and ascendancy of the Asclepius religion. They polemize vividly against the common opinion that it depended on superstition, deceit, and propaganda,—certainly justly, in part at least. They emphasize the new and important point of view that the rising appreciation of the boon of health in great measure was responsible for Asclepius' popularity; Asclepius was the god not only of the sick but of the healthy also, and this side is expressed by the most venerated of his daughters, Hygiea: she had a house altar. They set forth eloquently the ethical aspect of Asclepius. Sometimes they seem to go too far, e.g. when they accept the assertion of the emperor Julian that Asclepius did not expect any reward (p. 113); the inscriptions from Epidaurus tell another story. The close relations of Asclepius to the Eleusinian cult are ascribed to the fact that these were the only ancient cults characterized by an experience other than that of this world. This is overemphasized, for they were kindred in the gentleness and humanity of the deities and the close connexion came about in Late Antiquity because these two were the living religions in Greece at that time.

The authors oppose rightly a too crude judgment on the belief in Asclepius, but they fail to make a distinction between the belief of educated people and that of the masses. They use the Epidaurian accounts of miracle cures in a one-sided manner; they do not analyze them nor give an all-round exposition of their contents nor estimate them as means of propaganda. These accounts are filled with sheer unbelievable things and with folk-tales of which two examples were quoted above (cf. II, p. 168, n. 29 and p. 170, n. 35). One cannot

avoid the conclusion that the Epidaurian priests knew the way to impress the masses and acted and wrote accordingly. Another much debated question is how the temple cures were in reality performed; many people speak much of deceit and suggestion. The authors reject the theories which assume an interference on the part of men, be they physicians or priests, and they make a good case for the view that the ancients commonly knew more of contemporary medicine than we do and that the dreams were reflections of the patient's every-day experience or of tales which he had heard. Due account is taken to the spontaneous healing of nervous diseases and reference is made to some relevant but little observed facts,—that ancient physicians were reluctant to assume responsibility whenever they were not certain of their success, so that in desperate cases people went to Asclepius and sometimes were healed, and that some of the suppliants suffered from relatively slight disorders which were deemed to be serious. The authors have made important contributions to the debate but have not brought it to a conclusion. I cannot help thinking that a comparison with modern *Gnadenorte*, e.g. Lourdes, Tenos, etc. would be illuminating, at least psychologically, though the authors deprecate it (p. 162, n. 17). Finally it is correctly emphasized that illness was a much more serious thing in ancient times than now, socially as well as politically. The comparison between Christ and Asclepius in vol. II, chap. 7, is very interesting but overlooks the fact that Christ did not act as a healer in the church,—this power was delegated to the apostles and saints; nor is it mentioned that Asclepius was vanquished at last when the Christians found rivals to him in healing saints (see Mary Hamilton, *Incubation* [1906], part ii, and E. Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligen-cults*, II, chap. 6).

The chapter on the cult is a good survey; a detailed account, which is not within the authors' scope, would have much more to say, e.g. on the administration and on the sacred treasures (II, p. 188, n. 18). The treasure chest in the temple of Cos has been found and from Ptolemais in Egypt has come a snake of granite with a small hole in its neck through which money could be inserted (C. C. Edgar, *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, XL [1902/3], pp. 140 ff.). From these snake-guarded treasures the folk-tale of the snake as guardian of a treasure is derived. It is a merit of the authors to have pointed to the fact that in Late Antiquity a daily divine service was performed in some temples of Asclepius (Epidaurus and Pergamum) and hymns were sung at various hours of the day, but they fail to remark that we possess two collections of such hymns inscribed on stone, one from Epidaurus (*I. G.*, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, 132-134, alluded to but not quoted, p. 194), and another from Athens (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 4533; the stone is at Cassel). This latter collection begins with the song urging Asclepius to awaken, which is quoted from Kaibel's *Epigrammata graeca*, Test. 598. The second hymn on this stone, to Asclepius, recurs in the Epidaurian collection and in Athenaeus, XV, p. 702 A, where it is ascribed to a certain Aiphron from Sicyon.

The preponderance of literary evidence is especially apparent in the two last chapters on the images and temples of Asclepius which make only very slight use of the archaeological materials. There

may be a certain truth in the authors' assertion that great importance is to be attributed to the literary testimonies on the images of the god, because the monuments remain silent while the former speak clearly, for most of the extant images are second-rate. However, I should have liked a mention of the beautiful Seopadic torso in Athens, found in the temple of Asclepius at Munychia (*Athenische Mitteilungen*, XVII [1892], pl. iv). The features of the god seem to tremble with pain and it has been justly remarked that only he who himself has felt pain can have real compassion for suffering man.

In the chapter on the temples this neglect of archaeology is really glaring. The Coan temple is described after Herondas, that at Epidaurus after Pausanias, with the barest mention of the magnificent extant remains. Regrettably there has been no comprehensive work on the excavations at Epidaurus since the old book by Cavadias (1900, in New Greek), but there are many reports and papers of which only two in *Archäologisches Jahrbuch* are quoted. The temple at Corinth is mentioned, with criticism of de Waele's dating in the second half of the sixth century B.C. (p. 246, n. 16) but without a hint of the numerous very interesting ex-votos found by the American excavators. The sacred precinct at the foot of the Acropolis of Athens with its wealth of beautiful reliefs is passed over, the magnificent buildings at Pergamum dismissed in two lines with a reference to Wiegand's report in a footnote. Certainly one does not attain a fair idea of the importance and the glory of the god without a knowledge of the great and extensive buildings which were erected to serve him and his suppliants.

Within the limits which the authors have set for themselves they have produced a scholarly and useful work which in certain respects makes considerable contributions to our knowledge and appreciation of Asclepius. The numerous footnotes are crammed with references, sometimes to recondite literature, which show an extensive reading. The volume of Testimonies has an *index locorum* and that of the Interpretations a useful index of the testimonies, adding the pages where they are treated, and another of ancient names, but no index of subjects.

MARTIN P. NILSSON.

LUND, SWEDEN.

SAMUEL ELIOT BASSETT. *The Poetry of Homer*. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1938. Pp. 273. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, Vol. XV.)

As the preface tells us, these lectures were never delivered. A few days before he was to leave for the West Coast Professor Bassett passed on. The manuscript was in final draft, however, and the editors found it necessary to make only minor revisions.

Professor Bassett's attitude towards Homer and the problems of the so-called Higher Criticism is a transitional one. Although he derives directly from Scott and the other great Unitarians, he had perused all the newer theories of Homeric style and had wisely found much of value in them. That he rejected many of their conclusions,

implied and otherwise, was as much because their research was incomplete as it was because he was loath to abandon his own ideas of Homer and his art. Parry had established the oral character of Homer's style, and Professor Bassett had accepted it, but he could not agree with the implication that everything in Homer is traditional and that the Great Poet had altered the tradition in only minor respects which it would be impossible to determine. He lays the burden of the proof on those who would, as it were, detract from the greatness of Homer. So he conceived of a Homer who made use of the oral traditional material for oral presentation but who approached and treated that material in the manner of a conscious creative artist.

In his first lecture Professor Bassett, therefore, presents a new Homeric Problem, to determine "more exactly, with our new knowledge and our new methods, the universal and the particular poetic qualities" of Homer. The nineteenth century philologists had given all of their attention to explaining the origin of the poems, but with Drerup and Rothe the scholars of the present century have begun to change the focus of their studies from the antecedents of Homeric poetry to the poetry itself. He assumed, and this is fundamental to an understanding of his book, that one master poet was responsible for the poetic qualities of the Homeric poems. "The Separatist hypothesis is a holdover from the last century; its present strength is due to a time lag. The trend is also away from it. It seems not improbable that soon the hypothesis will be abandoned, or will sink into insignificance. The characteristic features of this genus of poetry are within our ken; the authorship of the poems is beyond it. But since all the greatest poetry whose authorship is known . . . bears witness to the singleness of great poetic power, it is reasonable that we should assume one great maker of the Homeric poems until we are confronted with unmistakable objective evidence to the contrary." This is, of course, still highly controversial, but Professor Bassett's second assumption, that Homer had no other purpose than "joy in the making, which . . . he shared with his audience," would probably be accepted by all. This is a pretty safe generalization, but when he continues by saying that "Homer's only poetic purpose was to make an imagined experience real" he has attributed to the poet a sophisticated approach which smacks more of later ages than of Homeric times. Like all great oral poets Homer has made an imagined experience real, but his purpose was the joy in sharing an interesting and lofty story with his audience.

When Professor Bassett reaches his third assumption, that Homer "came at the peak of the early Greek epic, and that his poems superseded all previous epics because they were both more complete and, in all respects, greater poetry," he prepares the way for a discussion of the originality of Homer. His statement that "to limit Homer too strictly to the imaginative material supplied by earlier bards is to deny his supremacy as an epic poet" is typical and significant, and leads to a discussion of the work of Parry, who "denied to Homer any individuality of style whatsoever." "His (Parry's) inferences have greatly increased our understanding of an essential and distinctive feature of Homer's style, namely, its

oral character. But he carried these inferences so far beyond what the evidence seems to justify that his chief thesis awakens the gravest doubt. . . . He established more firmly and more clearly . . . the fundamental difference between the style of Homer and that of later poetry . . . In this, Parry seems . . . to have made one of the most important contributions of recent years to our understanding of Homer's poetry . . . Homer composed solely for oral recitation . . . Parry went much further and held that not only the style but also the language and the ideas of Homer were purely traditional."

It is difficult, if not impossible, twelve years after his death, to determine what Parry would have replied to this. But, as a close student of Parry's work who was privileged to be associated with him in his Yugoslav research, I would venture the following on my own responsibility, with the belief that Parry would have agreed. Death prevented him from ever presenting any of the results of his fifteen months in Yugoslavia. During that time his understanding of a purely oral poetry had increased enormously, and it is only natural to assume that his theories of Homeric style would have been tempered by that increased understanding. Because of the paucity of what has remained to us of early Greek poetry, we shall never be able to determine exactly the points in which Homer shows "originality." To do that we should have to know in detail the tradition in which he was steeped. We should need not two poems, whatever their length, but hundreds, both from the poet of the Homeric poems and from other singers whom he had heard. But we may be able to show from a study of the Yugoslav material, hundreds of poems from many different poets, to what extent an oral poet can be "original." This is clear now, that the oral poet is not interested in "originality" as it is used by literary criticism today. He is interested in singing new songs on occasion, though he loves the old songs best, and the good singer takes pride in a distinctive manner of singing, which, however, he considers more in the light of the perfection of the proper manner than as anything "original." But further discussion of Homer's originality will have to wait until we know more about the epic technique of oral verse-making. The whole question seems to be one of emphasis.

Professor Bassett's final postulate is that "Homer is 'The Poet' because he possessed the 'divine' vision to see the grandeur of human existence, and because . . . he breathed the breath of life into the image which he had made."

The second and the third lectures discuss the manner in which Homer created the "epic illusion." He does this by the creation of three minor illusions: (1) the Illusion of Historicity, (2) the Illusion of Vitality, and (3) the Illusion of Personality. The Muse in Homer does not inspire with a frenzy, but does furnish the facts about the Heroes, and vouches for the historicity of the story. The Illusion of Vitality is concerned with the manifestations of the progressiveness, continuity, and movement of all life as it is represented in Homer, and is related to the categories of time and place. These categories are fluid as applied to the Homeric poems, and one does violence to the poetic art of Homer if one attempts to analyze them too pragmatically. But the most important of the constituents of the

Epic Illusion is the Illusion of Personality. The use of direct speech is the greatest contributor to this Illusion, and to prove that Homer's use of it is not only more extensive but also more dramatic than that of any other epic poet Professor Bassett compares Homer's dialogues with those of Attic tragedy. This comparison with Attic Tragedy is used again in the last chapter of the book when the poet is considered as realist and idealist. Comparing two differing types of composition would seem to be of doubtful value, fascinating as the comparison may be.

Thus far Professor Bassett has been analyzing the creation of the Epic Illusion. With the fourth lecture he turns to the breaking of that illusion. About one-fifth of the poems is impersonal narrative, the account of action objectively presented. The speeches take up three-fifths of the poems, and "the direct personal utterance of the poet, or his interpretation or explanation which the objective narrative cannot give, one-fifth." Throughout the poems are references to the poet's own day. The best examples are found in the similes, where the poet makes use of the present tense and addresses his audience. Description also has the effect of breaking the illusion, and the vignettes of minor heroes contribute to the same cause. All of these interpositions tend to act as a "tonic to the attention" of the audience.

There is much that is of great value in all of this, which I have perforce sketched only briefly. The characteristics are those of oral epic. The oral poet does create these illusions, albeit unconsciously, and he does break them in the manner which Professor Bassett has so eloquently described. But Homer himself would be baffled by the literary terminology. His comment would very likely be the same as that of the Yugoslav singers: "That's the way I heard it, and that's the way I sing it."

Space does not permit a more detailed review of the last four lectures of the book, which deal respectively with "The Poet and His Audience," "The Poet as Singer," "Homer the Poetic Demiurge, Plot and Characters," and "The Poet as Realist and Idealist." Of these, lectures five and six are the most rewarding.

Professor Bassett had gone part of the way toward a reconciliation between the concept of Homer as an oral poet, one composing in an oral tradition and all that that implies, and the concept of Homer as a conscious artist as we use the term today. He went as far as his knowledge of such an oral tradition allowed. He has presented many of the facts, together with much extraneous material, especially in his last two lectures, but the interpretation of those facts seems out of focus. Who knows but that the correcting of the focus may reveal "Homer, the Oral Poet" as a greater figure than even Professor Bassett's "Homer, The Poet"!

ALBERT BATES LORD.

BOSTON, MASS.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under Books RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Alfonsi (Luigi). *Albio Tibullo e gli Autori del "Corpus Tibullianum."* Milan, Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero," 1946. Pp. viii + 101. (*Pubbl. dell' Univ. Cattolica del S. Cuore, Nuova Serie, XIII.*) *American (The) Numismatic Society Museum Notes*, I, 1945. New York, *American Num. Soc.*, 1946. Pp. 106; 23 pls. \$1.50.

Arens (Johannes Cornelis). *De Godenschildering in Ovidius' Metamorphosen.* Nijmegen, *Drukkerij Gebr. Janssen*, 1946. Pp. xii + 192.

Ball (Sister Mary Tarcisia). *Nature and the Vocabulary of Nature in the Works of Saint Cyprian.* Washington, D.C., *Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1946. Pp. xix + 303. (*Patristic Studies, LXXV.*)

Bibliotheca Universitatis Leidensis. *Codices Manuscripti, IV: Codices Perizoniani.* Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1946. Pp. ix + 145; frontispiece.

Bignone (Ettore). *Storia della Letteratura Latina, I: Originalità e Formazione dello Spirito Romano, l'Epica e il Teatro dell' Età della Repubblica; II: La Prosa Romana sino all' Età di Cesare, Lucilio, Lucrezio, Catullo.* Florence, *G. C. Sansoni*, 1945 (II) and 1946 (I, seconda edizione riveduta). Pp. xii + 599; 470.

Bolkestein (Hendrik). *Adversaria Critica et Exegetica ad Plutarchi Quaestitionum Convivalium Librum Primum et Secundum.* Amsterdam, *H. J. Paris*, 1946. Pp. 142.

Bonfante (G.). *Los Elementos Populares en la Lengua de Horacio.* Madrid, *Librería y Casa Editorial Hernando (S. A.)*, 1937. Pp. 146. (Junta para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas centro de Estudios Históricos. *Disertaciones "Emerita," I.*)

Bossert (H. T.) and Qambel (Halet). *Karatepe. A Preliminary Report on a New Hittite Site.* Istanbul, 1946. 7 pp. Turkish text; 7 pp. English text; xvi pp. of plates, Turkish and English captions. (Faculty of Letters of the Univ. of Istanbul: *Publ. of the Institute for Research in Ancient Oriental Civilisations*, I.)

Carpenter (Rhys). *Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, *Univ. of California Press*, 1946. Pp. 198. \$2.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures, XX.*)

Castelin (Karel O.). *The Coinage of Rhesaena in Mesopotamia.* New York, *American Numismatic Society*, 1946. Pp. 111; 17 pls.; 3 figs. \$2.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, 108.)

Christopher (Rev. Joseph P.). *St. Augustine. The First Catechetical Instruction [De Catechizandis Rudibus]. Translated and Annotated.* Westminster, Md., *Newman Bookshop*, 1946. Pp. 171. \$2.50. (*Ancient Christian Writers. The Works of the Fathers in Translation, II.*)

Daniëls (G. C. J.). *Religieus-Historische Studie over Herodotus.* Antwerp and Nijmegen, 1946. Pp. 202. (*Historische Bibliotheek van Godsdienstwetenschappen*)

David (M.) and van Groningen (B. A.). *Papyrological Primer.* Second (English) Edition. Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1946. Pp. ix + 40\* + 167; 2 maps; 6 facsimiles.

den Boer (W.). *De Allegorese in het werk van Clemens Alexandrinus.* Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1940. Pp. 163. 3.15 guilders. (*Dissertationes Inaugurales Batavae ad Res Antiquas Pertinentes*, I.)

Dorjahn (Alfred P.). *Political Forgiveness in Old Athens. The Amnesty of 403 B.C.* Evanston, *Northwestern Univ.*, 1946. Pp. 56. (*Northwestern Univ. Stud. in the Humanities*, XIII.)

Emeneau (M. B.). *Kota Texts, Part Two.* *Univ. of California Publ. in Linguistics*, II, 2 (1946), pp. 193-390.

Enk (P. J.). Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber I (Monobiblos), eum prolegomenis, conspectu librorum et commentationum ad IV libros Propertii pertinentium, notis criticis, commentario exegetico. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1946. Pars prior prolegomina et textum continens, pp. xii + 162; pars altera commentarium continens, pp. 210. 11 guilders.

Festugière (A.-J.). Épicure et ses dieux. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1946. Pp. xv + 135.

Grant (Michael). From *Imperium to Auctoritas. A Historical Study of Aes Coinage in the Roman Empire* 49 B.C.-A.D. 14. Cambridge, University Press; New York, Macmillan Co., 1946. Pp. xvii + 510; 12 pls.; key to monograms and ligatures.

Groag (E.). Die Reichsbeamten von Achaea in Spätrömischer Zeit. Budapest, Institut für Münzkunde und Archäologie der P. Pázmány-Universität, 1946. Pp. 92. (*Dissertationes Pannonicae*, Ser. I, No. 14.)

Herrick (Marvin T.). The Fusion of Horatian and Aristotelian Literary Criticism, 1531-1555. Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1946. Pp. 117. \$1.50. (*Illinois Stud. in Language and Literature*, XXXII, No. 1.)

Herzfeld (Ernst). Zoroaster and his World. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1947. Pp. xvii + 851 (in two volumes). \$25.00.

Howald (Ernst). Der Dichter der Ilias. Erlenbach-Zürich, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1946. Pp. 181. 9.80 fr. bound; 8.00 fr. geheftet.

Hutton (James). The Greek Anthology in France and in the Latin Writers of the Netherlands to the Year 1800. Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. xi + 822. \$5.00. (*Cornell Stud. in Class. Philology*, XXVIII.)

Jones (Leslie Webber). Cassiodorus Senator. An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. xvii + 233. \$3.00. (*Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies*, XL.)

Keeler (Laura). Geoffrey of Monmouth and the Late Latin Chroniclers 1300-1500. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1946. Pp. viii + 152. (*Univ. of California Publ. in English*, XVII, 1.)

Kerényi (Karl). Prometheus. Das Griechische Mythologem von der Menschlichen Existenz. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1946. Pp. 82; frontispiece. 6 fr. (*Aliae Vigiliae*, N. F., IV.)

Knudtzon (Erik J.). Bakchiastexte und andere Papyri der Lunder Papyrussammlung (P. Lund. Univ. Bibl. 4). With Commentary. Lund, Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1946. Pp. 139; 8 pls.; genealogical chart. (Lund Diss.)

Lattimore (Richmond), translator. The Odes of Pindar. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. xii + 170. \$2.75.

Metzger (Bruce M.). Lexical Aids for Students of New Testament Greek. Princeton, privately printed, 1946. Pp. viii + 110. \$1.00.

Most (Rev. William G.). The Syntax of the Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae. Washington, D. C., Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1946. Pp. xxv + 356. (*Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature*, XX.)

Weller (Hermann). Templum Divini Spiritus, Carmen in certamine poetico Hoeufftiano præmio aureo ornatum. Amsterdam, Academia Disciplinarum Nederlandica, 1941. Pp. 16.

Weller (Hermann). Dismas, Carmen in certamine poetico Hoeufftiano præmio aureo ornatum. Amsterdam, Academia Disciplinarum Nederlandica, 1942. Pp. 17.

Wilkinson (L. P.). Horace and his Lyric Poetry. Cambridge, University Press, 1945. Pp. ix + 185. \$2.75.